ter insisting that the true and logical course was that of the Treaty, namely, to take up a case, to examine the facts, and to discuss and apply the law to the facts thus ascertained, as proposed by Mr. Stampfli.

Finally it was concluded, on the proposition of Count Sclopis, to follow substantially the programme of Mr. Stampfli, that is, to take up the inculpated vessels, seriatim, each Arbitrator to express an opinion. in writing thereon, of such tenor as he should see fit, but these opinions to be provisional only for the present, and not to conclude the Arbitrator, or to prevent his modifying such opinion, on arriving at the point of participation in the final decision of the Tribunal.

On the 16th, consideration of the programme of Mr. Stampfli was resumed. It consisted of the fol lowing heads, which deserve to be set forth here, in order to show how thoroughly the subject had been examined and digested by Mr. Stampfli.

"(A.) Indications générales :

1. Question à decider.

2. Délimitation des faits.

3. Principes généraux.

(B.) Décision relative à chacun des croiseurs.
Observations préliminaires :

1. Le Sumter.

(a) Faits.

(b) Considérants.

(c) Jugement."

[Follow the names of the other vessels, with similar sub-division of heads of inquiry.]

"(C.) Détermination du Tribunal d'adjuger une somme en bloc. (D.) Examen des éléments pour fixer une somme en bloc. (E.) Conclusion et adjudication définitive d'une somme en bloc."

The completeness and exactness of this programme are self-evident; and by these qualities it really imposed itself on the Tribunal, in spite of all objection, and of occasional temporary departures into other lines of thought. There will be occasion hereafter to remark on the precision and concision of the opinions of Mr. Stampfli.

SIR ALEXANDER COCKBURN'S CALL FOR REARGUMENT.

Sir Alexander Cockburn then renewed his proposition for a preliminary argument by Counsel, setting forth analytically the various objects of inquiry involved in the claims of the United States, and concluding as follows:

That, looking to the difficulty of these questions, and the conflict of opinion which has arisen among distinguished jurists on the present contest, as well as to their vast importance in the decision of the Tribunal on the matters in dispute, it is the duty, as it must be presumed to be the wish, of the Arbitrators, in the interests of justice, to obtain all the assistance in their power to enable them to arrive at a just and correct conclusion. That they ought, therefore, to call for the assistance of the eminent counsel who are in attendance on the Tribunal to assist them with their reasoning and learning, so that arguments scattered over a mass of documents may be presented in a concentrated and appreciable form, and the Tribunal may thus have the advantage of all the light which can be thrown on so intricate and difficult a matter, and that its proceedings may hereafter appear to the world to have been characterized by the patience, the deliberation, and anxious desire for information on all the points involved in its decision, without which it is impossible that justice can be duly or satisfactorily done."

"To obtain all the assistance in their power to en

able them to arrive at a just and correct conclusion," --"to call for the assistance of the eminent counsel who are in attendance on the Tribunal to assist them with their reasoning and learning."

Analyzing the proposition, and omitting the introductory and concluding phrases of more or less irrelevant and diffuse appeal to extraneous considerations, the essence of the proposition is to call on Counsel to assist the Tribunal, "so that arguments scattered over a mass of documents may be presented in a concentrated and appreciable form."

Now, passing over the looseness and inaccuracy of expression in this statement, it plainly is incorrect in substance. The considerations of law or fact neces

sary for the instruction of the Tribunal are not “scattered over a mass of documents;" they are "presented in a concentrated . . . form" [we do not say appreciable, because that is not a quality intelligible as ap plied to form] in the three arguments of each of the Governments, that is to say, "Cases," "CounterCases," and "Arguments." The proposition betrays singular confusion of mind on the part of a nisi prius lawyer and judge. The subjects or elements of ar gument are, it is true, "scattered over a mass of doc uments;" but it is quite absurd to apply this phrase to the Arguments themselves, in which the two Governments had each labored, we may suppose, to exhibit their views of the law and the facts in a manner to be readily comprehended and appreciated by the Tribunal. In the Arguments proper, filed on the 15th of June, each Agent had, as the Treaty requires,

delivered "to each of the said Arbitrators and to the Agent of the other party a written or printed argument showing the points and referring to the evi dence on which his Government relies." These "Arguments" were freshly in the possession of the Arbitrators. To call on Counsel, for the reason assigned, to reargue the matters therein argued, was just as unreasonable as it would be for a judge presiding at a hearing in common law, equity, or admiralty, to call on the counsel, who have just finished their ar guments, to do something for the "assistance" of the Court,—it would be difficult to see what,-to the end "that arguments scattered over a mass of documents may be presented in a concentrated and appreciable form.' And if in this case such arguments had been filed in print, it would be natural for counsel to say that they had just done the thing required of them, as the Court would perceive if it would please to read those arguments: which, in the present case, it would seem, Sir Alexander had neglected to do; and, instead of doing it, he had got bewildered by plung ing unpreparedly into the "mass of documents" filed by the two Governments.

After discussion, the Tribunal decided to proceed with the case of the Florida, according to the programme of Mr. Stampfli, that is, in effect, overruling the motion of Sir Alexander Cockburn.

The Tribunal, it would seem, could not perceive the advantage of discussing speculative general questions, as in a moot court; and, more especially, questions of law, which had already been discussed abun

H

dantly in the appropriate place and time, that is, in the successive Cases and Arguments of the two Gov.

ernments.

CASE OF THE “FLORIDA” DECIDED.

The Arbitrators then met on the 17th, and proceeded to take up the case of the Florida.

On motion of Sir Alexander Cockburn, it was or dered by the Tribunal that the provisional opinions or statements to be read by the Arbitrators should be printed, and distributed to the Arbitrators and to the Agents and Counsel of the two Governments.

Mr. Stampfli's opinion or statement had been read already, and was in print.

After some incidental discussion among the Arbitrators, Sir A. Cockburn began the reading of his opinion on the case of the Florida.

The Tribunal met again on the 19th, and Sir Alexander Cockburn proceeded to read another portion of his opinion in the case of the Florida.

Then, after some debate, caused by irregularities of speech or conduct on the part of Sir Alexander, Mr. Adams proceeded to read the commencement of his opinion in the matter of the Florida.

On the 22d, the case of the Florida was concluded. Sir Alexander Cockburn and Mr. Adams completed the reading of their opinions, and the Baron d'Itajubá and Count Sclopis both read theirs. The result was to convict Great Britain of culpable want of due diligence in the matter of the Florida by the concurrent provisional opinions of four of the Arbitra