of such rewards is to encourage the citizenry in the exercise of their duties as citizens for which no other compensation is paid; it is not intended as a bonus to public servants for performing their duties. The Committee has also retained the provision contained in 18 U.S.C. 3059 providing for payments of all or part of the reward even if the person being apprehended is killed during the arrest. The purpose of the reward may well be fully accomplished by the providing of information that led to the attempted arrest. The Committee has also authorized various investigatory agencies to offer rewards for services and information that assist in the detection or investigation of an offense or in the apprehension of an offender. The rewards to be offered by those agencies will be much smaller in size and will generally be in the form of payments to regular underworld informants, contacts, and the like. Such expenditures are a necessary and important method of conducting an efficient program of law enforcement. Such payments, both in size, frequency, and purpose, are totally distinct from the rewards that can be offered and paid under section 3131. 2 Subchapter B of chapter 30. CHAPTER 32.-RENDITION AND EXTRADITION Chapter 32 consists of two subchapters. The first subchapter concerns rendition of fugitives, and it essentially reenacts current law. The second subchapter sets forth the procedure applicable in extradition cases. The laws pertaining to extradition are substantially changed in an effort to streamline and clarify extradition procedure. 1. In General SUBCHAPTER A.-RENDITION (Sections 3201-3203) This subchapter deals with the subject of rendition-covering the obtaining of custody for trial of a person incarcerated by a different jurisdiction and the arrest and return of a fugitive: Section 3201 reenacts the provisions of Public Law 91-538, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, with certain modifications which will be highlighted. Section 3202 reenacts the basic existing Federal law on the procedure for returning a fugitive from the State where he is found to the State from which he fled. Section 3203 brings forward definitional material and certain general provisions. 2. Present Federal Law The Interstate Agreement on Detainers is designed to facilitate the securing of defendants incarcerated in other jurisdictions for purposes of prosecution. It also enables defendants incarcerated in one jurisdiction to compel prompt disposition of charges pending against them in other jurisdictions. Advance Congressional consent was given. the States to enter into this type of agreement by the Act of June 6, 1934. The purpose of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, when enacted by Congress in 1970, was to make the United States and the District of Columbia parties to the Agreement which then included more than 20 states as parties.2 At the present time almost 40 States have become parties to the Agreement. This subchapter reasserts the commitment of the Congress to the purposes of the Agreement. SECTION 3201. INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS A number of significant changes have been made in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. First, the Agreement now provides 14 U.S.C. 112(a), 44 Stat. 909. 2 H. Rept. No. 91-1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. Rept. No. 91-1356, 91st Cong., 2d. Sess. (1970). Section 3202. that upon rendition to a receiving State at the instance of the defendant all pending charges in that jurisdiction must be disposed of. The amendments to this Article made by section 3201 make it clear that, with respect to charges made by the United States, only charges pending within the receiving judicial district are intended to be covered. Currently, the Agreement is subject to the unintended interpretation that all Federal charges must be disposed of irrespective of the district in which they are pending. Second, Article IV of the Agreement presently provides that the Governor of the State in which the prisoner is incarcerated has 30 days in which affirmatively to refuse to deliver the prisoner.* In the case of the United States, the power is vested in the Attorney General, and, in the case of the District of Columbia, the Mayor of the District. Section 3201, by omission of this provision, would deprive the State Governors of such power vis-a-vis the United States and the District of Columbia, and surrenders the power of the Attorney General and the Mayor of the District to block turnovers of prisoners to the States. The change in Article IV is made to avoid the 30-day waiting period and to eliminate the veto power vested in the executive official. The Committee does not believe that there is any reason to make a prosecutor's request to provide a speedy trial subject to denial by the executive official-a denial that is within his absolute discretion. SECTION 3202. RENDITION OF A FUGITIVE Section 3202 reenacts without significant change the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 3182. This section sets forth the measures to be taken by one state in demanding the delivery of a fugitive from justice from another State and the obligations of the State in which the fugitive is found upon the receipt of such a demand. The Constitution provides that: "A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime." This provision has been held not to be self-executing and accordingly requires legislation in the form presently enacted as 18 U.S.C. 3182 and carried forward by section 3202. Prototype legislation has been held constitutionally valid. Rendition to or from territories of the United States has been held valid under this section although the Constitution is silent on that matter. As a prerequisite to rendition, it must be shown that probable cause has been established, in a court of the demanding State, to believe that the fugitive committed a crime.8 Section 3202 uses the term "crime" instead of the phrase "treason, felony, or other crime" which appears in 18 U.S.C. 3182 and which is taken from the Constitution. The term "crime" as defined in section 111 is broad enough to cover the reach of existing law. As defined, the term "crime" includes a misdemeanor. The current statute has been held applicable to misdemeanors, even those punishable only 3 Art. III(d). 4 Art. IV (a). 5 Art. IV, section 2, clause 2. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80 (1885). 9 7 Cutting v. Geer, 135 Colo. 503. 313 P.2d 314 (1957). 8 See Kirkland v. Preston, 385 F. 2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Ex parte Reggel, 114 U.S. 642 (1885). Section 3203. by a fine.10 The Committee believes that this interpretation should be continued, and using the term "crime" reaches that result. The general definition of "state" in section 111 also includes territories and districts, thereby eliminating the necessity of specifying them as does 18 U.S.C. 3182. The last sentence of section 3202, concerning the transportation of a fugitive by the agent of the demanding State, reenacts 18 U.S.C. 3194. SECTION 3203. GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR SUBCHAPTER A This section carries forward the definitions and general provisions applicable to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers from current law. It should be noted that the right to amend the Agreement, which is set forth in subsection (c), exists under current law. 1. In General SUBCHAPTER B. EXTRADITION (Section 3211-3217) Extradition is the term used in international law to express the means by which a fugitive wanted in one jurisdiction is returned to another.' Extradition, as used in this subchapter, refers exclusively to the surrender of fugitives by the United States to sovereign foreign countries and by foreign countries to the United States. This legislation, as does current law, relates primarily to requests made to the United States by foreign governments. The basic purpose of entering into an extradition treaty is to foreclose the possible use of a country's border as a refuge from prosecution or punishment. Toward that end, it has been the policy of this country to interpret liberally the provisions of extradition treaties so that a fugitive may be surrendered as soon as practical. Fugitives from other countries found in this country are afforded a hearing to determine whether or not they are extraditable. Such hearing is probably most analagous to a preliminary hearing in a criminal proceeding. Nevertheless, it has been clearly understood that an extradition hearing is neither a criminal nor a civil proceeding.* The basic requirements for the extradition of a fugitive, as well as any basis for a bar to his surrender, are set forth in the specific applicable treaty. Under present law, the procedure by which extradition from the United States to a foreign country is accomplished is provided generally by chapter 209, of title 18.5 10 Morton v. Skinner, 48 Ind. 123 (1874). 16 Whiteman, Digest of International Law, p. 727. 2 Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933); Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936); Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371 (1901). 3 18 U.S.C. 3184. Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457 (1888): United States ex rel. Oppenheim v. Hecht, 16 F. 2d 955 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 273 U.S. 769 (1927). 518 U.S.C. 3181-3195. The Committee has concluded that present law concerning extradition is in need of modernization and updating, and therefore the provisions pertaining to extradition have been substantially rewritten. These statutes will clearly designate the procedures that are required for an extradition, the events which must occur prior to surrender, and the time limitations under which all parties are required to act. It will, of course, remain essential for all parties to an extradition proceeding to act pursuant to the applicable treaties on extradition. 2. Present Federal Law The present extradition law is located in 18 U.S.C. 3181-3195. The reasons why the present statutes concerning extradition are in need of modernization and updating are varied. In some cases the existing statutes are obsolete. For example, today there is no need for provisions similar to those found in 18 U.S.C. 3189 (dealing with the actual physical location of an extradition hearing) and 3191 (dealing with witnesses for indigent fugitives), and thus these provisions have been eliminated. As to the other provisions, it should be noted that at the time they were enacted a serious problem of fugitives fleeing from other countries to the United States did not exist. Today, in view of the development of the airplane and other modes of high speed transportation, the United States is much more accessible to these fugitives and it is necessary to streamline our extradition procedures so as not to become a haven for such fugitives. In addition, at the time the present extradition laws were enacted, foreign countries seeking the extradition of fugitives were, for the most part, represented by private attorneys and not by the Department of Justice. Today, however, the Department represents the foreign country seeking extradition in the vast number of extradition cases and the extradition laws need to reflect this change in policy so as to facilitate the Justice Department's handling of extradition cases.` Finally, between the time the current extradition laws were enacted and the present time, the United States has entered into many extradition treaties which have set forth different procedures to be followed in extradition cases. To avoid confusion it is important that our extradition statutes conform to the procedures set forth in these treaties. Where pertinent, the current law provisions will be outlined in the discussion of the various sections of this subchapter. SECTION 3211. SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF EXTRADITION PROVISIONS This section sets forth the scope and limitations of this subchapter. Subsection (a) confirms an accepted principle of international law that extradition is only to be pursuant to a treaty or convention. Absent such treaty or convention a nation has no legal duty or obligation to surrender a fugitive from justice, although it may choose to do so as an exercise of comity.9 Subsection (b) which is based upon current 18 U.S.C. 3181, changes the language of that section so as to include, in addition to treaties, Many of the existing statutes date back to the nineteenth century. Factor v. Laubenheimer, supra note 2. 8 Ibid. E.g., Fioccori v. Attorney General, 462 F. 2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972). |