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SECTION X.

ACCEPTANCE.

BRITISH LAWS.

An acceptance is an engagement to pay the bill when due (a). The acceptance of both inland and foreign bills must be in writing on the bill, and signed by the acceptor, or some person authorised by him (b). The drawee is not bound to accept a bill drawn upon him, unless he has contracted an express or implied obligation to that effect, in which case he would only be liable to the drawer for the refusal of acceptance (c). In no case, however, can a person contract any liability on a bill or note, except by his signature on the same.

Acceptance

must be in writing.

termanding the authority

to accept.

Where the drawer dies before the bill is accepted, the autho- Death counrity to accept is held to be countermanded, and the acceptance should be refused, inasmuch as the drawing does not operate as an assignment of the funds in the hands of the drawee (d). Where the drawee is found to be an infant, or a married woman, the holder may refuse his or her acceptance, and has a right to treat the bill as dishonoured.

No person can be the acceptor of the bill of exchange except the drawee of the bill, or some one who accepts it for the honour of the drawer, as provided by the expression "in case of need at Messrs." &c. (e). The bill must be accepted by the drawee himself, or by some person duly authorised by him, though the holder may refuse the acceptance by an agent (ƒ). The acceptance per procuration is in fact a notice to the holder that the party so accepting acts under an authority from his principal, and imposes upon the holder the duty of ascertaining that the party so accepting is acting within the terms of such authority (g).

Infancy of drawee a just ground for re

fusal of acceptance. Who may be the acceptor.

Where a bill is drawn on two or more persons partners in Bills draw

(a) Russell v. Phillips, 14 Q. B. 891; Clarke v. Cock, 4 East, 72.

(b) 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 6.
(c) Smith v. Brown, 6 Taunt. 446;
Laing v. Barclay, B. & C. 398.

(d) Gibson v. Minet, 1 H. Bl. 586.
(e) Polhill v. Walters, 3 B. & Ad.

114.

(f) 19 & 20 Viet. c. 97, s. 6.

(g) Alexander v. Mackenzie, 6 C. B.
766; Attwood v. Munnings, 7 B. & C.
283; Owen v. Van Uster, 10 C. B.
318;
Nichols v. Diamond, 9 Exch.
154; Davidson v. Stanley, 2 M. & G.
721; Mare v. Charles, 5 B. & E. 978;
Coore v. Callaway, 1 Esp. 116; Rich-
ards v. Barton, 1 Esp. 269.

upon partne

or upon seve

ral parties not partners.

Acceptance

time.

trade, the acceptance of one is the acceptance of all. But if the drawees are not partners, the bill must be accepted by all the drawees; and if one of them only accepts, the bill should be protested, unless the one who accepted acted as the special agent of the others (a).

The drawee must accept the bill in a reasonable time within must be given in a reasonable twenty-four hours after presentation, and if he does not accept it within that time, the holder may treat it as dishonoured (). A bill may be accepted, even before it is drawn, by signing a blank bill duly stamped, and delivering the same to another for the purpose of filling it up and using it, the acceptor rendering himself in this case liable for any sum the party may have written upon it which is covered by the stamp (c). A bill may also be accepted after it has become due, and the effect of such an acceptance is to render the bill payable on demand (d).

Acceptance may be absolute or condi

tional.

Place of payment.

An acceptance may be absolute or conditional, qualified or partial, but the holder may refuse to take a conditional or qualified acceptance varying from the tenor of the bill; and if he takes it, he discharges all the parties in the bill. Where the acceptor gives a conditional acceptance contingent on the fulfilment of a certain condition, as, for example, payable on giving up a bill of lading, it is binding on the holder of the bill, upon presenting it for payment, to give up the bill of lading (e).

Where a bill is accepted payable at the house of a banker or other place, without further expression, it is deemed a general and unqualified acceptance; but where the acceptor expresses in his acceptance that he accepts the bill payable at a banker's house or other place only, and not otherwise, or elsewhere, such acceptance is deemed a qualified acceptance, and the acceptor would be discharged by the non-presentation of the bill at such a place (ƒ).

By the acceptance the drawee becomes primarily liable to pay the bill, and the drawer and indorsers are only collaterally liable on his default (g).

(a) Jenkins v. Morris, 16 M. & W. 877.

(b) Ingram v. Forster, 2 Smith, 243, 244.

(c) Montague v. Perkins, 17 Jur. 557; Temple v. Pullen, 4 Exch. 389; Armfield v. Allport, 27 L. J. Exch. 42.

(d) Wynne v. Raikes, 5 East, 514; Billing v. Devaux, 3 M. & G. 565.

(e) Smith v. Vertue, 30 L. J. C. P. 56 (N. S.).

(f) 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 78, s. 1; Sebag v. Abitbol, 4 M. & S. 462; Turner r. Hayden, 4 B. & C. 1.

(g) Heylyn v. Adamson, 2 Burr. 674; Dingwall v. Dunster, Doug. 249; Smith v. Knox, 3 Esp. 47; Philpot . Bryant, 4 Bing. 720.

drawee in case

value.

So long as the bill is in the hands of the drawer or payee, Right of the the acceptor may resist the payment of the bill, if he has of want of accepted without value or for accommodation; but if it has passed to a third person, who has given value for it, the plea of want of consideration will fail (a). And the fact that such bond fide holder for value knew that the bill was accepted for the accommodation of the drawer or payee is not a sufficient answer by the acceptor to an action by the holder (b).

Nothing will discharge the acceptor but payment or release. But a release in a composition deed would not cover a bill or note which the creditor had previously indorsed for value (c). A release of one of two or more joint acceptors would operate as a release to all (d), but mere forbearance or omission to demand time would not be a discharge to the other (e).

What will dis

charge the acceptor.

ance and its

Upon the refusal of the drawee to accept, or upon his offer to Non-acceptaccept the bill in a qualified manner, it is the duty of the holder, consequences. within a reasonable time, to give notice of non-acceptance to Notice. the drawer or indorser against whom he intends to resort (ƒ). Even where the bill did not require to be presented for acceptance, if it be presented and dishonoured, due notice must be given (g).

cuse notice.

Death, bankruptcy, or known insolvency of the party to What will exwhom notice should be given, are no excuses for want of notice of non-acceptance (). Where, however, the drawer or indorser has absconded, or is in prison, or where there are insuperable

(a) Southall v. Rigg, 11 C. B. 481; Kearns v. Durell, 6 C. B. 596; Sparrow r. Chisman, 9 B. & C. 241; Charles v. Marsden, 1 Taunt. 224; Stein v. Yglesias, 1 C. M. & R. 565.

(b) Smith v. Knox, 3 Esp. 46; Fentum v. Pocock, 5 Taunt. 192; Jewell v. Parr, 13 C. B. 909; Parr v. Jewell, 16 C. B. 684; Lazarus v. Cowie, 3 Q. B. 459; Pooley v. Harradine, 7 E. & B. 431; Rayner v. Pussey, 28 L. J. Exch. 132.

(c) Margetson v. Aitkin, 3 E. & B. 338; Harrhy v. Wall, 1 B. & Ald. 103; Cranley v. Hillary, 2 M. & S. 120.

(d) Nicholson v. Revill, 4 A. & E. 675.

(e) Perfect v. Musgrave, 3 Price, 111; Price v. Edmunds, 10 B. & C. 578; Wright v. Simpson, 6 Ves. 774; Strong

v. Foster, 17 C. B. 201.

(f) Turner v. Leach, 4 B. & Ald.
451; Roscow v. Hardy, 12 East, 434.
The object of such a notice is not
merely to enable the drawer to with-
draw his effects from the hands of the
drawee, but to provide for payment of
the bill thus suddenly cast upon him-
self, and to make prompt arrangements
suited in this unexpected emergency.
Rucker v. Hiller, 3 Camp. 118; Tin-
dal v. Brown, 1 T. R. 167; Darbishire
v. Parker, 5 East, 2.

(g) Roscow v. Hardy, 2 Camp. 458.
(h) Russell v. Langstaff, Doug. 514;
Esdaile v. Sowerby, 11 East, 114; Ex
parte Johnson, 1 Mont. & Ayrt. 622;
Ex parte Bignold, 2 Mont. & Ayrt.
633.

Foreign bills must be protested.

Time when the

be sent.

obstacles to the sending of such notice, as a sudden illness or death of the holder, or a war, then the want of immediate notice may be excused, and the same may be sent as early as possible (a). The sending of notice of non-acceptance is also excused when the day happens to be a festival day, as Christmas Day or Good Friday, or other fast-day appointed by the State, or where the holder is prohibited by his religious duties from attending to business (b). Notice of dishonour to the drawer is not necessary where he had no effects in the hands of the drawee, and he had no right to expect that the bill would be accepted.

On the non-acceptance of a foreign bill the holder must, besides giving notice, protest the bill in the usual legal manner by means of a notary, and the protest should be made at the place where the acceptance should have been given; or if the bill was drawn to a place, and payable at another, at either of those places (c). The protest should be made on the day when the acceptance is refused, and within business hours (d). But it is not requisite for the holder to protest any inland bill for nonacceptance in order to preserve his rights against the drawer and previous indorsers (e).

The notice must be sent within reasonable time after the

notice should acceptance is refused, the holder being required to use diligence in communicating the fact to the party against whom he means to resort (f). Where the parties are in the same town, each party should have a day to give notice, and it is sufficient if the notice be sent so as to be received the day following that of the dishonour, or following that on which he receives intelligence of such dishonour (g). Where the parties are at a distance, the notice should be sent not later than by the mail of the following day; or if there be no mail on that day, the mail of the subsequent day (h).

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(e) Windle v. Andrews, 2 B. & Ald. 696.

(f) Tindal v. Brown, 1 T. R. 168; Rowe v. Tipper, 13 C. B. 256.

(g) Scott v. Lifford, 9 East, 347; Smith v. Mullett, 2 Camp. 208; Rowe v. Tipper, 13 C. B. 255.

(h) Geill v. Jeremy, M. & M. 61; Hawkes v. Salter, 4 Bing. 715; Bray v. Hadwen, 5 M. & S. 68; Wright . Shad cross, 2 B. & Ald. 501.

The notice should be sent simultaneously to all the parties on whom the holder intends to resort, and in order to charge an earlier party to a bill by notice of dishonour from himself, the holder must send him the notice as promptly as if to his own immediate indorser (a). The notice must be sent by the holder or his agent, or by any party on the bill except the drawee, and the notice by one enures in favour of all (b). Notice should be given to all the parties liable on the bill, if the holder intends resorting against them all. If the holder gives notice to his immediate indorser only, his power of recourse is then restricted to him (c). Any one of the parties in the bill may, by his conduct, dispense the holder from the necessity of giving notice of non-acceptance (d).

Upon the non-acceptance of the bill, the holder acquires a right of immediate payment from the parties liable to him; and he has a right to recover the principal sum, damages, and interest (e).

To whom and by whom the notice should

be sent.

An acceptance suprà protest, or after the bill has been Acceptance protested for non-acceptance by the drawee, or an acceptance for suprà protest. honour, is held not as an absolute, but as a conditional accept

ance, the acceptor engaging to pay the bill, if it be not paid by
the drawee himself. After refusal by the drawee to accept the
bill, any person may accept it for the honour either of the
drawer, or of any of the indorsers, the holder being at liberty to
receive or to refuse such an acceptance.
But the acceptor
suprà protest is liable to pay the bill only where the same on
its becoming due has again been presented to the drawee for
payment, and was duly protested for non-payment. After the
second presentment and protest for non-payment the bill must
be again presented to the acceptor suprà protest not later than
the day after the bill has become due, and if the acceptor suprà
protest, or for honour, resides in any town or place other than
the place where the bill was made payable, the holder must
forward such bill the day after it became due. When the
acceptor suprà protest pays the bill suprà protest, he must

(a) Rowe v. Tipper, 10 C. B. 256. (b) Newen v. Gill, 8 C. & P. 367; Chapman v. Keane, 3 Ad. & E. 193; Harrison v. Roscoe, 15 M. & W. 231; Lysaght v. Bryant, 9 C. B. 46.

(c) Rowe v. Tipper, 10 C. B. 249.

(d) Phipson v. Knoller, 4 Camp. 185.

(e) Ballingall v. Gloster, 3 East, 481; Bishop v. Young, 9 B. & P. 83; Pollard v. Herries, 3 B. & P. 335; De Tastet v. Baring, 11 East, 265.

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