On the day of the fire, September 13, 1893, from twenty-five to thirty barrels of oil and oil barrels were upon the platform. Some were nearly or quite empty, some were partly full, but most of them were probably full or nearly full. The only evidence to show how the fire originated tended to prove that one Casserly, a teamster, brought a load of boots to be shipped upon a car which was standing upon the track on the rear side of the platform; that he was smoking a pipe; that he stepped into the car to wait for the defendant's foreman of the yard, who was to help him to unload the boots; that in stepping in he stubbed his toe and knocked some of the ashes and tobacco out of his pipe; that he relighted the pipe with a match, and threw the match down; and that at this time he was standing in the door of the car, facing the platform. It must be assumed, upon the evidence, that the fire caught upon the ground underneath the platform from the match thrown down by Casserly. All efforts to extinguish the fire failed; it spread fast and was almost immediately upon the top of the platform, running up a post according to one of the witnesses, and very soon it reached the barrels of oil, which began to explode, and the fire communicated to the plaintiff's buildings, and they were burned. There was evidence tending to show that all of the oil had been upon the platform for a longer time than forty-eight hours. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the platform was never to his knowledge empty of oil and oil barrels, it was completely saturated with oil, and that general condition of things, so far as the platform was concerned, had existed for eight years, ever since he himself had been there. Upon the evidence introduced by the plaintiff, the Court directed a verdict for the defendant. 1. The plaintiff in substance contends before us that the defendant was negligent in storing oil upon the platform. . . . In our view this becomes the important and decisive question of the case: Whether, assuming that the defendant was thus in fault, the plaintiff introduced any evidence which would warrant a finding by the jury that the damage to his property was a consequence for which the defendant is responsible; or, in other words, whether the act of Casserly in starting the fire was such a consequence of the defendant's original wrong in allowing the oil to remain upon the platform that the defendant is responsible to the plaintiff for it. . . . The rule is very often stated that in law the proximate and not the remote cause is to be regarded; and in applying this rule it is sometimes said that the law will not look back from the injurious consequence beyond the last sufficient cause, and especially that where an intelligent and responsible human being has intervened between the original and the resulting damage, the law will not look back beyond him. This ground of exonerating an original wrongdoer may be found discussed or suggested in the following decisions and text-books, amongst others. ... It cannot, however, be considered that in all cases the intervention even of a responsible and intelligent human being will absolutely exonerate a preceding wrongdoer. Many instances to the contrary have occurred, and these are usually cases where it has been found that it was the duty of the original wrongdoer to anticipate and provide against such intervention, because such intervention was a thing likely to happen in the ordinary course of events. Such was the case of Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136, where it was found by the jury that the meddling of young boys with a loaded truck left in a public street was an act which the defendants ought to have apprehended and provided against, and the verdict for the plaintiffs was allowed to stand. . . . According to this statement of the law, the questions in the present case are, was the starting of the fire by Casserly the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's negligent act in leaving the oil upon the platform? According to the usual experience of mankind, ought this result to have been apprehended? The question is not whether it was a possible consequence, but whether it was probable, that is, likely to occur, according to the usual experience of mankind. That this is the true test of responsibility applicable to a case like this has been held in very many cases, according to which a wrongdoer is not responsible for a consequence which is merely possible, according to occasional experience, but only for a consequence which is probable, according to ordinary and usual experience. There may not always have been entire consistency in the application of this doctrine; but, in addition to cases of boys meddling with things left in a public street, Courts have also held it competent for a jury to find that the injury was probable, although brought about by a new agency, when heavy articles left near an opening in the floor of an unfinished building, or in the deck of a vessel, were accidentally jostled so that they fell upon the persons below; McCauley v. Norcross, 155 Mass. 584; The Joseph B. Thomas, 81 Fed. Rep. 578; when sheep allowed to escape from a pasture and stray away in a region frequented by bears, were killed by bears; Gilman v. Noyes, 57 N. H. 627; and when a candle or match was lighted by a person in search of a gas leak, with a view to stop the escape of gas; Koelsch v. Philadelphia Co., 152 Penn. St. 355; and in other cases not necessary to be specially referred to. In all of these cases, the real ground of decision has been that the result was or might be found to be probable, according to common experience. Without dwelling upon other authorities in detail we will mention some of those in which substantially this view of the law has been stated. . . . The rule exempting a slanderer from damages caused by a repetition of his words rests on the same ground. Hastings . Stetson, 126 Mass. 329; Shurtleff v. Parker, 130 Mass. 293; Elmer v. Fessenden, 151 Mass. 359. Tried by this test, the defendant is not responsible for the consequences of Casserly's act. . . . 2. The plaintiff, however, contends that this question should have been submitted to the jury. This course would have been necessary, if material facts had been in dispute. But where upon all the evidence the Court is able to see that the resulting injury was not probable, but remote, the plaintiff fails to make out his case, and the Court should so rule the same as in cases where there is no sufficient proof of negligence. McDonald v. Snelling, 14 Allen, 290, 299. In Hobbs v. London & Southwestern Railway, L. R. 10 Q. B. 111, 122, Blackburn, J., said: "I do not think that the question of remoteness ought ever to be left to a jury; that would be in effect to say that there shall be no such rule as to damages being too remote." It is common practice to withdraw cases from the jury on the ground that the damages are too remote. . . 3. The fact, if established, that the defendant's platform with the oil upon it constituted a public nuisance [by violating a statute], is immaterial, under the circumstances of the present case. . . . Illegality on the part of a defendant does not of itself create a liability for remote consequences, and illegality on the part of a plaintiff does not of itself defeat his right to recover damages. The causal connection between the two still remains to be established. Exceptions overruled. ... KNOWLTON, J. I agree to nearly all of the propositions of law in the opinion of the majority, but I do not agree that the case presents no question of fact for the consideration of a jury. It seems to me that the principal question is whether there was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant in reference to the risk of such an accident as happened. I think that there was such evidence. To say nothing of the particulars testified to, the fact that one is acting in violation of a criminal statute is always evidence of negligence. See Pub. Sts. c. 102, § 74. The opinion assumes that there was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant in keeping so large a quantity of oil for so long a time in such a place. . . . To constitute negligence creating a liability for the damages to the plaintiff, it is not necessary that the defendant should have contemplated the particular event which occurred. It is enough if it should have contemplated the probable happening of some accident of this kind, which involves danger to the property of others that ought to be guarded against. I think the jury well might have found that the burning of the plaintiff's property was a direct result of the defendant's conduct in keeping this oil on the platform. 462. CURRIER v. MCKEE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE. 1904 99 Me. 364, 59 Atl. 442 ACTION on the case under the Civil Damage Act, R. S. 1883, c. 27, § 49, now R. S. 1903, c. 29, § 58, brought by the plaintiff to re cover of the defendant damages for selling intoxicating liquor to her son, by means of which she alleged she had been injured in her means of support, etc. At the close of plaintiff's testimony, on motion of defendant, the presiding justice ruled that on the evidence of the plaintiff the action could not be maintained, and ordered a nonsuit, and plaintiff excepted. The material facts appear in the opinion. Frank L. White and Ira G. Hersey, for plaintiff. George H. Smith and Louis C. Stearns, for defendant. Sitting: WISWELL, C. J., SAVAGE, POWERS, PEABODY, SPEAR, JJ. POWERS, J. This is an action under the Civil Damage Act, and comes to the law court on exceptions to the ruling of the presiding justice directing a nonsuit. There was evidence tending to prove that the plaintiff lived with her son Will A. Currier aged thirty-four upon his farm and was dependent upon him for her support; that the defendant sold intoxicating liquor to the son which caused his intoxication; that while so intoxicated he entered the store of one Boulier who ordered him out of the store; that he went out, but turned and tried to come back with the intention of striking at Boulier and having a fight with him; that he did strike Boulier, who thereupon struck him and broke his jaw, by reason whereof his ability to labor was decreased and the support which he afforded his mother sensibly diminished. The defendant contends that no recovery can be had except for those injuries of which the intoxication is the proximate cause; that the independent act of an intelligent and responsible human being intervened and caused the broken jaw from which all damage to the plaintiff resulted, and that the intoxication was therefore the remote and not the proximate cause of the injury. . . . The Legislature seems to have regarded intoxicating liquor as dangerous to society, and to have intended that whoever by furnishing liquor contributed to the intoxication of any person should be held responsible for injuries inflicted by him while in that condition, without placing upon the sufferer the burden of showing that the injury was due to the intoxication. . . . If this provision is to be regarded as calling for the same sequence and connection of causation required by the maxim of the common law which the defendant invokes, that the law looks to the proximate and not to the remote cause, the oft embarrassing question remains of what is a proximate and effective although not the immediate cause of the injury. . . . It is urged that the act of an intelligent and responsible human being, the blow struck by Boulier, intervened between the intoxication of the son and the resulting injury to the plaintiff. Upon the evidence, however, the jury might have found that the illegal sales of the intoxicating liquor by the defendant to the plaintiff's son caused his intoxication, and that his intoxication caused him to make an assault upon Boulier, and that the blow of the latter was solely in self-defence when struck at by the intoxicated son. If so, the intervention of Boulier was rightful. It is the wrongful or negligent act of the third party intervening which breaks the chain of causation and relieves the original wrongdoer of the consequences of his wrongful act; but if in the right, he is not responsible and the party injured must seek reparation from him whose wrongful act was the first in the order of events causing the injury. A reference to some of the authorities will show that this principle has been frequently recognized ever since the squib case. Scott v. Shepard, 3 Wilson, 403. . . . In Schmidt v. Mitchell, 84 Ill. 195, it was held that if a person in consequence of intoxication should get into a difficulty resulting in his being shot in the thigh, the party selling the liquor might be responsible for the direct consequences of the injury received; but that if after becoming sober, his disregard of his physician's instructions should necessitate the amputation of his leg, the liquor seller would not be responsible for the loss of life; there the wound was lawfully inflicted by one Freidenback in defence of his house. Shugart v. Egan, 83 Ill. 56, is sometimes cited in support of a contrary doctrine; there, however, the plaintiff's husband, in consequence of mere words used by him while intoxicated, was assaulted and slain by one McGraw; it is evident that mere words would not justify the assault and that McGraw was a wrongdoer. The same Court, commenting upon Shugart v. Egan in a later case, said: "It was there said to be the common experience of mankind that the condition of one intoxicated invited protection against violence rather than attack, and that it was not a natural and probable result of intoxication that the person intoxicated should come to his death by the wilful criminal act of a third party. . . . It was not the intention that the intoxicating liquor alone, of itself and exclusive of other agency, should do the whole injury. That would fall quite short of the measure of remedy intended to be given. The statute was designed for a practical end, to give a substantial remedy, and should be allowed to have effect according to its natural and obvious meaning." Schroden v. Crawford, 94 Ill. 357. . . . The question of proximate cause is for the jury under appropriate instructions of law. One is not bound to anticipate what is merely possible, nor on the other hand is he liable for such consequences only as usually follow. It is sufficient if the result ought to have been apprehended according to the usual experience of mankind. The defendant need not have intended that the plaintiff's son should make an assault upon Boulier or even have expected it or the injury which followed. Enough if according to human experience it was to be apprehended that such were likely to happen from the intoxication. . . . It is natural as well as lawful that one assaulted should use reasonable force to repel the assailant even to his personal injury. It is for the jury to say who is the assailant, and whether, under the circumstances, the force used was reasonable and appropriate. It is also for them to determine whether one, who lets loose such a dangerous agent as intoxicating liquor, is not bound to apprehend that the intoxication thereby pro |