3. The judge too broadly charged the jury that if erysipelas would not have occurred unless the accident happened, then the plaintiff was entitled to recover for the suffering from the erysipelas, as if it were a part of the original wound. This wholly eliminated from the case the question of intervening causes, and withdrew the question of fact as to whether the wound directly and solely caused the erysipelas. If the wound were a part of the cause of the erysipelas, and yet there were intervening causes without which erysipelas would not have set in, then the defendants were not liable. . . . STOWE, P. J.: This suit was brought to recover damages for a personal injury sustained by the plaintiff from falling into a coal-hole in front of defendant's premises on Ninth street in the city of Pittsburgh, on April 10, 1886. . . . Whether the cover was made and adjusted in a way that was reasonably safe and secure, was for the jury, and that question was fairly submitted. . . . Although, according to the testimony of the medical experts, erysipelas is not a necessary consequence of such an injury, yet it is conceded that in frequent instances it does follow flesh wounds. The causes which produce erysipelas would seem to be obscure; the modern theory is that erysipelas is the result of some specific poison, which enters the system through the exposure of the wound; but the nature of this poison and the conditions under which it operates, are not well understood. The disease was, however, a development which might fairly have been anticipated as a result of the injury; and as in this instance the disease developed in the wound, it was a reasonable inference of the jury that if there had been no wound there would have been no erysipelas. There is no intimation that erysipelas intervened from any want of care or skill on the part of Dr. Orr, or that proper precautions were not taken by the use of antiseptics, etc., in the treatment of this wound. On the contrary, it is conceded that the disease, if not the necessary and usual result, frequently occurs in such cases. The negligence of the defendant may therefore be regarded not only as the direct cause of the wound, but of the disease, which, from occult causes, not attributable to treatment, improper habits, or peculiar constitutional tendencies, frequently develops from personal injuries. It was in this view of the case the Court instructed the jury that even if the erysipelas was not the immediate result of the injury, it might nevertheless be regarded by the jury as part of the injury itself. Nothing intervened to produce this disease other than might have been fairly anticipated as the direct, although not the necessary, result of the injury; as well might we attribute the contact of the atmosphere or the microscopic existences therein as an intervening cause in such cases. Upon an examination of the whole case we find no error, and the Judgment is affirmed. 449. GREEN v. SHOEMAKER & COMPANY COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND. 1909 111 Md. 69, 73 Atl. 688 [Printed ante, Book I, as No. 37.]1 1 [TOPIC 2. PROBLEMS: The plaintiff was injured by reason of a defect in the defendant's highway. In consequence of a scrofulous tendency already existing, the plaintiff suffered a necrosis of the bone which would otherwise not have occurred. Was this too remote? (1875, Stewart v. Ripon, 38 Wis. 591.) The plaintiff was an unborn child, and his mother was riding in an elevator owned by the defendant. By the defendant's carelessness, the mother and the child were injured. May the child recover? (1900, Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638; 1891, Walker v. Gt. Northern R. Co., 28 L. R. Ire. 69; and cases cited in the note to No. 121, ante.) The plaintiff was severely injured by defective machinery of the defendant. His head was affected, and after several weeks he fell into an insane melancholy and committed suicide. Is the defendant responsible? (1909, Brown v. American S. & W. Co., Ind. App., 88 N. E. 80.) The plaintiff was riding over the defendant's defective bridge, and the bridge gave way. In consequence of the fright, the plaintiff, who was a pregnant woman, suffered a miscarriage. Was this too remote? (1875, Oliver v. La Valle, 36 Wis. 592.) The defendant's negligent act set fire to the plaintiff's premises. While trying to put out the fire, the plaintiff was injured. Was this too remote? (1907, Illinois C. R. Co. v. Siler, 229 II. 390, 82 N. E. 362.) The plaintiff was riding on the defendant's coach, and was negligently put into such a position of danger that he jumped, to escape it, and thereby broke his leg. Was this too remote? (1816, Jones v. Boyce, 1 Stark. 493.) The plaintiff was standing on the platform at the defendant's railroad station. The defendant's freight train approached, with a piece of timber projecting from one of the cars. On discovering this, the plaintiff, having no time to do otherwise, threw herself down on the platform to avoid the timber. The blow and shock brought on an illness. Was this too remote? (1890, Buchanan v. R. Co., 52 N. J. L. 265.) The plaintiff's intestate was intoxicated by the defendant's liquor. He then picked a quarrel with an old enemy, fought with him, ran away to escape the police, stumbled, fell into a river, and broke his neck. Was this too remote? (1899, Roach v. Kelly, 194 Pa. 24, 44 Atl. 1090.) By the negligence of the defendant, a lamp blazed up in its railroad car. Efforts to smother it were unavailing. The plaintiff, in alarm, rose to go into the next car, and in passing out was injured. Was this too remote? (1899, Gannon v. R. Co., 173 Mass. 40, 52 N. E. 1074.) The defendant thrust a long board through a transom in the hotel bedroom where the plaintiff lived, as she was preparing to retire. The board did not fall into the room; but the plaintiff, in jumping aside to escape it, fell and injured her knee. Was this too remote? (1899, Ellick v. Wilson, 58 Nebr. 584, 70 N. W. 152.) See also the problems cited ante, note to No. 38, Book I. NOTES: "Recovery for insanity caused by excitement." (H. L. R., VIII, 176.) "Accident as cause of insanity and subsequent suicide." (H. L. R., IX, 156.) Topic 3. Intervening Third Person's Act SUB-TOPIC A. THIRD PERSON'S ACT INDUCED DIRECTLY OR 450. ASHLEY v. HARRISON NISI PRIUS. 1794 Peake 256 (*194) THIS declaration stated that the plaintiff during the time of Lent, 1793, caused to be performed every Wednesday and Friday night, by divers singers and musicians, at a certain place of public amusement called Covent Garden Theatre, certain musical performances for the entertainment of the public for certain rewards paid to him for admission into the said place of public amusement by those persons who were desirous of hearing the said musical performances; by means whereof he derived great gains, &c.; yet the defendant, knowing the premises, but contriving to lessen the profits, &c. and to terrify, deter, &c. a certain public singer called Gertrude Elizabeth Mara; who had been before that time retained by the plaintiff to sing publicly for him at the said place, &c. from so singing, wrote and published a certain false and malicious paper writing of and concerning the said G. E. Mara, and of and concerning her conduct, as such public singer as aforesaid, containing therein, &c. The libel was then set out, and the declaration concluded, that by reason thereof the said G. E. M. could not sing without great danger of being assaulted, ill-treated, and abused, and was terrified, deterred, prevented, and hindered from so singing; and that the profits of the amusement were thereby rendered much less than they otherwise would have been. On the opening of the cause, Lord Kenyon, C. J., expressed his disapprobation of the action; but on Erskine, for the plaintiff, suggesting that the objection was on the record, his Lordship permitted the cause to proceed. The declaration was proved, and Madame Mara said, that "she did not choose to expose herself to contempt again, and therefore refused to sing." When the defendant's counsel were proceeding to their defence, they were stopped by Lord KENYON, who said: This action is unprecedented, and I think cannot be supported on principle. The injury is much too remote to be the foundation of an action. If this action is to be maintained, I know not to what extent the rule may be carried. For aught I can see to the contrary, it may "Owner injured in saving property fired by defendant's negligence." (H. L. R., XVI, 379.) "Intervening causes: defendant's negligence." Owner injured in saving property endangered by (H. L. R., XXI, 293.)] equally be supported against every man who circulates the glass too freely, and intoxicates an actor, by which he is rendered incapable of performing his part on the stage. If any injury has happened, it was occasioned entirely by the vain fears or caprice of the actress. Madame Mara says, she did not choose to expose herself to contempt again. The action then is to depend entirely on the nerves of the actress; if she chooses to appear on the stage again, no action can be maintained; if she does not, her refusal is to be followed with an action. . . . The plaintiff was nonsuited.1 451. TARLETON AND OTHERS v. M'GAWLEY Peake 205 THIS was a special action on the case. The declaration stated that the plaintiffs had sent a vessel called the "Bannister," with a crew on board, under the command of one Thomas Smith, and loaded with goods proper for trading with the natives, to a part of the coast of Africa called Cameroon, to trade with the natives there. That while the lastmentioned ship was lying off Cameroon, a canoe with some natives on board came to the same for the purpose of establishing a trade, and went back to the shore, of which defendant had notice. And that he well knowing the premises, but contriving and maliciously intending to hinder and deter the natives from trading with the said Thomas Smith, for the benefit of the plaintiffs, with force and arms, fired from à certain ship called the "Othello," of which he was master and commander, a certain cannon loaded with gunpowder and shot, at the said canoe, and killed one of the natives on board the same. Whereby the natives of the said coast were deterred and hindered from trading with the said T. Smith for the benefit, &c., and plaintiffs lost their trade. Erskine, in his opening for the plaintiffs, distinguished this case from that of Ashley v. Harrison [ante, No. 450], where Lord KENYON had held the injury to be too remote to be the foundation of an action. In this case the plaintiffs' loss was not occasioned by the vain fears of the negroes, or even the fear of a battery committed on them, but a fear arising from the danger of life itself. The plaintiffs called Thomas Smith, who proved the facts stated in the declaration; and further, that the defendant had declared the natives owed him a debt, and that he would not suffer any ship to trade Reporter's Note. Vide Tarlton and Others v. M'Gawley, post, p. 205. In Taylor v. Neri, 1 Esp. 386, where a person engaged by the manager of a theatre as a public singer had been beaten, and thereby prevented from performing, Eyre, C. J., held, that the manager could not maintain an action for the remote injury which he sustained in consequence. with them until that was paid; in pursuance of which declaration he committed the act complained of by the plaintiffs. . Lord KENYON, C. J. This action is brought by the plaintiffs to recover a satisfaction for a civil injury which they have sustained. The injury complained of is, that by improper conduct of the defendant the natives were prevented from trading with the plaintiffs. The whole of the case is stated on the record, and if the parties desire it, the opinion of the Court may hereafter be taken whether it will support an action. I am of opinion it will. . . . Had this been an accidental thing, no action could have been maintained, but it is proved that the defendant had expressed an intention not to permit any to trade, until a debt due from the natives to himself was satisfied. If there was any court in that country to which he could have applied for justice, he might have done so, but he had no right to take the law into his own hands. The plaintiffs had a verdict, and the parties agreed to refer the damages to arbitration. In this case an action had been brought in the Court of Queen's Bench in Ireland, in the names of Knight and his wife (the former being joined for conformity), to recover damages for slanderous words spoken of the wife. The words complained of were alleged to have been uttered to the husband, and were thus set forth in the first paragraph of the plaint: "Jane is a notorious liar, and she will do her best to annoy you, as she takes delight in creating disturbances wherever she goes, and I advise you not to introduce her into society. Any singularity of conduct which you may have observed in your wife must be attributed to a Dr. Casserly of Roscommon, as she was all but seduced by him; and I advise you, if Casserly comes to Dublin, not to permit him to enter your place, as he is a libertine and a blackguard; I have no other object in view in telling you about her conduct, and in speaking to you as I have done, but your own welfare. She is an infamous wretch, and I am sorry that you had the misfortune to marry her; and if you had asked my advice on the subject, I would have advised you not to marry her." . . The averment of special damages was in these terms: "And the plaintiff's aver that from the said false, scandalous, and malicious statements of the defendant the plaintiff William was at first led to believe, and that he did in fact believe that his wife, the plaintiff Jane, had been guilty of improper and immoral conduct before her marriage, and that her character and conduct was such as represented as aforesaid by said defendant; that he, the plaintiff William, ought not any longer to live |