the principal for the tort committed by the agent is limited to the mere pecuniary loss, we cannot sanction it. Such a rule would be in conflict with all known rules of damages in actions of tort for personal wrongs; and would be almost equivalent to a license to officers of railroad trains and steamboats to insult and outrage passengers committed to their care for courtesy and protection: mischievous alike to the companies and the public. But if it mean, as it may and probably was intended, compensatory damages as in like actions for other personal torts, we affirm and adopt it as the rule of the Court. We see no reason for distinguishing such actions from others of like character, in the rule of damages. In Wilson v. Young, 31 Wis. 574, Lyon, J., inadvertently fell into some subtleties found in Mr. Sedgwick's excellent work, which appear to us all now to confuse compensatory and exemplary damages. The distinction was not in that case, and the passage in Sedgwick was cited and approved, as such high authorities often are, without sufficient consideration. We all now concur in disapproving the distinction. In giving elements of damages, Mr. Sedgwick distinguishes between "the mental suffering produced by the act or omission in question: vexation: anxiety" which he holds to be ground for compensatory damages; and the "sense of wrong or insult, in the sufferer's breast, from an act dictated by a spirit of wilful injustice, or by a deliberate intention to vex, degrade, or insult," which he holds to be ground for exemplary damages only. Sedgwick's Measure of Damages, 35. Mr. Sedgwick himself says that the rule in favor of exemplary damages "blends together the interests of society and the aggrieved individual, and gives damages not only to recompense the sufferer, but to punish the offender" (ib. 38); and, following him, this Court held in the leading case of McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 424, and has often since reaffirmed, that exemplary damages are "in addition to actual damages." In actions of tort, as a rule, when the plaintiff's right to recover is established, he is entitled to full compensatory damages. When proper ground is established for it, he is also entitled to exemplary damages, in addition. The former are for the compensation of the plaintiff; the latter, for the punishment of the defendant and for example to others. This is Sedgwick's blending together of the interest of society and the interest of plaintiff. And it is plain that there cannot well be common ground for the two. The injury to the plaintiff is the same, and for that he is entitled to full compensation, malice or no malice. If malice be established, then the interest of society comes in, to punish the defendant and deter others in like cases, by adding exemplary to compensatory damages. We need add no authority to Mr. Sedgwick's that, in actions for personal tort, mental suffering, vexation, and anxiety are subject of compensation in damages. And it is difficult to see how these are to be distinguished from the sense of wrong and insult arising from injustice and intention to vex and degrade. The appearance of malicious intent may indeed add to the sense of wrong; and equally, whether such intent be really there or not. But that goes to mental suffering, and mental suffering to compensation. So it seems to us. But if there be a subtle, metaphysical distinction which we cannot see, what human creature can penetrate the mysteries of his own sensations, and parcel out separately his mental suffering and his sense of wrong, so much for compensatory, and so much for vindictive damages? And if one cannot scrutinize the anatomy of his own, how impossible to dissect the mental agonies of another, as a surgeon does corporal muscles. If possible, juries are surely not metaphysicians to do it. And we must hold that all mental suffering directly consequent upon tort, irrespectively of all such inscrutable distinctions, is ground for compensatory damages in action for the tort. With these views, we can see no error in the charge of the Court below on the subject of damages. By the Court. The judgment of the Court below is affirmed. 41. CHICAGO v. McLEAN SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. 1890 133 Ill. 148, 24 N. E. 527 APPEAL from Appellate Court, First District. Geo. F. Sugg and Charles S. Cameron (Wm. E. Hughes, of counsel), for appellant. Frederick Peake (James Frake, of counsel), for appellee. MAGRUDER, J. This is an action of case commenced by the appellee against the appellant in the Circuit Court of Cook County on March 13, 1888, to recover damages for a personal injury. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, which judgment has been affirmed by the Appellate Court. The cause is brought here by appeal from the Appellate Court. The declaration avers, in substance, that the city wrongfully and negligently suffered the sidewalk of Hermitage Avenue to be and remain in an unsafe and dangerous condition; that a part of the sidewalk, about four feet in length, had been "torn down," or the sidewalk had never been built, so as to extend over said space of four feet in length, as it should have been, and would have been, had the sidewalk been complete; that such space was open and uncovered, except by one plank laid lengthwise with the sidewalk, across said open space, which plank was loose and insecure; that in the evening of March 15, 1886, plaintiff was passing along said sidewalk, it being then dark, and there being a driving snow-storm; that, while plaintiff was using all due care to prevent injury to herself, she stepped into said open space, and fell to the ground, and was injured, etc. The facts are settled by the judgment of the Appellate Court. Appellant complains of an instruction given by the trial Court, which told the jury that if they found the defendant guilty, and that plaintiff had sustained damages by reason of the injury, they had a right, in estimating such damages, to "take into consideration all the facts and circumstances in evidence before them; the nature and effect of the plaintiff's physical injuries, if any, shown by the evidence to have been sustained from the cause alleged in the declaration; her suffering in body and mind, if any, resulting from such injuries," etc. The part of the instruction which is particularly objected to is that which allows damages for "suffering in mind." The instruction here complained of is substantially the same as the fifth instruction in Railroad Co. v. Martin, 111 Ill. 219, which was held to be good. In that case we said: "Where suffering in body and mind is the result of injuries caused by negligence, it is proper to take it into consideration in estimating the amount of damages." The decision in the Martin case is conclusive upon the point here made, and we must hold that the instruction given by the trial Court was not erroneous. Upon her direct examination plaintiff was asked this question: "How has your mind been since that time, your faculties?" to which she answered as follows: "Very poor; very different from what it was before." An objection to this question and answer by defendant's counsel was overruled, and exception was taken. Counsel for appellant urge, as a reason why their objection should have been sustained, that the effect of the injury upon the plaintiff's mind was matter of special damage, and should have been specially pleaded in the declaration. In the first place, the language of the declaration is broad enough to cover such effect upon the mind as may have resulted from the injury to the body. It is averred that plaintiff "suffered great pain and agony." "Agony" has been defined to be violent pain of body or mind. In the second place, the plaintiff is always entitled to recover all damages which are the natural and proximate consequence of the act complained of; and those damages which necessarily result from the injury are termed "general," and may be shown under the general allegations of the declaration. Only those damages which are not the necessary result of the injury are termed "special," and required to be stated specially in the declaration. Coal Co. v. Hood, 77 Ill. 68. But the body and mind are so intimately connected that the mind is very often directly and necessarily affected by physical injury. There cannot be severe physical pain without a certain amount of mental suffering. The mind, unless it is so overpowered that consciousness is destroyed, takes cognizance of physical pain, and must be more or less affected thereby. Railroad Co. v. Stables, 62 Ill. 313. We do not understand that the instruction, or the admitted proof in this case, contemplated any other mental suffering than that which was inseparable from the bodily injury. Therefore no allegation of special damage was necessary. Any mental anguish which may not have been connected with the bodily injury, but caused by some conception arising from a different source, could not properly have been taken into consideration by the jury. We are of the opinion that it was not error to overrule the objection. We perceive no such error in the record as would justify a reversal. The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. 42. LARSON v. CHASE SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA. 1891 47 Minn. 307, 50 N. W. 238 APPEAL from District Court, Hennepin County; Hooker, Judge. Action by Lena Larson against Charles A. Chase for the unlawful mutilation and dissection of the body of plaintiff's husband. Demurrer to complaint overruled. Defendant appeals. Affirmed. Bradish & Dunn and Babcock & Garrigues, for appellant. MITCHELL, J. This was an action for damages for the unlawful mutilation and dissection of the body of plaintiff's deceased husband. The complaint alleges that she was the person charged with the burial of the body, and entitled to the exclusive charge and control of the same. The only damages alleged are mental suffering and nervous shock. A demurrer to the complaint, as not stating a cause of action, was overruled, and the defendant appealed. The contentions of defendant may be resolved into two propositions: First. That the widow has no legal interest in or right to the body of her deceased husband, so as to enable her to maintain an action for damages for its mutilation or disturbance; that, if any one can maintain such an action, it is the personal representative. Second. That a dead body is not property, and that mental anguish and injury to the feelings, independent of any actual tangible injury to person or property, constitute no ground of action. Time will not permit, and the occasion does not require, us to enter into any extended discussion of the history of the law, civil, common, or ecclesiastical, of burial and the disposition of the body after death. But this whole subject is only obscured and confused by discussing the question whether a corpse is property in the ordinary commercial sense, or whether it has any value as an article of traffic. The important fact is that the custodian of it has a legal right to its possession for the purposes of preservation and burial, and that any interference with that right by mutilating or otherwise disturbing the body is an actionable wrong. And we think it may be safely laid down as a general rule that an injury to any right recognized and protected by the common law will, if the direct and proximate consequence of an actionable wrong, be a subject for compensation. It is also elementary that while the law as a general rule only gives compensation for actual injury, yet, whenever the breach of a contract or the invasion of a legal right is established, the law infers some damage, and, if no evidence is given of any particular amount of loss, it declares the right by awarding nominal damages. Every injury imports a damage. Hence the complaint stated a cause of action for at least nominal damages. We think it states more. There has been a great deal of misconception and confusion as to when, if ever, mental suffering, as a distinct element of damage, is a subject for compensation. This has frequently resulted from courts giving a wrong reason for a correct conclusion that in a given case no recovery could be had for mental suffering, placing it on the ground that mental suffering, as a distinct element of damage, is never a proper subject of compensation, when the correct. ground was that the act complained of was not an infraction of any legal right, and hence not an actionable wrong at all, or else that the mental suffering was not the direct and proximate effect of the wrongful act. Counsel cites the leading case of Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577-598. We think he is laboring under the same misconception of the meaning of the language used in that case into which Courts have not infrequently fallen. Taking the language in connection with the question actually before the Court, that case is not authority for defendant's position. It is unquestionably the law, as claimed by appellant, that "for the law to furnish redress there must be an act which, under the circumstances, is wrongful; and it must take effect upon the person, the property, or some other legal interest, of the party complaining. Neither one without the other is sufficient." This is but another way of saying that no action for damages will lie for an act which, though wrongful, infringed no legal right of the plaintiff, although it may have caused him mental suffering. But, where the wrongful act constitutes an infringement on a legal right, mental suffering may be recovered for, if it is the direct, proximate, and natural result of the wrongful act. It was early settled that substantial damages might be recovered in a class of torts where the only injury suffered is mental, — as, for example, an assault without physical contact. So, too, in actions for false imprisonment, where the plaintiff was not touched by the defendant, substantial damages have been recovered, though physically the plaintiff did not suffer any actual detriment. In an action for seduction substantial damages are allowed for mental sufferings, although there be no proof of actual pecuniary damages other than the nominal damages which the law presumes. The same is true in actions for breach of promise of marriage. Wherever the act complained of constitutes a violation of some legal right of the plaintiff, which always, in contemplation of law, causes injury, he is entitled to recover all damages which are the proximate and natural consequence of the wrongful act. That mental suffering and injury to the feelings would be ordinarily the natural and proximate result of knowledge that the remains of a deceased husband had been mutilated is too plain to admit of argument. In Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281, where the |