colt thereby became frightened and ran away, and this plaintiff, without any fault of her own, became entangled in a picket rope attached to said colt, and was dragged for a long distance over the prairie, and was severely injured, in that her flesh was badly bruised and lacerated, and her back was strained, so as she believes, to be permanently injured. (4) That by reason of said injuries she suffered great bodily pain, and was confined to her bed for a long time, and was and still is unable to do her housework, or any work, and is, as she believes, permanently injured and otherwise greatly injured, and was compelled to spend $100 for medical attendance, nursing, and help about the house, to her damage of five thousand dollars." The allegations of the complaint are denied, except as to the first paragraph, and defendant alleges that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. Does the complaint state a cause of action? It was not assailed until the trial began, and it must be liberally construed. Our Civil Code provides that "neither parent nor child is answerable, as such, for the act of the other." Compiled Laws, § 2620. It is a rule of the common law that "a father is not liable in damages for the torts of his child committed without his knowledge, consent, participation, or sanction, and not in the course of his employment of the child.” Schouler, Domestic Relations, § 263. The allegations of the complaint connecting defendant with the injurious act of his minor child are these: (1) He purchased and gave him a gun; (2) the child used it negligently; (3) the father knew he was so using it; and (4) he encouraged, countenanced, and consented to such negligent use. It may be conceded that it is not negligence per se for a father to furnish his son, aged thirteen years, with a gun, or permit him to use one, if the boy uses it with ordinary care and the father is justified in presuming that it will be so used. But if he knows that his son is using the firearm in such a careless and negligent manner as to endanger the life and property of persons about him, it is certainly his duty to interpose his parental authority, and prevent, if possible, a course of conduct on the part of his child which is likely to produce injury to others. If, as alleged, defendant's son was in the habit of using a gun given him by his father in a dangerous manner, and defendant knew of such use, it was his moral and legal duty to prevent a continuation of such conduct; and it is immaterial whether his knowledge was derived from seeing his son's acts of negligence, or from being informed of them by other persons. His culpability consisted in permitting his son to continue in a course of conduct which in its nature was likely to result in damage to those with whom his son came in contact. If he knew his child was using the gun recklessly, as an ordinary intelligent person he must have apprehended the natural consequences of such recklessness; and, as a good citizen, he should have made a reasonable effort to prevent such consequences. On the contrary it is alleged that he encouraged, countenanced, and consented to the manner in which his son was carrying and using the gun. We think defendant's objection to the introduction of any evidence under the complaint was properly overruled. It follows from what has been stated that the Court did not err in admitting evidence tending to prove that the son of defendant used the gun negligently on other occasions than that involved in this case. One of the material issues was whether he was in the habit of using the gun in a reckless manner, and the only way to establish such fact was by evidence showing how he acted when using it. Of course, it was necessary to show that defendant knew of his culpable conduct, but such knowledge could be established by other witnesses than those who testified concerning the acts of his son. . . . There is sufficient evidence to establish all the elements of plaintiff's cause of action, provided defendant knew of the manner in which the gun was used by his son is that of the plaintiff, who says: "I told Mr. Glidden that he would (should) take care of his boy; that his boy had been down there and shot at the horses, and scared them loose; and he answered and said, 'Wherever there is a lake, the boy has a right to run.' I told him that the boy shot after the horses; that is what I told him at the time." This is denied by defendant, but must be accepted as true by the Court. If so, defendant was informed that his boy was conducting himself in a most reckless and unlawful manner. Finding no reversible error, the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. [TOPIC 2. PROBLEMS: A reporter interviewed the defendant about a story reflecting on the plaintiff. The defendant said he had no objection to its being published. The story was that the plaintiff had tried by a bribe to get the defendant to burn the plaintiff's house, so as to obtain the insurance-money. Is the defendant responsible? (1897, Hazy v. Waitke, 23 Colo. 556, 48 Pac. 1048.) A broke by night into the house where were the plaintiff and her daughters. B was a spectator, who afterwards expressed approval of the act. Is B responsible? (1895, Lamb v. Harbaugh, 105 Cal. 680, 39 Pac. 59.) The defendant was lessor of land. The plaintiff erected a fence said to be an unlawful obstruction of a right of way. The plaintiff's lessee and others proposed to go and tear it down. The defendant told them that he would stand by them, no matter what it cost. They tore it down, but a scuffle ensued, and the fencebreaking parties committed a wrongful battery on the plaintiff. Is the defendant responsible for the battery? (1895, Wagner v. Aulenbach, 170 Pa. 495, 32 Atl. 1086.) The defendant and others went to serenade a bridegroom, with a charivari party. The noise and insults led to violence; weapons were drawn, and G., a member of the party, accidentally shot the plaintiff. Is the defendant responsible? (1902, Gilmore v. Fuller, 198 Ill. 130, 65 N. E. 84.) The defendant owned some land which was leased to the plaintiff. A stranger one day asked permission of the defendant to bury a dead horse on the land; the defendant assented. The horse had had an infectious disease; and the plaintiff's cows, while pasturing there afterwards, were made ill and died. Was the defendant responsible? (1901, Fitzwater v. Fassett, 199 Pa. 442, 49 Atl. 310.)] SUB-TITLE (II): EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE Topic 1. Defects and Nuisances on Premises 399. REGINA v. WATTS (OR WATSON) KING'S BENCH. 1704 1 Salk. 356; 2 Ld. Raym. 856 INDICTMENT for not repairing a house standing upon the highway, ruinous and like to fall down, which the defendant occupied and ought to repair ratione tenurae suae. The defendant pleaded Not guilty; and the jury found a special verdict, viz. That the defendant occupied, but was only tenant at will; and whether he was liable, was the question. Et per Curiam: The ratione tenurae is only an idle allegation; for it is not only charged, but found, that the defendant was occupier, and in that respect he is answerable to the public; for the house was a nuisance as it stood, and the continuing the house in that condition is continuing the nuisance. And as the danger is the matter that concerns the public, the public are to look to the occupier, and not to the estate, which is not material in such case as to the public. . . 400. TARRY v. ASHTON HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. 1876 L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 315 AT the trial before QUAIN, J., at the sittings in London after Easter Term, 1875, it appeared that the plaintiff was walking along the Strand in front of the defendant's house on the afternoon of the 16th of November, 1874, when a large lamp, which was suspended from the front of the house and projected several feet across the pavement, and weighed 40 lbs. or 50 lbs., fell upon her and injured her severely. At the time. of the accident a man named Weaver, in the employ of the defendant, was engaged blowing the water out of the gas pipes. He had raised a ladder against the lamp-iron or bracket from which the lamp hung, and the afternoon being wet and windy, on Weaver mounting the ladder it slipped, and he, to save himself from falling, caught hold of the lampiron; this shook the lamp, and its fastenings broke, and it fell on the plaintiff. In the August previous the defendant, having lately come into occupation as tenant of the house, and knowing the lamps, etc., to be of some age, employed Chappell, an experienced gasfitter, to examine them and put them in thorough repair. But on examination of the lamp after the accident, it appeared that the breakage was caused by the general decay under the cup and ball, which connected the lamp with the lamp-iron or bracket. The jury found, that there was no negligence on the part of the defendant personally, nor on the part of Weaver; but there was negligence in Chappell, "the defendant's servant." That the lamp was out of repair through general decay, but not to the knowledge of the defendant. That the immediate cause of the fall of the lamp was the slipping of the ladder; but if the lamp had been in good repair the slipping of the ladder would not have caused the lamp to fall. And they assessed the damages at £40. On these findings, a verdict was entered for the plaintiff for £40, with leave to move to enter a verdict for the defendant, or a nonsuit, if on the findings of the jury the judge ought to have nonsuited, or directed a verdict for the defendant. A rule having been obtained accordingly, A. Collins, and Poulter, shewed cause. [The argument of coun sel deals with another point, and is printed post in No. 438.] BLACKBURN, J. I desire to decide nothing beyond what the circumstances of the case require; and on the facts of the case, I am of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to keep the verdict. It appears that the defendant came into occupation of a house with a lamp projecting from it over the public thoroughfare, which would do no harm so long as it was in good repair, but would become dangerous if allowed to get out of repair. It is therefore not a nuisance of itself. But if the defendant knowingly maintained it in a dangerous state he would then be indictable for the nuisance. This much is clearly decided by Reg. v. Watson,1 for the defendant was there held liable for not repairing his house, which was on a highway and was ruinous and like to fall down, on the ground that as occupier he was bound to keep the house so as not to be a nuisance. . . The occupier would be bound to know that things like this lamp will ultimately get out of order, and as occupier, there would be a duty cast upon him from time to time to investigate the state of the lamp. If he did investigate, and there were a latent defect which he could not discover, I doubt whether he would be liable; but if he discovers the defect and does not cure it, or if he did not discover what he ought on investigation to have discovered, then I think he would clearly be answerable for the consequences. It was his duty to have the lamp set right; it was not set right. The rule must be discharged. 401. ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. HEATLEY COURT OF APPEAL, CHANCERY DIVISION. 1897 L. R. [1897] 1 Ch. 560 APPEAL from KEKEWICH, J. This was an action by the AttorneyGeneral at the relation of the united vestry of the parishes of St. Mar 12 Ld. Raym. 856; 1 Salk. 356; [ante, No. 399.] garet and St. John the Evangelist, Westminster, and the united vestry, as plaintiffs, for an injunction to restrain the defendants, Mr. Tod Heatley and Sir Henry Moore Brownrigg, from allowing a piece of land at the corner of St. Anne's Lane and Great Peter Street, Westminster, to be and to remain in such a state as to be a nuisance or injurious to health, and also to restrain the said defendants from allowing the said land to be used or let for fairs, shows, or in any other manner which would be likely to be or cause a nuisance, or to be injurious to health. . . . Up to 1894 the defendant Tod Heatley had an equitable interest in the piece of land; but in that year his interest came to an end, and Sir H. M. Brownrigg became the absolute owner of the property [and later the sole defendant in the case]. After the buildings had been pulled down, the site, which was about a quarter of an acre in extent, was inclosed by a hoarding [fence] six feet high. The neighbourhood is a densely populated one, and chiefly inhabited by the poorer classes, amongst whom are many costermongers. No new buildings have ever been erected on the land, and it appeared by the evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs that the hoarding had become dilapidated and had large gaps in it, that dead dogs and cats, vegetable refuse, fish, offal, rubbish, and all kinds of filth had been thrown or deposited upon the vacant ground; also that noisy shows attracting dirty and riotous crowds had been held upon it, and that squatters had used it for their caravans. According to the evidence, the condition of the land and the uses to which it was being put constituted a continuing nuisance injurious to the health of the inhabitants of the parish. The defence of Sir H. M. Brownrigg was that, since the pulling down of the houses, a proper and sufficient hoarding had been provided and maintained round the vacant land, and that he had done all in his power to prevent persons from throwing filth and refuse over, and from breaking that hoarding, and from trespassing on the land; and that it was owing to deficient police protection and sanitary arrangements in the neighbourhood attributable to a great extent to the neglect of the vestry, that unruly and disorderly persons had been in the habit of doing the acts complained of. . . . The action was tried before KEKEWICH, J. on November 24, 1896, when his Lordship dismissed the action as against Sir H. M. Brownrigg, but without costs, so far as it sought to restrain him from allowing the land to be and to remain in such a state, or to be used in such a manner, as to be a nuisance or injurious to health. The plaintiffs appealed against the dismissal of their claim. . . Warrington, Q. C., and Morton Smith, for the appellants. . . Renshaw, Q. C., and Ingpen, for the respondents. The nuisance in this case is not caused by any act, default, permission, or sufferance of Sir H. M. Brownrigg, who has done everything he could reasonably be called upon to do. It is caused entirely by the acts of third parties, over whom he has no control, done without his knowledge, and gen |