same follows if x is a class, series, or group of acts; (3) if A does the act in a careless or otherwise wrongful way, different from that in which I expected him to do it, and not as I myself might have done it, my personal culpability is no longer clear; nevertheless, so far as the theoretical principle of Activity is necessary in every tort, it is here plainly satisfied. 394. CHARLES VINER. A General Abridgment of Law and Equity, "Trespass," Q. (2d ed., 1793, vol. XX.) If several come, and one does the trespass, and the others do nothing but come in aid, yet all are principal trespassers, and shall render damages, and shall be imprisoned. Brooke, "Trespass," pl. 232, cites 22 Ass. 43. 395. ROBINSON v. VAUGHTON. (1838. 8 C. & P. 255.) Alderson, B. If I give a man leave to go on a field over which I have no right, and he goes, that will not make me a trespasser. But if I desire him to go and do it, and then he does it, that is a doing of it by my authority, which is quite a different thing, and I should be liable; which was the case here. 396. HAMILTON v. HUNT SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. 1853 14 Ill. 472 THIS was an action of trespass to personal property, brought originally by the appellee against the appellant, before the justice of the peace of Marshall County, and appealed by Hamilton to the Circuit Court of said county, LELAND, Judge, where, at the April term, 1853, the cause was again tried and judgment rendered for the plaintiff below. The defendant below appealed to this Court. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the Court. T. S. Dickey, for appellant. O. Peters, for appellee. CATON, J. The bill of exceptions shows so much of the evidence as is necessary to a proper understanding of the instruction which was refused by the Court, and upon which the case is brought here for review. It appears that the appellant and one Cochran sold a steer to Scott, the price of which was indorsed upon a note which he held against them. The steer was at the time running upon the prairie, and they agreed to point him out whenever Scott should send for him. While he was yet running at large, Scott sold the steer to Clark. Clark went after the steer and called Hamilton, who pointed out a red steer which he said he was sure was the one which Scott had bought, giving the ear-marks of the one sold. Clark then killed the steer, when it was found that one of the ear-marks was wanting. Hamilton then went and examined some other cattle and soon returned, saying that he was mistaken, and that the steer that Scott had bought was among some other cattle. The steer which was killed was older and larger than the one sold. The steer purchased by Scott had been running on a farm occupied by Hamilton & Cochran, and Cochran had been heard to call him his own, and talked of getting a mate for him. For the plaintiff, the Court instructed the jury that if the plaintiff's steer was killed under the direction of the defendant, he was liable in this action of trespass. The defendant then asked the Court to instruct the jury, "That if the jury believe from the evidence that Clark killed the steer in controversy, and that Hamilton had nothing to do with the killing directly or indirectly, except that Clark inquired of Hamilton, 'what steer was sold to Scott,' and Hamilton by mistake pointed out the plaintiff's steer to Clark as the one that had been sold to Scott, that is not such a direction as is spoken of in the instructions given at the request of the plaintiff, and would not constitute a trespass by Hamilton. This instruction was refused, and the defendant excepted. . . . Now this instruction might or might not be correct, depending upon circumstances which the jury might find to exist in the case. Were Hamilton a stranger to the transaction, and bound to assume and intending to assume no responsibility in relation to it, and casually inquired of by Clark to point out the steer because he was supposed to have information on the subject, and, being thus inquired of, had unfortunately made the mistake; it may be that that would not so connect him with the act of killing as to make him a joint trespasser with Clark. On the other hand, if he and Cochran had jointly sold the steer to Scott, who had sold him to Clark, and under that contract of sale was bound to point out the steer when called upon for that purpose, which seems to have been the case (from so much of the evidence as is contained in the bill of exceptions), then he had assumed the responsibility of a direct party to the transaction, which would make him liable for the mistake which he committed. The designation of the steer, under such circumstances, would be the act of delivery, and would constitute a direction to Clark to take the steer, and would make him responsible for the taking as much as if he had done it with his own hands. . . . If this was the case which they found to be proved, then the instruction would undoubtedly have misled them, and it was properly refused by the Circuit Court. The judgment must be affirmed. 397. BROWN v. PERKINS Judgment affirmed. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. 1861 1 All. 89 TORT of breaking and entering the plaintiff's grocery shop and destroying various articles of trade and consumption. . . . On exceptions heretofore taken in this case a new trial was granted, At the second trial the and the case remitted to the Superior Court. plaintiff was called as a witness, and gave his testimony tending to show, that on the 8th of July, 1856, he was in possession of and occupied a close at Rockport on which his shop was situated, and that he was in the grocery, old junk, and iron business; that on said 8th of July a large crowd of men and women, principally women, came to the shop adjoining his shop, and entered it and destroyed a demijohn of alcohol; that the crowd then broke into his own shop, and destroyed several articles of personal property, and broke and injured his shop; that the defendants were among the crowd which entered his shop and that he saw the defendants coming out of the shop with the crowd which destroyed his property... The defendants called a large number of witnesses who gave evidence tending to show that neither of the defendants was near the door of the plaintiff's shop when it was broken open; that Mr. Perkins was on the opposite side of the street, thirty-five or forty feet from the door; and that Mrs. Perkins was in Lane's saloon; and that Mr. Perkins did not enter the plaintiff's shop that day. . . Upon this case the plaintiff's counsel asked for the following, amongst other instructions, to the jury: "Fourthly: That persons are regarded in law as present, aiding, and assisting in the execution of a trespass, who are so near that, in case of resistance or opposition to the acts which are done or prepared to be done, they could aid and defend those who are actually doing them, or prevent and keep away those who might come to the assistance of the party against whom or whose interest the act to be done would operate injuriously; [also] all those present who countenance and approve the measures which are taken, or make no opposition or manifest no disapprobation of them; and this is more emphatically true, if those present and approving stand in such a relation as would naturally enable them to exercise any authority, control, or influence over the actors, as when the actors are wives or children, especially daughters, and the persons present are husbands or fathers of such actors. . . The presiding judge instructed the jury, in accordance with this request, with the exception of striking out the words "and this is more emphatically true." . . . The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the plaintiff alleged exceptions. J. W. Perry & C. Sewall, for the plaintiff. 1. All those present at a riot, assenting to the breach of the peace and approving of the acts done, are equally liable, although they take no active part in the injury done to property. . . . 2. There is no distinction between those who go to do an unlawful act and those who go to see it done. E. H. Darby & R. S. Rantoul, for the defendants. . . . 5. Persons present at a riot and doing nothing, especially if not ordered to depart, are not held liable. . . . BIGELOW, C. J. . . . 2. The evidence at the trial tended to show, that, by a concerted action or conspiracy, many persons assembled together with a design to commit unlawful acts by trespassing on the premises and destroying the property of others whom they supposed to be engaged in an unlawful and obnoxious traffic; and that, in pursuance of this common design, they broke and entered the shop of the plaintiff, and there injured and destroyed various articles of personal property. It also appeared that both the defendants were present during the perpetration of these unlawful acts on the premises of the plaintiff. . . . Upon this point, however, the evidence was contradictory; the defendants contending that they were there as spectators only, innocent of any combination or conspiracy, and in no way participating in or encouraging the unlawful acts of others. This was the great contention between the parties at the trial. In this posture of the case, it was essential to a fair and impartial trial, and to the due protection of the rights of the plaintiff, that a precise and accurate instruction should be given to the jury, prescribing the rule of law by which a party who is present at the commission of a trespass, but not actively participating therein, may be held liable as a trespasser for aiding and abetting the unlawful act. In this particular the rulings at the trial were not sufficiently explicit. By omitting to give the instructions asked for by the plaintiff in his fourth prayer, and substituting in its stead another ruling, we think the Court left the case to the jury without a clear, intelligible, and exact statement of the rule of law adapted to the facts on proof and necessary to guide them in making a proper application of the testimony. The effect of the instruction given to the jury was to lead them to believe that the defendants could not be held liable as principals for aiding and assisting in the unlawful acts by countenancing and approving the measures which were taken, or by making no opposition or manifesting no disapprobation of them, unless they stood in such relation as would naturally enable them to exercise some authority, control, or influence over the actors; as where the actors are wives or children, especially daughters, and the persons present are husbands or fathers of such actors. .. We do not, however, mean to say that we give our sanction to the fourth instruction asked for by the plaintiff as containing a just and correct statement of the law. The first clause is too broad and sweeping in its definition of what legally constitutes an aiding and an abetting of an unlawful act. It is not accurate to say that all those present at the commission of a trespass are liable as principals who make no opposition or manifest no disapprobation of the wrongful invasion of another's person or property. The true rule on that point is this: Any person who is present at the commission of a trespass, encouraging or exciting the same with words, gestures, looks, or signs, or who in any way or by any means countenances or approves the same, is in law deemed to be an aider and abettor, and liable as principal; and proof that a person is present at a trespass without disapproving or opposing it, is evidence from which, in connection with other circumstances, it is competent for the jury to infer that he assented thereto, lent to it his countenance and approval, and was thereby aiding and abetting the same. 3 Greenleaf, Evidence, § 41; Foster, 350; 1 Hale P. C. 438. On the other hand, it is to be borne in mind that mere presence at the commission of a trespass or other wrongful act does not render a person liable as a participator therein. If he is only a spectator, innocent of any unlawful intent, and does no act to countenance or approve those who are actors, he is not to be held liable on the ground that he happened to be a looker-on and did not use active endeavors to prevent the commission of the unlawful acts. 1 Hale P. C. 439; Roscoe Crim. Ev. (2d ed.) 201. Exceptions sustained. 398. JOHNSON v. GLIDDEN SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH DAKOTA. 1898 11 S. D. 237, 76 N. W. 933 APPEAL from Circuit court, Spink county. Hon. A. W. CAMPBELL, Judge. Action by Charlotte Johnson against Arthur J. Glidden, for damages in consequence of the alleged negligent use of a gun by defendant's minor child. From a judgment on a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and from an order overruling his motion for a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. A. W. Burtt, for appellant. Neither parent nor child is answerable as such for the acts of the other. Comp. Laws, § 2620. A father is not liable for the wrongful acts of his minor son unless the acts are committed with the father's consent or in connection with the father's business. Smith v. Davenport, 24 Pac. 851. . . . H. G. Warnock, for respondent. HANEY, J. Plaintiff's cause of action is thus stated in her complaint: "(1) That Earnest Glidden is the son of said defendant, and was on the 17th day of August of the age of thirteen years, living at home with said father, and under his custody, care, and control. (2) That prior to said 17th day of August, 1895, said defendant carelessly and negligently purchased and gave to said Earnest Glidden a certain firearm, known as a gun, which said Earnest Glidden was in the habit of using in a careless and negligent manner, so as to endanger the life and property of persons about him, all of which was well known to this defendant, and who encouraged, countenanced, and consented to his carrying said gun and in so using it in said careless and negligent manner. (3) That on said 17th day of August, 1895, this plaintiff was watering a colt on her own premises, when said Earnest Glidden came along with his gun and, against the request of this plaintiff, carelessly and negligently fired said gun in front of said colt; that said |