"It is no conversion by a common carrier or other bailee, who has received property from one not rightfully entitled to possession to deliver it in pursuance of the bailment, if this is done before notice of the right of the real owner. After such notice he acts at his peril. A delivery to the party entitled to the possession will be a protection to him, and he may defend in the right of such party before delivery." Cooley on Torts, 456. The plaintiff in error cites, in opposition to this rule, the case of Kohn v. Railroad Company, 37 S. C. 1, 16 S. E. 376, 24 L. R. A. 100, 34 Am. St. Rep. 726, the syllabus of which reads: "Where goods were received by a common carrier for transportation, and their possession then demanded by the agent of the shipper's mortgagee, after condition broken, but the carrier declined to surrender the possession, and after retaining them until next day then shipped the goods to their destination, the carrier is not liable to the mortgagee for a conversion of the goods." In a monographic note to the report of this case, in 34 Am. St. Rep., it is incidentally correctly appraised in the following statement of the law: "There is no doubt, except in South Carolina, that the true owner of personal property may enforce his right to it as against the consignor or consignee, or the carrier, or other bailor or bailee, whenever he sees fit to do so, before its delivery to the consignee, as directed by the bailor. Hence, when the true owner demands the property of the carrier, and the latter has notice or knowledge of the title of the former, it is the duty of the carrier to deliver the property at once to the owner, and his refusal to do so renders him guilty of a tort, and at once liable to such owner in an action for conversion." The District Court properly took this view of the case upon the merits. . . . The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. All the Justices concurring. 313. SUTTON v. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA. 1906 99 Minn. 376, 109 N. W. 815 [Printed post as No. 318; point 1 of the opinion.]1 1 PROBLEMS: [The plaintiff's gun was wrongfully in the possession of one J. P. The defendants were creditors of J. P., and he delivered them the gun as security. Later he came and got it back from them, giving them other security, and he sold the gun to a fourth person. Has the plaintiff an action for conversion? (1841, Leonard v. Tidd, 3 Metc. 6.) The agents of an insurance company saved some of the plaintiff's goods from a fire and placed them in a warehouse under the defendant's charge. The plaintiff came to get them, but the defendant said that he could not deliver them (2) Sundry legal rules dependent on Disseisin 314. LACON v. BARNARD COMMON BENCH. 1627 Cro. Car. 35 TROVER and conversion of one hundred sheep, showing that the plaintiff upon the twenty-fifth day of March, 19 Jac. 1., was possessed of those goods and lost them, and that upon the last day of April they without an order from the insurance company. Was this a conversion? (1821, Alexander v. Southey, 5 B. & Ald. 247.) The plaintiff left his plough for a while, for safe keeping, on the land of C., with C.'s consent. C. transferred his land to H. The defendant borrowed the plough from H., supposing it to belong to H.; used it for three or four days; then returned it. Later the plaintiff informed the defendant that it was the plaintiff's plough, and demanded that he return it and pay for its hire, or else pay its value. The defendant did neither. Is he liable for a conversion? (1883, Frome v. Dennis, 45 N. J. L. 515.) The defendant employed the defendant, a carrier, to take his goods to a storage-place and there hold them subject to the plaintiff's orders. The goods, while there, were attached by a third person on garnishee process. When the plaintiff came for them, the defendant informed him of the attachment and declined to surrender the goods. Was this a conversion? (1906, Cornell v. Mahoney, 190 Mass. 265, 76 N. E. 664). G. shipped goods to the plaintiff, M., by the B. & O. R. Co. The R. Co. transhipped to the defendant carrier as agent to forward, but by mistake the waybill was filed out so as to direct delivery to G.'s order. The defendant delivered to G. Has the plaintiff an action for conversion? (1905, Merchants' & M. T. Co. v. Moore, 124 Ga. 482, 52 S. E. 802.) The defendant, a warehouseman, received goods on storage from a party who had no right to dispose of them, and gave a receipt. The bailor assigned the receipt and the holder of it came and got the goods from the defendant. Has the plaintiff, the true owner, an action for conversion? (1887, Hudmon v. Dubose, 85 Ala. 446, 5 So. 162.) The plaintiff and the defendant occupied a farm together. Each took half the hay crop. The plaintiff departed, leaving his hay in storage. The defendant instructed his employee to feed his cattle from the plaintiff's hay, which was done. Was this a conversion? (1892, Brown v. Ela, 67 N. H. 110, 30 Atl. 411.) The mortgagor of wheat placed it in the defendant's elevator. Some months later, the plaintiff, the mortgagee, who was entitled to possession on demand, wrote demanding it and asking when it would be delivered. No reply coming, a second letter was sent. The defendant replied that he had referred the matter for investigation to the superintendent in another town and requested the plaintiff to write to the latter. He did so, but received no reply. After five months, he wrote to the defendant by registered mail. The receipt was returned, but no reply. Has the plaintiff an action for conversion? (1902, First National Bank v. Minneapolis & N. E. Co., 11 N. D. 280, 91 N. W. 436.) The defendant sheriff entered the store where goods were to be attached. Two or three of the debtor-firm were there. Should the Court instruct the jury that when the sheriff said "he had a warrant for collecting the rent and had come to levy on everything in the house," the sheriff's possession was complete so as to came to the defendant's hands, who the same day sold and converted them to his proper use. The defendant for eleven of them pleaded not guilty. And as to the eighty-nine, the residue, he pleaded, that the plaintiff at another time, viz. on the eighteenth day of September, 19 Jac. 1., prosecuted an original writ out of the Chancery, returnable in this Court, against the defendant and one Brian Smith, quare ceperunt et abduxerunt 100 oves, and thereto they appeared, and the plaintiff counted against them of their taking of a hundred sheep upon the fourteenth day of April, 19 Jac. 1., and thereto they pleaded not guilty for the eleven sheep, and for the eighty-nine residue they pleaded a recovery in debt by the defendant against Edward Hatcliff of a debt of sixty pounds; and that the said Edward Hatcliff was then possessed of the said eighty-nine sheep and that by virtue of a fieri facias those goods were sold to him, whereupon he took them into his custody; the plaintiff thereto [in the former action] replied, and took issue, and [a verdict was] found for him, and damages assessed to twopence, and thereupon the plaintiff had judg ment of the said twopence damages, and had six pounds for costs. And [so the defendant now] avers, that the said taking and driving, for which the recovery in trespass was had, and the conversion of the said eighty-nine sheep in this action be all one, and that the said judgment is yet in force. To this plea the plaintiff replies, that true it is he brought such an action, and recovered the twopence for the taking and driving of the said eighty-nine sheep, and six pounds for costs; but he farther saith, that the said twopence damages was not assessed for the value of the said sheep and the conversion of them, and that the said defendant, at the day and year in the bill, sold the said eighty-nine sheep and converted them to his own use: the which conversion is the same conversion whereof he now complaineth. Upon this replication the defendant demurred generally: and it was now argued at the Bar by Serjeant Crew, for the defendant, and by Serjeant Henden, for the plaintiff; and after the said arguments at the Bar, it was resolved support an action for trespass d. b. a.? (1896, Jones v. Howard, 99 Ga. 451, 27 S. E. 765.) ESSAYS: George Luther Clark, "The Test of Conversion," (H. L. R., XXI, 408.) "Possession: nature and essential elements." (H. L. R., VI, 443.) "Pledgee violating terms of pledge." (H. L. R., IX, 289, 540; X, 65; XI, 201; XIII, 55.) "Demand and refusal: when necessary: innocent purchaser from converter." (H. L. R., XI, 66, XV, 590.) "What constitutes conversion: refusal to deliver damaged goods without payment of freight." (H. L. R., XX, 227, 236.)] By HUTTON, HARVEY, and myself [CROKE] that this replication is good, and that the plaintiff ought to recover; for the damages of twopence given for the eighty-nine sheep being so small, is in itself an implication (and the Court shall so intend it) that it was given only for the taking and driving of them, and that the plaintiff had them again, and not in lieu of the value of them; for if it should be given for the value of them, then the plaintiff should thereby lose the property in them, and have nothing for his sheep but twopence, and the defendant should have the sheep. But the law will rather intend (and so it may be averred) that those [former] damages were given only for the taking and driving [the sheep], and that the plaintiff had them again, and afterwards lost them, and that the defendant found and after converted them, &c. And this demurrer is a confession that he converted them after the said taking and driving; for the action of trespass is supposed to be upon the 14th April, 19 Jac. 1. which well stands with the former action; for the defendant may take and chase them one day, and the plaintiff recover damages for the chasing, and after lose them, &c. And this first action is brought for the first taking and chasing, and the second for the conversion, so both may stand together, which is now confessed by the demurrer, and that the damages were given for the first taking and driving and not for the conversion; therefore they conceived the plaintiff should recover. But YELVERTON held, because the action of trespass is cepit et abduxit, therefore it includes that the defendant had them, and ousted the plaintiff of the possession; and although the damages be small, it shall be intended to be given for the sheep; and if so, then he cannot have an action for converting them afterward. — But judgment was given for the plaintiff. 315. NORRIS v. BECKLEY CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA. 1812 2 Mills Const. 228 THE plaintiffs, in this case, had brought an action of trover against the defendant for certain negroes, and obtained a verdict for 300 dollars, to be released upon the payment of 30 dollars and delivering him the negroes. The defendant appealed from that verdict to this Court, where a decision was also given against him. He then filed a bill of injunction in the Court of Equity which, after the usual delay, was also dismissed. After this long and ineffectual struggle, he tendered the negroes to the plaintiffs, who voluntarily accepted of them. This action was brought for the work and labor of the negroes, during the time the proceedings were delayed by the appeal to this Court, and the injunction. The case was tried before Mr. Justice Smith, at Abbeville, who was of opinion the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, and the jury found a verdict accordingly. An appeal was then made to the Constitutional Court to set aside that verdict, as being contrary to law and evidence. The opinion of the Court was delivered by Mr. Justice NOTT. The action of trover is a remedy by which a person recovers damages for the conversion of personal property, but not the property itself. It is a well known legal maxim, that a verdict in trover vests the property in the defendant; "transit in rem judicatam." From the time of this verdict, therefore, the property belonged to the defendant, and it would be very extraordinary that a person should be required to pay for the use of his own property. The [fact of the trover] verdict being in the alternative makes no difference; for the jury cannot find such a verdict without the consent of the plaintiff; and then it is optional with the defendant which alternative to choose. It does not weaken his right to the property. It is only a mode of payment offered by the plaintiff, which the defendant may accept or refuse as he may think proper. It is contended [by the plaintiff] that by delivering up the negroes, he [the defendant] recognized the right of the plaintiff from the time of the verdict; but I cannot conceive it in that light: he recognized no right in the plaintiff, except what the law gave him; that was a right to 300 dollars. He [the plaintiff] had no right to demand the specific property. I should rather conclude that the acceptance of it afterwards was a satisfaction of the judgment. ... But it is said justice requires that, after keeping the plaintiff out of his property, by various groundless and vexatious suits, he [the defendant] should pay him for the use of it. But let it be repeated that he did not keep him out of his property. He kept him out of his money, that is, the amount of the judgment; but the property belonged to defendant. . . Suppose the defendant had paid up the judgment in money; could the plaintiff have sued for the labor of the negroes? Certainly not; and delivering up the negroes, instead of paying the money, was only paying the same amount in a different way. The verdict, therefore, must be set aside, and a nonsuit granted. GRIMKE, BAY, and COLCOCK, J., concurred. JOHNSON, and GANTT, J., dissented. 316. HARTLEY STATE BANK v. MCCORKELL 91 Ia. 660, 60 N. W. 197 APPEAL from District Court, Woodbury county; A. Van Wagenen, Judge. June 21, 1890, plaintiff commenced this action to recover possession, as absolute owner thereof, of a certain stallion known as "Chere" purchased by defendant October 21, 1887, from L. M. Hartley, of the |