the plaintiff, as held by the Supreme Court of Minnesota; yet, if it could not have been reasonably anticipated as a result of the fright, it would not be the proximate cause of her injuries. The question of the reasonable anticipation of the injury as a result of the fright is entirely disregarded in that case, and causes it to be in conflict with the weight of authority, because it absolutely disregards this principle. In the Bell case, an instruction was approved which read as follows:

"That if great fright was, in their opinion, a reasonable and natural consequence of the circumstances in which the defendant had placed Mary Bell, and she was actually put in great fright by these circumstances, and if injury to her health was, in their opinion, a reasonable and natural consequence of such great fright, and was actually occasioned thereby, damages for such injury would not be too remote, and might be given for them if they found for the plaintiff."

It was objected that the instruction was erroneous unless the fright was accompanied by physical injury, but it was held the objection was not well founded; that a nervous shock was to be considered as a bodily injury, and, if such bodily injury might be a natural consequence of fright, it was an element of damages for which a recovery might be had; that as the negligence caused fright, if the fright contemporaneously caused physical injury, the damage could not be too remote. This case, like the Purcell case, bases the right of recovery solely on the fact that negligence may cause physical injury, and hence the damage could not be too remote. The courts in the above cases seem to have lost sight of the only safeguard against imposition in cases arising from negligence, and that is the elementary rule that, before a plaintiff can recover, he must show a damage naturally and reasonably arising from the negligent act, and reasonably to be anticipated as a result. Two trains might be passing on a double-track road, one carrying passengers, and the other freight, and, at the moment when the engine of the freight train is immediately opposite a passenger car, it might become necessary to sound a whistle, whose effect might be to startle and greatly frighten a nervous person in the passenger car; and the fact that a whistle unexpectedly sounded would be calculated to startle and frighten a nervous person, and that such fright might produce a nervous shock that would cause physical injury, under the principle announced in the Purcell and Bell cases, supra, would authorize a recovery. That could only be done, under the authority of those cases, by absolutely ignoring the principle that the injury might be reasonably anticipated as the result of the act, and, where it cannot be so anticipated, the result is too remote. These cases are discussed by Beven and Sedgwick without laying sufficient stress on this principle.

In our opinion, these authorities, so much relied on by counsel for appellant, are not only against the great weight of authority, but are not sustainable on principle. Appellee, in this case, was on the premises to collect rent, as he lawfully might, without any knowledge of the nervous condition of appellant; and it cannot be said that his manner, lan

guage, or gestures, or declared purpose of preventing the removal of the household effects of his tenants, were naturally and reasonably calculated to, or that it might be anticipated they would, produce the peculiar injury sustained by the appellant. It could not have been reasonably anticipated by the appellee that any injury therefrom could reasonably have resulted. The action is purely one of negligence; and, if appellee could be held liable under this evidence, then any person who might so speak or act as to cause a stranger of peculiar sensibility, passing by, to sustain a nervous shock productive of serious injury, might be held liable. Thus, one whose very existence was unknown to the party guilty of so speaking and acting would be given a right of recovery. Terror or fright, even if it results in a nervous shock which constitutes a physical injury, does not create a liability. On the ground of public policy alone, having reference to the dangerous use to be made of such cause of action, we hold that a liability cannot exist consequent on mere fright or terror which superinduces nervous shock. The Appellate Court held the language of the appellee, as disclosed by the evidence, was not such as could be held to constitute negligence, and that the injury sustained by appellant could not, according to common experience, be reasonably anticipated to result from such actions and language. We concur in that view, and the judgment of the Appellate Court for the First District is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

SPADE v. LYNN & BOSTON RAILROAD

COMPANY

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. 1897

168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88

TORT, for personal injuries occasioned to the plaintiff by the alleged negligence of the defendant. The declaration alleged that while, on February 16, 1895, the plaintiff was a passenger in the defendant's car, and in the exercise of due care, "one of the defendant's agents or servants, in attempting to remove from said car a certain person claimed and alleged by said defendant's agent to be noisy, turbulent, and unfit to remain as a passenger in said car, conducted himself with such carelessness, negligence, and with the use of such unnecessary force, that said agent and servant, acting thus negligently, created a disorder, disturbance, and quarrel in said car, and thereby frightened the plaintiff and subjected her to a severe nervous shock, by which nervous shock the plaintiff was physically prostrated and suffered, and has continued to suffer, great mental and physical pain and anguish, and has been put to great expense."

At the trial in the Superior Court, before Mason, C. J., there was evidence tending to show that the accident complained of occurred while the plaintiff was being conveyed to her home in Chelsea upon a

crowded car of the defendant company after 10.30 P. M., on February 16, 1895.

The plaintiff testified in substance that two men somewhat intoxicated were allowed, during a part of the trip from Boston to Chelsea, to stand near her in the car, one of them in a position where he was leaning or lurching toward her in such a way that she was obliged to move to avoid him; that a controversy occurred between one of the intoxicated persons and the conductor about the payment of a fare, and that the conductor said to the intoxicated person, after some other conversation, that if he did not keep quiet he would throw him off the car, even if he broke his head; that as she neared the place where she was to leave the car,

"the first thing I saw was the conductor.

grab this man by the collar;

the next thing I saw was . . . another man from the other end of the car, whom I did not know, come down; but the other man, as he pulled him, lurched over on me; then it seemed as though I turned to solid ice. My breath was cut right off. I could not have spoken; I tried to speak, but I chilled so I kept growing stiffer and stiffer, until I did not know, I do not know when they got me off the car."

She further stated that nothing had occurred of any sort or description that gave any suggestion of a warning that the conductor was going to rush at the drunken man at this time; that he did it "just as quick as a man could jump;" and that the intoxicated person standing directly in front of her "lurched over so it kind of pushed me back against the car."

The plaintiff further testified:

"Q. Your body was not injured in any way by contact with this man? A. Oh, no, I was not injured. There were not any marks on me, anything like that."

"Q. You suffered no pain from this man touching you? A. No, not any injury from that.

"Q. What was the cause of this man's touching you, the one that lurched forward? A. When the conductor jumped and grabbed this man that I told about, on the opposite side of the car, that made a commotion, and as he twitched him it pushed this other man over on to me."

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff; and the defendant alleged exceptions, the nature of which appears in the opinion.

S. L. Whipple and W. R. Sears, for plaintiff.

C. K. Cobb, for defendant.

ALLEN, J. This case presents a question which has not heretofore been determined in this Commonwealth, and in respect to which the decisions elsewhere have not been uniform. It is this: Whether, in an action to recover damages for an injury sustained through the negligence of another, there can be a recovery for a bodily injury caused by mere fright and mental disturbance. The jury were instructed that a person cannot recover for mere fright, fear, or mental distress, occasioned

by the negligence of another, which does not result in bodily injury, but that, when the fright or fear or nervous shock produces a bodily injury, there may be a recovery for that bodily injury, and for all the pain, mental or otherwise, which may arise out of that bodily injury. In Canning v. Williamstown, 1 Cush. 451, it was held, in an action against a town to recover damages for an injury sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of a defective bridge, that he could not recover if he sustained no injury in his person, but merely incurred risk and peril which caused fright and mental suffering. In Warren v. Railroad Co., 163 Mass. 484, 40 N. E. 895, the evidence tended to show that the defendant's train struck the carriage of the plaintiff, thereby throwing him out upon the ground; and it was held to be a physical injury to the person to be thrown out of a wagon, or to be compelled to jump out, even although the harm consists mainly of nervous shock. It was not, therefore, a case of mere fright, and resulting nervous shock.

The case calls for a consideration of the real ground upon which the liability or non-liability of a defendant guilty of negligence in a case like the present depends. The exemption from liability for mere fright, terror, alarm, or anxiety, does not rest on the assumption that these do not constitute an actual injury. They do in fact deprive one of enjoyment and of comfort, cause real suffering, and, to a greater or less extent, disqualify one for the time being from doing the duties of life. If these results flow from a wrongful or negligent act, a recovery therefor cannot be denied on the ground that the injury is fanciful and not real. Nor can it be maintained that these results may not be the direct and immediate consequence of the negligence. Danger excites alarm. Few people are wholly insensible to the emotions caused by imminent danger, though some are less affected than others. It must also be admitted that a timid or sensitive person may suffer, not only in mind, but also in body, from such a cause. Great emotion may, and sometimes does, produce physical effects. The action of the heart, the circulation of the blood, the temperature of the body, as well as the nerves and the appetite, may all be affected. A physical injury may be directly traceable to fright, and so may be caused by it. We cannot say, therefore, that such consequences may not flow proximately from unintentional negligence; and, if compensation in damages may be recovered for a physical injury so caused, it is hard, on principle, to say why there should not also be a recovery for the mere mental suffering when not accompanied by any perceptible physical effects.

It would seem, therefore, that the real reason for refusing damages sustained from mere fright must be something different, and it probably rests on the ground that in practice it is impossible satisfactorily to administer any other rule. The law must be administered in the courts according to general rules. Courts will aim to make these rules as just as possible, bearing in mind that they are to be of general application. But as the law is a practical science, having to do with the affairs of life,

any rule is unwise if, in its general application, it will not, as a usual result, serve the purposes of justice. A new rule cannot be made for each case, and there must therefore be a certain generality in rules of law, which in particular cases may fail to meet what would be desirable if the single case were alone to be considered. Rules of law respecting the recovery of damages are framed with reference to the just rights of both parties, not merely what it might be right for an injured person to receive, to afford just compensation for his injury, but also what it is just to compel the other party to pay. One cannot always look to others to make compensation for injuries received. Many accidents occur, the consequences of which the sufferer must bear alone. And, in determining the rules of law by which the right to recover compensation for unintended injury from others is to be governed, regard must chiefly be paid to such conditions as are usually found to exist. Not only the transportation of passengers and the running of trains, but the general conduct of business and of the ordinary affairs of life, must be done on the assumption that persons who are liable to be affected thereby are not peculiarly sensitive, and are of ordinary physical and mental strength. If, for example, a traveller is sick or infirm, delicate in health, specially nervous or emotional, liable to be upset by slight causes, and therefore requiring precautions which are not usual or practicable for travelling in general, notice should be given, so that, if reasonably practicable, arrangements may be made accordingly, and extra care be observed. But as a general rule a carrier of passengers is not bound to anticipate or to guard against an injurious result which would only happen to a person of peculiar sensitiveness. This limitation of liability for injury of another description is intimated in Allsop v. Allsop, 5 Hurl. & N. 534, 539. One may be held bound to anticipate and guard against the probable consequences to ordinary people, but to carry the rule of damages further imposes an undue measure of responsibility upon those who are guilty only of unintentional negligence. The general rule limiting damages in such a case to the natural and probable consequences of the acts done is of wide application, and has often been expressed and applied. Lombard v. Lennox, 155 Mass. 70, 28 N. E. 1125; White v. Dresser, 135 Mass. 150; Fillebrown v. Hoar, 124 Mass. 580; Derry v. Flitner, 118 Mass. 131; Railroad Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469,475; Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 227; Ellis v. Cleveland, 55 Vt. 358; Phillips v. Dickerson, 85 Ill. 11; Jones v. Fields, 57 Iowa, 317, 10 N. W. 747; Renner v. Canfield, 36 Minn. 90, 30 N. W. 435; Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577, 591, 595, 598; The Notting Hill, 9 Prob. Div. 105; Hobbs v. Railway Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 11, 122.

The law of negligence, in its special application to cases of accidents, has received great development in recent years. The number of actions brought is very great. This should lead courts well to consider the grounds on which claims for compensation properly rest, and the necessary limitations of the right to recover. We remain satisfied with the