granted to Fred. N. Lang, on the 10th day of September, 1889, for a "Toy Automatic Race-Course," and contains the usual prayer for an injunction and accounting. The device covered by the patent is a shaft projecting upwards from the centre of the base of a circular shell or case, from 15 to 18 inches in diameter, to which shaft a clock-work mechanism is so geared that it can be made to revolve rapidly by releasing the escapement of the clock-work. On this shaft are mounted two or more radial arms, to the ends of which are attached small toy figures of horses. These radial arms are attached to the shaft by separate collars so loose that they turn easily on the shaft. The clock-work escapement is released by dropping a nickel coin through a slot in the machine, whereupon the shaft commences to revolve rapidly, carrying the radial arms with it, but, after a certain number of revolutions, the force of the clock-work is cut off, and the radial arms continue to revolve, from the momentum they have obtained while the clock-work was going, until such arms finally stop from friction and the resistance of the air. Several objections are urged against the motion for an injunction, such as that the bill is multifarious, non-infringement, etc., which I do not deem it necessary to consider, as it seems to me there is sufficient reason on another ground for withholding the injunction. The proof shows that the only use to which complainant's, or, for that matter, the defendants', machines, have been so far applied, is to place them in saloons, bar-rooms, and other drinking places, where the frequenters of such places make wagers as to which of the toy horses will stop first, or which will stop nearest to a designated point, after the machine has been put in motion, by dropping a nickel in the slot; in other words, the machine in question is only used for gambling purposes. The law of the United States only authorizes the issue of a patent for a new and useful invention, and in an early case on that subject (Bedford v. Hunt, 1 Mason, 302) it was held that the word "useful," as used in this statute, means such an invention as may be applied to some beneficial use in society, in contradistinction to an invention which is injurious to the morals, health, or good order of society, and the principle thus enunciated has been uniformly applied ever since. It is urged that this machine is susceptible of being utilized as a toy, or child's plaything; but it is a sufficient answer to this suggestion that no such use has been as yet made. The patent has been very recently issued, and it is possible that a useful application may yet be found for it; but as the case now stands, the only use to which the invention has been put being for gambling purposes, I must hold that it is not a useful device, within the meaning of the patent law, as its use so far has been only pernicious and hurtful. Injunction refused.1 1 [PROBLEMS: Water alone has in prior art been used to sprinkle roads, for the purpose of holding down the dust. Oil alone has been so used. The plaintiff makes a mix (2) Infringement 226. UNITED TELEPHONE COMPANY v. SHARPLES CHANCERY DIVISION, SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ENGLAND. 1885 L. R. 29 Ch. D. 164 THE plaintiffs are the proprietors of the patent rights in certain telephonic apparatus known as "Bell Telephones" and "Blake Transmitters," and the defendant, Mr. G. Sharples, carries on business as a chemist and electrician, or telegraph engineer, at Preston, in Lancashire, under the firm of Sharples & Co. In November, 1883, the defendant, who had in his possession certain royalty-paid Bell telephones and Blake transmitters, saw an advertisement by the American Telephone Company of Rotterdam in the Electrical Review, offering Bell telephones and Blake transmitters of ordinary construction for sale, and on the 5th of that month he wrote to them saying that he might shortly require a few Blake transmitters and Bell telephones for export, and requesting the company to state their prices. Having ascertained the prices charged by the Rotterdam company, which were much lower than those for which the patented articles could be bought in England, the defendant, on the 10th of November, ordered two Blake transmitters and two Bell telephones, which were ture of oil and water, in which "the water carries minute particles of oil down into the body of the dust, thereby binding the dust particles into a top-dressing that adheres to the roadbed," and attains high utility for the purpose. Is this a patentable invention? (1909, Westrunnite Co. v. Commissioners of Lincoln Park, 7th C. C. A., 174 Fed. 144.) For purposes of commercial clothes-laundries a steam-heated drying-room was long in prior use in the art. An endless conveyor propelled by machinery, with devices for stopping it at will and for carrying buckets or other articles depending from it, was long in prior use in many arts. The plaintiff combined the endless conveyor and the steam-heated drying-room to laundry purposes, so as to attain increased speed, convenience, and efficiency in the process of drying clothes. Was this a patentable invention? (1909, American Laundry M. M. Co. v. Troy Laundry M. Co., 2d C. C. A., 174 Fed. 415.) ESSAYS: Walter F. Rogers, "Patents for Methods; the case of Risdon Iron and Locomotive Works v. Medart et al." (A. L. R., 29, 559.) C. C. Langdell, "Patent Rights and Copy Rights." (H. L. R., XII, 553.) William B. Whitney, “Patentable Processes." (H. L. R., XIX, 30.) Edward W. Hulme, "History of the System of Patents for Industrial Inventions." (Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, III.) Dwight B. Cheever, "Rights of Employer and Employee to Inventions made during Employment." (M. L. R., I, 384.) NOTES: "Employee's patent: Employer's right." (C. L. R., VI, 204.) "Patentee: Monopoly right of." (C. L. R., IX, 536, 559.) "Novelty: Tests of novelty." (H. L. R., VI, 151; XIII, 62.)] shortly afterwards sent by the company and received and paid for by the defendant. . . . The defence admitted that the instruments purchased from the Rotterdam company would, if manufactured in this country, have infringed the plaintiffs' patents, but alleged that the defendant had merely purchased them for examination and experiment by himself and his pupils in his laboratory in order to see if he could improve upon them, that he had never otherwise used them, and that since the commencement of the action he had sent them out of the country as a present to one M. Julius Barlein of Moscow. Theodore Aston, Q. C., Moulton, and A. J. Ashton, for the plaintiffs. The importation and using or vending in England of apparatus manufactured abroad according to the specification of an English patent is an infringement of that patent. . . . Hastings, Q. C., and Goodeve, for the defendant: The plaintiffs' privilege is to "make, use, exercise, and vend" the invention which is the subject of their patents. The defendant has neither made nor vended, nor has he exercised or used it so as to infringe the patents. Mere purchase and importation of a pirated article not for sale or profit is no infringement, and the importer may subsequently lawfully export it as a present. . . . It need not, perhaps, be a user for pecuniary profit, but it must be a user for advantage; and it is perfectly lawful to import from abroad a pirated article, pull it to pieces, and improve it, or use it for the purpose of experiment and instruction; is neither making, using, nor vending. for this KAY, J. (after reviewing the evidence), said: It is admitted by the counsel for the defendant that if a man buys abroad, imports into this country, has in his possession here, and sells, although to a foreign customer, an instrument which he knows would, if made, sold, or used in this country be an infringement of an English patent, that would be an infringement of such patent. I confess I have little hesitation in acceding to this, and in my opinion, upon the balance of the evidence this is what was actually done in this case. Therefore I hold upon that ground that there has been a clear infringement of these patents. But suppose that this was not the case, what is the alternative story? The witness Sharples says: "We used these instruments for the purpose of experiment; the cost of them was so small that we could afford to allow our pupils to pull them to pieces or experiment with them." Now they had, as he says, a number of the so-called royalty-paid instruments, which were more costly; and he says, again and again, "We could not afford to let our pupils use those, and pull them in pieces or experiment with them, and therefore it was that we bought these, which were very much cheaper, in order that our pupils might experiment with and use these, instead of using the more expensive instruments." I am asked to say that that was not a user in this country. What does the word "pupil" mean? The defendant says that the pupils are persons who do not pay anything for being taught, but, on the contrary, that those of them who have been a certain time, or certain classes of them, receive some payment. But whether these pupils, these young persons, who are admitted into this business for the purpose of learning it do or do not pay for their instruction it is obvious enough that they are paid very much less than an ordinary assistant would be paid who did not want to learn the business. They are admitted upon the terms that part of the remuneration they shall get for their services shall be instruction in the business. And to say that to buy a telephone which is an infringement of an English patent for the purpose of instructing your pupils who are learning the business, to let them use and experiment with it, to let them, if they please, pull it in pieces, for the purpose of saving the expense of using the patent telephone and experimenting with or pulling that to pieces, to say that that is not a user in this country, is a thing to which I cannot accede. It seems to me plainly to be a user. If it were nothing but this, that it was fixed (as has been proved) between the lower room and the switch-room for the purpose of being used by the pupils who could not be trusted with the use of the more costly instrument, it would be a part of the instruction of those pupils, and the person who so used it would be getting the advantage of instructing his pupils by means of this cheaper instead of the more expensive instrument. I asked Mr. Goodeve whether he carried his proposition thus far, that there could be no user of a patent unless it produced a direct pecuniary advantage to the person who used it? At first he seemed inclined to go so far, but I think at last he receded from that position; because I put to him this very obvious case: Suppose, for example, if the Singer sewing machine were protected by patent, a man should buy a cheaper instrument which he knows is an infringement of the patent, for some member of his household, who uses it, let us say, for amusement simply, would that be a user in this country or not? Without any doubt it would, although it did not produce to or save him one farthing. Therefore Mr. Goodeve modified his proposition to this, that "it must be a user for the purpose of advantage." Well, then, is not the user which I have been describing a user for the purpose of advantage? If not I do not know what advantage means or user means. I do not think it necessary to consider the other parts of the case, because one instance of clear infringement of the patent is quite enough to justify the order which it seems to me the Court is bound to make. That order is, that there be a perpetual injunction against the defendant Sharples, restraining him from infringement of the plaintiffs' patents, and I order him to pay all the costs of this action. 227. MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. COWING SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1881 105 U. S. 253 APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Mr. William F. Cogswell, for the appellant. Mr. Elisha Foote, for the appellees. Mr. Chief Justice WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court. The only questions raised on this appeal relate to the amount which the Goulds' Manufacturing Company is entitled to recover for the infringement of letters-patent No. 117,925, dated August 8, 1871, for an im- · provement in pumps "specially designed for drawing off the gas from oil-wells and conducting the same to the furnace of the engine." The validity and the infringement of the letters are not disputed here. After the letters and the infringement were established below, the case was sent to a master to ascertain the damages. He reported that 298 pumps had been manufactured and sold by the defendants, out of which a net profit of $47.71 on each pump had been realized, that being the difference between the cost of the material and labor used in making a pump and the price at which it was sold. Upon this report the Court ruled that, as the patent was only for an improvement on an old pump, the profits for which the defendants were accountable must be confined to such as were realized from the manufacture of the patented improvement, and not from the whole pump as improved. For this reason a new reference was ordered to state the account on the proper basis. The second report was, in its result, substantially the same as the first. . . . The master on the second reference, however, reported further as follows: "I find as further facts from the evidence that the plaintiffs' pump, with their patented improvement, which they had introduced into the market, virtually controlled the market, and had superseded all the other pumps then in use for pumping gas, and the others were literally driven out of the market, as they could not be sold at the places where the plaintiffs' pump had been introduced. The defendants went into the very market where the plaintiffs' pump had been introduced, and where they had sold, and where plaintiffs were then supplying most of their pumps, and the defendants, in fact, went and employed Wenson, the former agent of the plaintiffs, to sell the pumps for them, and he, from being the plaintiffs' agent in the locality, made very ready sale of the same pumps for the defendants, and had not the defendants interfered in urging the pumps which they manufactured upon this local market the plaintiffs would certainly have had the whole market to themselves, and would, beyond doubt, have secured orders and supplied the demand of |