"We, the following reputable physicians and dentists, occupying offices in the Eitel Building, endeavoring to uphold the honor and dignity of our professions and desiring to encourage only the best and most desirable tenants for our office building, and thereby conserve the best interests of the public at large, are most emphatically opposed to the indiscriminate rental of offices in this building to osteopaths, neuropaths, autopaths, chiropractors, uptomtereists, unprofessional masseurs, criminal practitioners, 'medical institutes,' advertising 'specialists,' patent medicine fakirs, quacks, charlatans, and other fraudulent concerns. We therefore demand the removal of all such persons now holding offices in this building and the exclusion therefrom of all such undesirable tenants in the future." He further alleged that the signers of the petition delivered a copy thereof with their names attached thereto to R. G. Shrader and the Crane Realty Company, and that these persons caused the same to be circulated and published. He then alleged that the respondents intended by the publication to and did charge him with being a quack and a charlatan in his profession, and with operating a fraudulent concern, and with being an undesirable tenant; and that such charges were false and untrue, and were made wilfully, without just cause or excuse, and for the purpose of injuring and destroying the appellant's good name, and to expose him to hatred, contempt, and ridicule, etc., and that by reason thereof he has suffered damages in the sum of $75,000. To the complaint a demurrer was interposed by the respondents, which the trial Court sustained. The appellant thereupon. elected to stand on the complaint, when a judgment of dismissal and for costs was entered against him. This appeal was taken therefrom. The record does not disclose the ground upon which the trial judge sustained the demurrer to the complaint, but counsel in this Court contend that it was properly sustained for two reasons: First, that the writing on which the action is founded is not libellous; and, second, if it be held to be libellous, it must be held to be privileged. That the writing is libellous per se it has seemed to us there can be but little question. In order to constitute a civil libel per se, it is not necessary that the words published should involve an imputation of crime. It is enough that they be of such a nature that the Court can presume as a matter of law that they will tend to disgrace the party of whom they are published, or hold him up to public ridicule, or contempt, or cause him to be shunned or avoided. The published article in question here tends to do all this, if it does not tend to do more. It carries an insinuation that the appellant is not a reputable physician, or one endeavoring to uphold the honor and dignity of the profession. It classes him with criminal practitioners, patent medicine fakirs, quacks, charlatans, and other fraudulent concerns. It demands his removal from the building in which he has his office as an undesirable tenant, and demands that in the future he be excluded therefrom. Clearly this is libellous per se if published of and concerning the appellant, and he is engaged in a reputable practice, and that it was published of and concerning the appellant and that his practice is reputable, was distinctly alleged in the complaint. The complaint states a cause of action. The judgment appealed from is reversed and remanded, with instructions to reinstate the case, and require the respondents to answer to the merits of the complaint. RUDKIN, C. J., and CHADWICK, GOSE, and MORRIS, JJ., concur. 155. QUINN v. REVIEW PUBLISHING COMPANY SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON. 55 Wash. 69, 104 Pac. 181 1909 DEPARTMENT 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; E. H. Sullivan, Judge. Action by Edward F. Quinn against the Review Publishing Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed. H. M. Stephens, for appellant. Alex. M. Winston, for respondent. MOUNT, J. The respondent brought this action to recover damages upon two causes of action, for alleged libels published against him in the regular issues of the Spokesman-Review, on June 6 and 7, 1908. The action was tried to the Court and a jury. A verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff on the first cause of action for $999, and on the second cause for $1. The defendant has appealed. It appears that the respondent was appointed inspector of sidewalks and cement and concrete work thereon for the city of Spokane, in May, 1904; that he continued as such inspector until July, 1905, when he became chief inspector of such work until June 5, 1908, when he was discharged. It was respondent's duty to inspect all sidewalk work done under contracts with the city, and to see that the terms of such contracts were faithfully complied with by the contractors. While he was chief inspector he had several inspectors under him, and it was his duty to instruct these inspectors, and also to see that they performed their duty. On June 5, 1908, respondent was discharged for alleged incompetency, and the next day the Spokesman-Review published an article as follows: "Blow at Graft and Jobbery. "One by one facts are being disclosed by City Engineer Ralston which demonstrate that the management of the city business under the old DaggettOmo-Gill-McIntyre régime, now drawing slowly to an end, has been honeycombed with inefficiency, favoritism, and graft. The domination of the board of public works by a majority of the members of the city council, and the presence until recently in the city engineers' office of an engineer who conducted that office with little regard for the efficiency in the service, together with the prevalence throughout of an iniquitous and corrupting system of political pull, have conspired to undermine the integrity of the business and of the city admin istration for the profit of favored contractors and others having business dealings with the city. Disclosures of the past few days have shown that appointments to places under the Omo board of public works have been made upon recommendation of members of the council with no regard for the fitness of the applicants; that specifications for contract work have been drawn carelessly in the interests of dishonest or careless contractors, that the system of inspection over street improvement contracts has consisted of one half idle pretence and the other half deliberate favoritism, exerted in behalf of contractors who were influential with the political powers behind the foreman of inspectors, Ed. Quinn. City Engineer Ralston is to be heartily commended for his action in securing the removal of Foreman Quinn and thereby striking one effective blow at this system of graft and jobbery. Already the efforts of Mayor Moore to restore responsible government to the city hall in the interests of the taxpayers are beginning to bear fruit." And on June 7, 1908, another article was published as follows: "Camera Catches False Inspectors. "Civilian Spies also aid in Detecting City Sidewalk Frauds. "A small army of volunteer civilian inspectors and a professional photographer were employed by City Engineer Ralston in procuring the evidence of the collusion of city inspectors through which cement contractors have been able to cheat the city in cement work by from 15 to 35 per cent of the amount of cement called for in their contracts and from 10 to 30 per cent of the actual cost of the work. As a result of the efficient employment of these agencies the engineer has made a case against some of the inspectors which is unshakable, and it was upon this evidence that he discharged a number of inspectors and procured the discharge of Foreman Quinn for inefficiency. Some of the disclosures obtained by the engineer prove the ingenuity of the contractors themselves, but others indicate that the skimping of cement work was accomplished through the frankly confessed negligence or collusion of the inspectors employed by the city to watch the contractors." It is argued by the appellant that these articles are not libellous per se, but, if libellous, are true, and that, therefore, the trial Court erred in denying the appellant's motions made at the close of respondent's evidence, and again at the close of all the evidence, for a directed verdict. In the case of Wofford v. Weeks, 129 Ala. 349, 30 South. 625, 55 L. R. A. 214, 87 Am. St. Rep. 66, the Supreme Court of Alabama quoted from Iron Age Publishing Company v. Crudup, 85 Ala. 520, 5 South. 333, as follows: "Generally any false and malicious publication, when expressed in printing or writing, or by signs or pictures, is a libel, which charges an offence punishable by indictment, or which tends to bring an individual into public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or charges an act odious and disgraceful in society. This general definition may be said to include whatever tends to injure the character of an individual or blacken his reputation, or imputes fraud, dishonesty, or other moral turpitude, or reflects shame, or tends to put him without the pale of social intercourse." And then said: "This quotation clearly recognizes the principle that, if the words employed in the alleged libellous publication impute dishonesty or corruption to an individual, they are actionable per se-a principle well established in other jurisdictions. So, too, it is libellous to impute to any one holding an office that he has been guilty of improper conduct in office, or has been actuated by wicked, corrupt, or selfish motives. Newell, Defamation, Slander & Libel, p. 69." Under this definition, which is no doubt correct, the publications in this case were clearly libellous per se. They charge that the management of the city business under the old régime has been honeycombed with inefficiency, favoritism, and graft; that the domination of the board of public works by a majority of the city council and the presence of an engineer, together with the prevalence throughout of an iniquitous and corrupting system of political pull, have conspired to undermine the integrity of business and of the city administration, for the profit of favored contractors; that the sytem of inspection over street improvement contracts has consisted of one half idle pretence and the other half deliberate favoritism, exerted in behalf of contractors who are influential with the political powers behind the foreman of inspection, Ed. Quinn. City Engineer Ralston is to be commended for his action in securing the removal of Foreman Quinn, and thereby striking an effective blow at this system of graft and jobbery. It is plain that this article and the one published the next day, upon which the second cause of action was based, clearly charged the respondent with being part of the system of jobbery and graft in the management of city contracts, and the main one through whom such jobbery and graft were accomplished; and it was no doubt intended thereby to charge, and did charge, the respondent with being guilty of improper conduct in office, and that he has been actuated by wicked, corrupt, and selfish motives. The articles were therefore libellous per se. We find no error in the record, and the judgment must therefore be affirmed. RUDKIN, C. J., and PARKER, DUNBAR, and CROW, JJ., concur. 156. PECK v. TRIBUNE COMPANY SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1909 214 U. S. 185, 29 Sup. 554 ARGUED April 29, 30, 1909. Decided May 17, 1909. On writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois, directing a verdict for the defendant in an action for libel. Reversed. Reported below, 83 C. C. A. 202, 154 Fed. 330. Mr. S. C. Irving, with whom Mr. Rufus S. Simmons and Mr. Frank J. R. Mitchell were on the brief, for petitioner. The article declared upon was libellous and actionable per se. Words must be construed in their ordinary meaning. . . . The publication which imputes to a person language known to those among whom she lives to contain false statements is libellous. . . . To charge a person with being a liar is libellous per se. . . . Even though the libel does not name the person injured, it is sufficient if it can be shown that it refers to him. . . . Though plaintiff's name was not mentioned, still the words of the publication may clearly refer to the plaintiff. . . . Mistake is not excuse for the publication of a libel. Mr. John Barton Payne, with whom Mr. William G. Beale was on the brief, for respondent. ... The publication of the advertisement, together with the picture of the petitioner, was not libellous per se. . . . The advertisement not being libellous per se, petitioner cannot maintain an action for the publication of her picture because it violates her alleged right of privacy. Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an action on the case for a libel. The libel alleged is found in an advertisement printed in the defendant's newspaper, The Chicago Sunday Tribune, and, so far as is material, is as follows: "Nurse and Patients Praise Duffy's. Mrs. A. Schuman, One of Chicago's Most Capable and Experienced Nurses, Pays an Eloquent Tribute to the Great Invigorating, Life-Giving, and Curative Properties of Duffy's Pure Malt Whisky." Then followed a portrait of the plaintiff, with the words, "Mrs. A. Schuman," under it. Then, in quotation marks, "After years of constant use of your Pure Malt Whisky, both by myself and as given to patients in my capacity as nurse, I have no hesitation in recommending it as the very best tonic and stimulant for all local and run-down conditions," etc., etc., with the words, "Mrs. A. Schuman, 1576 Mozart St., Chicago, Ill.," at the end, not in quotation marks, but conveying the notion of a signature, or at least that the words were hers. The declaration alleged that the plaintiff was not Mrs. Schuman, was not a nurse, and was a total abstainer from whisky and all spirituous liquors. There was also a count for publishing the plaintiff's likeness without leave. The defendant pleaded not guilty. At the trial, subject to exceptions, the judge excluded the plaintiff's testimony in support of her allegations just stated, and directed a verdict for the defendant. His action was sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 83 C. C. A. 202, 154 Fed. 330. Of course, the insertion of the plaintiff's picture in the place and with the concomitants that we have described imported that she was the nurse and made the statements set forth, as rightly was decided in Wandt v. Hearst's Chicago American, 129 Wis. 419, 421, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 919, 116 Am. St. Rep. 959, 109 N. W. 70, 9 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 864; Morrison v. Smith, 177 N. Y. 366, 69 N. E. 725. Therefore the |