substantial or material advantage has resulted from the speaking of the words. That is not shown in this declaration, and therefore I reluctantly hold that the demurrer is good. If upon further inquiry anything can be found amounting to such special damage as the law requires, the plaintiffs may have leave to amend their declaration. . . .

BLACKBURN, J. The law upon the subject of disparaging words spoken of other persons is not in a satisfactory state. For words written an action is maintainable, though possibly not more than one farthing damages could be obtained, whereas for words spoken imputing unchastity to a woman no action can be maintained unless special damages is shown; for which purpose there must be material injury to the interests of the person slandered. What is here alleged is not more than loss of the consortium vicinorum.

Judgment for the defendant.

(1) Oral Defamation (Slander)

144. CRITTAL v. HORNER

COMMON PLEAS. 1619

Hob. 219

CRITTAL brought an action of the case against Horner, for saying, that he had caught the French pox, and had carried them home to his wife, and had judgment: the slander is not in the wicked means of getting them, but in the odiousness of the infection, as a leper, 2 Cro. 144. 1 Roll. 44.

145. LACY v. REYNOLDS

KING'S BENCH. 1591.

Cro. Eliz. 215

ACTION for words, which were, "He is as very a thief as any is in Warwick gaol"; and avers that J. S. was then a prisoner in Warwick gaol condemned for horse-stealing. And it was clearly held that for these words action did lie, with this averment, but not otherwise.

146. ROBINS v. FRANKS

KING'S BENCH. 1601

Cro. Eliz. 857

ACTION for these words: "Thou art a rogue, and a thief." After verdict it was moved in arrest of judgment, that an action lies not for

these words, for they are too general. But the Court held, that for the word "thief" it is maintainable, unless it be coupled with other words, which prove it to be no felony intended. Wherefore it was adjudged for the plaintiff.

ACTION for these words: "Thou has killed thy master's cook" (innuendo one John Yarrington, servant to Mr. Dingley), who was murdered. The defendant pleaded not guilty; and found against him.

It was moved in arrest of judgment, because he doth not shew who was the plaintiff's master, nor that Mr. Dingley was master to him who was slain; so the words are uncertain. Sed non allocatur; for it is not material who was the plaintiff's master, because the words in themselves import slander. Wherefore it was adjudged for the plaintiff.

148. PETT-MORGAN v. KENNEDY

SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA. 1895

62 Minn. 348, 64 N. W. 912

APPEAL by defendant William Kennedy from an order of the District Court for Ramsey County, Otis, J., overruling his demurrer to the complaint. Affirmed.

John L. Townley, for appellant. The words set out in the complaint are not actionable per se. . . . The words must charge an indictable offence, involving moral turpitude and subjecting the person to infamous punishment. . . . So far as appears from the complaint, plaintiff was charged with misdemeanor punishable with a fine or imprisonment commutable to a fine. This is not an indictable crime, punishable with infamous punishment. The imputation does not involve moral turpitude.

...

Frank P. Hopkins, for respondent. . . . The words charged impute a crime. . . . The charge involved moral turpitude. .

COLLINS, J. It is further contended in appellant's behalf that the words set out in the complaint as those spoken by Mrs. Kennedy are not actionable per se. They were as follows: "He has been drunk throughout Thanksgiving week. He has not returned any night during that week other than in a state of drunkenness. He has drunken people in his room. He gets people in his room and makes them drunk. He was drunk during the early hours of the morning after Thanksgiving." Drunkenness is a crime under the laws of this State. G. S. 1894, 6949. It is punishable by indictment. It was held in St. Martin v. Desnoyer,

1 Minn. 131 (156), and again in West v. Hanrahan, 28 Minn. 385, 10 N. W. 415, that words spoken of another which, when taken in their plainest and most natural sense, and as they would be ordinarily understood, obviously import the commission of a crime punishable by indictment are actionable per se. It is barely possible that, in view of the many indictable offences in this State under the present statutes, some of which reflect very slightly, if at all, upon the moral character of a person indicted, the proposition so flatly laid down in these two cases will have to be qualified; but here the misbehavior charged in the words alleged to have been used by the defendant's wife was not only indictable, but involved the element of moral turpitude, and was such as to injuriously affect the social standing of the plaintiff. In view of the moral sentiment of the people of this State on the subject of drunkenness, so pronounced as to lead to the enactment of the Scheffer law in 1889, we do not hesitate to say that moral turpitude is involved in the charge that a man has been getting other people drunk, and has himself been on a drunken debauch lasting for a week. The words uttered, according to the complaint, were actionable per se.

Order affirmed.

149. LOYD v. PEARSE

KING'S BENCH. 1618

Cro. Jac. 424

ACTION for these words: "Thou are a bankrupt rogue, and accounted a common knave; and thou art a thief, and hast stolen my corn." As to the first words, "Thou are a bankrupt rogue, and accounted a common knave," the defendant pleaded not guilty; and as to the other words he justified. The issue being thereupon joined, both the pleas were found for the plaintiff, and twelvepence damages given for the first words, and for the last words thirty-nine shillings; and costs for both. But the plaintiff having judgment for both, it was for this cause reversed: for the first words in the first issue are not actionable, the plaintiff being neither merchant nor tradesman; and the judgment being entire it is reversable in toto; for, in the judgment, the damages are conjoined, although they were severed in the verdict.

150. CLIFFORD v. COCHRANE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS. 1882

10 Ill. App. 570

ERROR to the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Elliott Anthony, of the Superior Court, sitting as Circuit Judge, presiding. Opinion filed April 10, 1882.

This was an action for libel, brought by appellant against appellee, based on the publication of an article in the Chicago Times newspaper, and which was subsequently republished in the San Francisco Chronicle. The declaration sets forth, in substance, that the plaintiff was an architect by profession; that he was employed by the city hall commissioners of San Francisco, to superintend the construction of the new city hall building in that city; that he gave the required bond, and entered upon the discharge of his duties as architect of the building. It then alleges the formation of a conspiracy, by a ring composed of divers persons in San Francisco, including the proprietors of the San Francisco Chronicle, to force the plaintiff to resign, so that they might elect one of their own number, and thus get control of the expenditure of the moneys, etc.; that to that end they procured certain false "opinions" so-called, of other architects, and among others the opinion of the defendant, Cochrane, to the effect that the plaintiff was crazy and wholly incompetent to discharge the duties of an architect, and that his appointment would be a public calamity, etc. That the opinion of the defendant was in the form of a conversation or interview between a reporter of the Chicago Times and the defendant, the latter knowing at the time of making them that his statements were to be published in that paper. The declaration alleges that the statements were published in the Times, and a few days subsequently appeared in the Chronicle.

The interview, as reported in the Times, was as follows:

Reporter: "Mr. Cochrane, with your permission I should like to ask you a few questions. Do you know an architect by the name of John Clifford ?" Cochrane: "Well, I did know an architect by the name of John Clifford some years ago, but he has not been a resident here for several years. I wonder what has become of the poor fellow."

Reporter: "I can enlighten you. He is in California. What is your opinion of him both as an individual and an architect ?"

Cochrane: "Well, as an individual, if you want me to speak frankly, I think he is crazy."

Reporter: "What would you say if he had been appointed architect of our city hall ?"

Cochrane: "I could scarcely conceive of such a thing happening; but had it happened I should regard it in the light of a public calamity. But, excuse my curiosity, why do you ask these questions ?"

Reporter: "Because Mr. Clifford has been appointed architect of the San Francisco city hall

Cochrane: "What, you are joking! Why, the thing is impossible." Reporter: "Nothing is impossible under an inscrutable Providence. I am afaid you are weak in the faith. Let me reassure you. Not only has this come to pass, but more remarkable still, in view of what you have just said, he refers to you as one who can vouch for his qualifications to creditably fill the position."

Cochrane: "You don't say so! He refers to me, does he? Well, well, to be sure, this is a somewhat delicate matter; but I have nothing to take back. I again say that I cannot regard his appointment in any other light than a public calamity."

The declaration contains the usual colloquium and innuendoes, alleging the words to have been spoken of the plaintiff as an architect, and avers that in consequence of the republication of the article in the San Francisco Chronicle, his bondsmen withdrew as sureties on his bond, and being unable to procure others, he was forced to, and did, resign his position of the building in question. The declaration also avers that by reason of the committing of the several grievances complained of, the plaintiff has been injured in his good name and in his reputation as an architect, and has been deprived of great gains and profits, which would otherwise have accrued to him; and that he suffered special damage by being forced to give up his position as architect of the new city hall building, whereby he was deprived of large profits, etc. Damages laid at $50,000.

To the declaration the defendant filed a general demurrer, which was sustained by the Court, and the plaintiff standing by his declaration, judgment was rendered for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed to this Court, and assigns for error the sustaining of the demurrer to the declaration..

Mr. W. T. Butler and Mr. Robert Hervey, for plaintiff. Messrs. Roberts & Hutchinson, for defendant in error. WILSON, P. J. It is first insisted by the learned counsel for appellee, that the plaintiff's declaration consists of two counts instead of one, and that as such, neither count shows a cause of action. After a careful examination of the allegations and averments of the construction claimed, . . . [we do not accept this view.]

Were the words as set out in the declaration actionable without proof of special damages? That they are so, we entertain no doubt. It is a familiar principle that words not actionable in themselves may become so if spoken of one engaged in a particular calling or profession. The general rule in relation to the speaking words of one in a particular calling may be stated as follows: Any words spoken of such a person in his office, trade, profession, or business, which tend to impair his credit, or charge him with fraud, or indirect dealings, or with incapacity, and that tend to injure him in his trade, profession, or business, are actionable, without proof of special damage. Starkie on Slander, 178 and notes; Townshend on Slander, 278 (3d ed.); Ostram v. Calkins, 5 Wend. 263; Demarest v. Haring, 6 Cow. 76; Chaddock v. Briggs, 13 Mass. 247; Chipman v. Cook, 2 Tyler Vt. 456; McMillen v. Birch, 1 Binney, 178; Day v. Buller, 3 Wils. 59; Onslow v. Horne, Id. 177.

In the latter case Lord Ch. J. DeGrey said:

"One of the general rules governing this action, is that words are actionable when spoken of one in an office of profit which may probably occasion the loss of his office, or when spoken of persons touching their respective professions, trades, and business, and do, or may probably tend to their damage." The rule as thus succinctly and comprehensively stated, is quoted by Parker, Ch. J., in Chaddock v. Briggs, supra, as also in many other