In short, the plaintif had no interest in the property of which he says he has been deprived by the fraudulent interference of the defendant, beyond a mere naked possibility; an interest which might indeed influence his hopes and expectations, but which is altogether too shadowy and evanescent to be dealt with by courts of law. I am of opinion that the defendant is entitled to judgment. 140. HARTLEY v. HERRING KING'S BENCH. 1799 8 T. R. 130 In an action upon the case for consequential damage arising from certain slanderous words spoken by the defendant of the plaintiff, the declaration stated that the plaintiff was, until the speaking and publishing of the false, scandalous and malicious words, &c., from time to time occasionally employed to preach to a certain congregation of persons dissenting from the church of England, at a certain chapel situate and being in the parish of Saint Mary Lambeth in the county of Surry, for that purpose regularly and in due form of law licensed, and had by reason of such good character and for such preaching received divers great gains profits and emoluments to his great benefit and advantage and to the comfortable support of himself and his family, to wit, at, &c.; Nevertheless the defendant well knowing the premises but maliciously contriving and intending to deprive him thereof, and to bring him into disrepute and detestation among his neighbours and amongst the persons 1 [PROBLEMS: R. made a will said to be in the plaintiff's favor. On R.'s death, the defendant took the will and suppressed it. The plaintiff brings an action of tort. (1909, Thayer v. Kitchen, 200 Mass. 382, 86 N. E. 952.) A reward of $200 had been offered for the arrest of a criminal. The plaintiff found out where the criminal was hiding, and called up a constable to send him to make the arrest, and share the reward; the telephone-receiver was in the defendant's store, the constable being near by there; the defendant answered the call, pretended to be the constable, got the information, made the arrest, and refused to divide the reward; is there an action? (1898, Smith v. Gentry, Ky. -, 45 S. W. 514.) The defendant, an ex-employee of the plaintiff, falsely stated to customers that the plaintiff was going out of business; the plaintiff had for several years prepared and sold a Christmas Annual; the defendant sold his annual instead. (1904, Sheppard Pub. Co. v. Press Pub. Co., 10 Ont. 243; analogous facts: 1886, Dudley v. Briggs, 141 Mass. 582.) "Suppose a man had a relation of a penurious disposition, and a third person, knowing that it would injure him in the opinion of that relation, tells the latter a generous act which the first has done, by which he induces the relation not to leave him money. Would that be actionable?" (Per Littledale, J., in Kelly v. Partington, 5 B. & Ad. 645.)] frequenting the said chapel, and to induce the said persons to prevent his preaching there or receiving any profit gain or emolument thereby on, &c. at, &c. scandalously, &c. spoke the following words, &c. (setting out the scandalous words, which charged the plaintiff with incontinence), per quod the plaintiff was injured in his good name, &c. and was fallen into disgrace among his neighbours and with the persons frequenting the said chapel as aforesaid, insomuch that the said persons frequenting the said chapel by reason of the speaking, &c. have wholly refused to permit him to preach at the said chapel, and have withdrawn from him their countenance and support, and have discontinued giving him the gains and profits and emoluments which they had usually given and would otherwise have given; and that the plaintiff was in other respects greatly damnified and hindered from getting his livelihood, to wit, at, &c. Best moved in arrest of judgment in the last term, because words charging a person with incontinence are not actionable in the common law courts, unless special damage be laid; and here none is precisely laid, it not being stated who were the persons who in consequence of the slander discontinued giving the plaintiff the emoluments he had before received, or that there was any certain stipend annexed to the chapel, or that the persons who frequented had a right to remove him from it, or that he was a preacher duly qualified according to the 10 Ann. c. 2. And he cited 1 Roll. Abr. 58. C. 35. Barnes v. Prudlin, 1 Sid. 396, 7. and Hunt v. Jones, Cro. Jac. 499. Marryat now shewed cause. The declaration alleges the special damage with as much certainty as the subject matter is capable of. It states that the plaintiff before the speaking of the scandalous words was employed to preach to a dissenting congregation at a certain licensed chapel, (the locality of which is stated,) and that he derived considerable profit from his good character and preaching, and that by reason of the scandal of the defendant the persons frequenting the chapel had refused to permit him to preach there, and had discontinued giving him the profits which they usually had and would otherwise have given. It was impossible to state who the congregation were by name, because being a large fluctuating and uncertain body they cannot be known to the plaintiff himself. The stating therefore where the chapel was, and the nature of the emolument which the plaintiff derived from his preaching, is stating as much as is necessary to enable the defendant to come prepared to meet the charge; and on this ground the cases cited are distinguishable from the present. 1 Roll. Abr. 58 was the case of slandering a brewer in his trade, by which he lost his customers, without stating any of them by name, which was holden ill: but there the plaintiff must have known who his customers were whom he had lost, and the defendant could not be enabled to defend himself without such notice. Lord KENYON, Ch. J. I see no objection to this declaration. But in deciding the present case I wish not to shake the authority of any of the cases relied upon by the defendant, which are distinguishable from the present for the reasons given at the bar. Where a plaintiff brings an action for slander by which he lost his customers in trade, he ought in his declaration to state the names of those customers, in order that the defendant may be enabled to meet the charge if it be false. But here the plaintiff was in possession of this office; and we are to conclude upon this record that he was properly licensed. But how could he have stated the names of all his congregation? He has stated that, in consequence of the words spoken of him by the defendant, he was removed from his office, and lost the emoluments of it, which (I think) is sufficient. The three other Judges expressing the same opinion, the Rule was discharged. SUB-TOPIC B. EXISTENCE OF THE RELATION AND ITS Loss 141. ANON. The Attorney's Practice in the King's Bench (1750, 3° ed., Vol. II, p. 157). Declaration for words [with no allegation of special damage]. Kent, to wit. W. M. late of C. in the said county was attached to answer to F. R. in a plea of trespass on the case, etc. and whereupon the said F. by his attorney complains, That whereas he the said F. is a good, true, pious, faithful and honest subject of this kingdom, and as a good, true, pious, faithful and honest subject of this kingdom hath hitherto demeaned and behaved himself, and as a good, true, pious, faithful and honest subject of this kingdom from the time of his nativity until the speaking, uttering and publishing of the scandalous, false, malicious and defamatory words first herein after mentioned to be spoken of the said F. was reputed and esteemed among all faithful and honest subjects of this kingdom with whom he dealt and conversed, and to whom he was known, and never was guilty of theft, robbery, fraud, or any such hurtful and odious crimes, nor until the speaking, uttering and publishing of the false, scandalous, malicious and defamatory words herein after first mentioned of the said F. was ever suspected to be guilty of those crimes or any of them: And the said F. by reason of his good name, fame, and reputation aforesaid, had obtained the love and good-will of all his neighbours and other faithful and honest subjects of this kingdom with whom he conversed and had dealings: Nevertheless he the said W. well knowing the premisses, but contriving and maliciously and wickedly intending to injure, defame and slander the said F. and to deprive him of his good name, fame credit and reputation aforesaid, and bring him into scandal, contempt and reproach, as well among all his neighbours, and friends, as other faithful and honest subjects of this kingdom, and to cause him to be punished according to the laws of this kingdom, made and provided against theft, robbery, felony and fraud, on the eighteenth day of march in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and thirty-eight at Chatham aforesaid, in a certain discourse which the said W. then and there had with divers subjects of this kingdom of and concerning the said F. did falsely, wickedly and maliciously speak, utter and publish of and concerning the said F. in the presence and hearing of those subjects, certain false, scandalous, malicious and defamatory words, to wit, He (meaning the said F.) is an old rogue and has robbed me (meaning him the said W.); And the said W. of his further malice prepensed against the said F. afterwards, to wit, on the same day and year, at Chatham aforesaid, in a certain other discourse which the said W. then and there had with divers other subjects of this kingdom of and concerning the said F. did falsely, wickedly and maliciously, and without any reasonable or probable cause whatsoever, publish and declare in the presence and hearing of those subjects, that the said F. had robbed him; by reason of the speaking, uttering and publishing which said several false, scandalous, malicious and defamatory words so spoken, uttered and published by the said W. of the said F. as aforesaid, and of the publishing of the said slander, he the said F. is greatly hurt, injured, prejudiced and damnified in his good name, fame, credit and reputation: . . to the damage of the said F. of two hundred pounds: And thereupon he brings suit, etc 142. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE. Commentaries on the Laws of England. (1765. Book III, p. 123.) Injuries affecting a man's reputation or good name are, first, by malicious, scandalous, and slanderous words, tending to his damage and derogation. As if a man maliciously and falsely utter any slander or false tale of another; which may either endanger him in law, by impeaching him of some heinous crime, as to say that a man hath poisoned another, or is perjured; or which may exclude him from society, as to charge him with having an infectious disease; or which may impair or hurt his trade or livelihood, as to call a tradesman a bankrupt, a physician a quack, or a lawyer a knave.. A second way of affecting a man's reputation is by printed or written libels, pictures, signs, and the like; which set him in an odious or ridiculous light, and thereby diminishes his reputation. 143. ROBERTS v. ROBERTS. (QUEEN'S BENCH. 1864. 5 B. & S. 384.) THE declaration stated that the plaintiff, Margaret, was a member of a sect of Protestant Dissenters, to wit, Calvinistic Methodists, and was a member of a private society and congregation of that sect held at Denbigh in North Wales, and the sect, and the different Societies of it, were subject to certain rules and regulations, and the different members of the sect and the Societies were respectively subject to those rules and regulations, and under the control and authority of the several respective Societies and of the leaders of the same, with respect to the moral and religious conduct of such members, and with respect to their being respectively allowed and permitted to be and continue to be members of the different Societies and congregations of the sect, and by those rules and regulations a member of one Society in the sect could not become a member of another Society in the sect unless the leaders or elders of the first-mentioned Society certified that the said member was morally and otherwise fit to be a member of such sect and of a Society of the same; and the defendant, being a member of the sect and of the Society to which the plaintiff Margaret then belonged, and well knowing the premises, falsely and maliciously spoke and published of the plaintiff Margaret, and of her as a member of such sect and Society, and in the presence of the leaders or elders and other members of the Society and congre gation which the plaintiffs and the defendant had just before then been attending, the false and scandalous words following in the Welsh language (setting them out), which words being translated into the English language have the meaning and effect following, and were so understood by the persons to whom they were so spoken and published, that is to say, "You" (meaning the plaintiff Robert Roberts) "have got for a wife" (meaning the plaintiff Margaret) "as great a whore as any in the town of Liverpool. . . ." meaning thereby that the plaintiff Margaret had been guilty of such immoral conduct as would prevent her being allowed and permitted to remain, become, or be a member of any Society and congregation of the sect aforesaid: and by means of the premises the plaintiff Margaret was not allowed or permitted to continue or be any longer a member of the Society and congregation aforesaid, and was turned out of the same, and the leaders or elders of the Society refused to certify that the plaintiff Margaret was morally or otherwise fit to be a member of the sect or of any Society or congregation of the same; and the plaintiff Margaret being desirous of becoming a member of a Society and congregation of the sect in Liverpool, was not allowed or permitted or able to become a member of the Society in Liverpool, and was prevented from attending religious worship; and by means of the premises the plaintiff Margaret became and was greatly injured in her good name and reputation, and became sick and ill and greatly distressed in body and mind. Averment, that, by means of the premises, the plaintiff Robert Roberts had been put to and incurred great expenses in and about nursing the plaintiff Margaret, and endeavouring to get her cured from her sickness, illness and distress of mind, and had sustained divers other injuries and damages. And the plaintiffs claimed 500l. Demurrer, and joinder. McInture, for the defendant. The words in the declaration are not actionable without special damage: Allsop and Wife v. Allsop, 5 H. & N. 534; Lynch v. Knight and Wife, in error, 9 H. L. C. 577. . . . And no special damage is alleged sufficient to render the words actionable by reason of such damage. Crompton Hutton, contra. Sufficient special damage to the wife is shown for which the husband may maintain this action. If the special damage must be pecuniary, an action for slander of a wife never could be maintained, as the damage would be to the husband, not to the wife. . . . COCKBURN, C. J. No cause of action is shown on this declaration, as it does not allege special damage sufficient to make the words spoken of the female plaintiff actionable. It is admitted that the loss of consortium vicinorum is not sufficient; and I am of opinion that the loss by the female plaintiff of membership of this Society and congregation, which appears to have been constituted for religious or spiritual purposes, amounts at most to no more than the loss of the merely nominal distinction of being able to call herself a member of it. It does not appear that any real or material advantages attach to membership; such as loss of a seat in the chapel, or of the opportunity of attending Divine worship there. If by reason of the words spoken the female plaintiff had been excluded from the meetings for religious worship, or from anything substantial which by right attached to membership of the Society, I should be disposed to hold that it was sufficient special damage. I think that to prevent a woman whose character for chastity is assailed from bringing an action for the purpose of vindicating it is cruel; but, as the law at present stands, such an action is not maintainable unless it be shown that the loss of some |