under this statute. That feature is not at all to be considered in measuring or estimating the loss sustained, or in determining the liability, in case of lineal kindred, when there is death caused by a wrongful act. In Railroad Co. v. Moranda, 93 Ill. 302, it is said (page 304): "It was wholly immaterial whether such next of kin had or had not other pecuniary resources after his death. Such evidence was held incompetent in O'Brennan's case, 65 Ill. 160, and in Powers' case, 74 Ill. 343." In the O'Brennan case, supra, it will be found that O'Brennan was seeking to recover damages for a personal injury, and he was permitted to testify that he was a supporter of his family as a lecturer. This was held to be immaterial, and the Court, in commenting on such evidence, say (page 163): "If it was admissible, then it would have been competent to have gone further, and shown all the circumstances of the family, — such as that the mother was an invalid, that one of the daughters was blind, that one son had accidentally lost a leg, etc., if such had been the case, so as to present a most pitiable picture of a helpless family dependent upon appellee for support as a lecturer; for, as the evidence had no place in the case but as a stimulant to the sympathy of the jury, it would be just as competent to make the stimulant strong as weak." See also Railway Co. v. Powers, supra. In Railroad Co. v. Baches, 55 Ill. 379, it is said: "The feelings of the widow and next of kin, their wealth or poverty, or any other fact than the pecuniary injury, cannot be considered in assessing the damages." The number and ages of the family are not material, as has been held, where the relation is lineal, as the sole measure of damages is pecuniary loss; that is, how much would the deceased, in all probability, have added to the estate, had he lived, which amount would not be affected by the number or ages of such kindred, as each would only get his proportionate share as provided by law for the distribution of the personal property of an intestate, without being increased or diminished, as to any one of them, on account of poverty, age, or physical condition. As to lineal heirs, as in this case, the authorities above clearly show the injury for the wrongful death is limited to the pecuniary or property interest of such kin in the life destroyed. It cannot be enhanced or diminished by showing the poverty, wealth, or physical helplessness of any of such kindred. To permit that to be done would be to make this defendant, for illustration, assume the burden of such conditions, if unfortunate, which is not contemplated by the statute. Railway Co. v. Powers, supra, cited in Moranda case, supra. For these reasons it was material error to admit evidence that Clarence Woolridge was a cripple, unable to work, and that he depended on his father for support. The question is not, under this statute, as to lineal kindred, how many there were, or their mental or physical con dition, but is solely how much would the deceased have been worth to them, in all reasonable probability, had he continued to live, which fact, as said in the Brodie case, supra, is easily ascertainable by proof as above indicated. . . . For the errors indicated the judgments of the Circuit and Appellate Courts are reversed, and the cause remanded. Reversed and remanded. 110. CARTER, J., in BRENNAN v. CHICAGO & CARTERVILLE COAL COMPANY. (1909, 241 Ill. 610, 89 N. E. 756.) The evidence objected to simply showed that the deceased supported his family with his earnings. This Court held in Pennsylvania Co. v. Keane, 143 Ill. 172, 175, 32 N. E. 260, 261, that it was competent to show that the wife, children, or next of kin were dependent upon the deceased for support before and at the time of his death, stating that: "This view is in consonance with the statute that gives the action, and which provides that such damages shall be given as are a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury resulting from the death to the wife and next of kin of the deceased person. It cannot well be said that proof that the wife or next of kin of the deceased were, at and before the time of his decease, dependent upon him for support, or that he was her or their sole support, is wholly immaterial and irrelevant to any point at issue in the case." This doctrine has been quoted with approval in Swift & Co. v. Foster, 163 Ill. 50, 44 N. E. 837; St. Louis, Peoria, & Northern Railway Co. v. Dorsey, 189 Ill. 251, 59 N. E. 593; Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago, & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Kinnare, 203 Ill. 388, 67 N. E. 826. These authorities are not in conflict with Chicago & Northwestern Railroad Co. v. Moranda, 93 Ill. 302, 34 Am. Rep. 168; Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill. 512; Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. . May, 108 Ill. 288; Chicago, Peoria, & St. Louis Railroad Co. v. Woolridge, supra, as contended by counsel for appellant. These last authorities lay down the rule that it is not competent to show the pecuniary circumstances of the widow, family, or next of kin at the time of or since the decease of the intestate, and are reviewed and distinguished by this Court in St. Louis, Peoria, & Northern Railway Co. v. Dorsey, supra. While it is erroneous to admit evidence of the resources of the widow or next of kin or their financial condition, it is not error to allow questions concerning the earnings of the deceased, and whether the wife and children were supported by him. 111. PERHAM v. PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY SUPREME COURT OF OREGON. 1898 33 Or. 451, 53 Pac. 14 [Point (2) of the opinion as set forth in No. 117, post.] 112. SAN ANTONIO & ARANSAS PASS RAILROAD SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS. 1894 87 Tex. 148, 27 S. W. 113 ERROR from Court of Civil Appeals of Fourth Supreme Judicial District. Action by Fannie Long and others against the San Antonio & Aransas Pass Railway Company. There was a judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals (26 S. W. 114) affirming a judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error. Reversed. Houston Bros., for plaintiff in error. Denman and Franklin, for defendants in error. GAINES, J. The plaintiffs in the trial Court (the defendants in error in this. Court) are the sons and daughters of Mrs. M. C. Long. They brought this suit, under the statute, to recover damages for injuries resulting to them from the death of their mother, which was alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, the San Antonio & Aransas Pass Railway Company. The petition alleged that the youngest of plaintiffs was twenty-four years old on the day of the accident which resulted in Mrs. Long's death. The allegations of the petition with reference to the damages were as follows: "Plaintiffs aver that said M. C. Long, during her lifetime, aided in the support and maintenance of each one of plaintiffs, cared for them in time of sickness, and at other times, and that her house was their home whenever they desired to make it such, and that each had every reasonable expectation that if said M. C. Long had lived she would have continued to aid and assist in the support and maintenance of each of them, as aforesaid; and they aver that by her death each of them has been deprived of her motherly care and assistance, and her said support and maintenance, all in their damage in the sum of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000)." These allegations were specially excepted to, substantially upon the ground that they were vague and indefinite. The Court overruled the exceptions, and we think there was no error in that ruling. It is contended that the petition should have averred specially the nature of the aid extended by Mrs. Long, in her lifetime, to each of the plaintiffs. The fact that the deceased, during her life, contributed to the support of her children, is evidence to be considered by the jury in determining the pecuniary loss sustained by them by reason of her death; and it may be that in a case like this, in which the children are all adults, and no longer abide under the parental roof, some evidence of a like character or effect is necessary in order to justify a recovery of damages. Such facts are not in themselves substantive facts which justify a judgment, and, being mere matters of evidence, are not required to be pleaded either in detail, or with any great degree of particularity. . . . The only witness who testified as to the family relations of the plaintiffs and the deceased, and as to the facts affecting the amount of damages, was Miss Fannie Long. In addition to the portions of her testimony which have already been set out, she deposed, in substance, that the deceased left surviving her neither father nor mother, and that the plaintiffs (two sons and four daughters) were her only children; the deceased mother, at the time of her death, had property amounting in value to $18,500; and that the income of her property was about $1,850. All of this except about $250, which was used in her own support, she devoted to the assistance of her children. She was cross-examined on that subject, but was unable to give either the date or amount of any donation, or the amount in the aggregate, that any one received in any one year. One received remittances of money, the children of another were given clothing, and others occasionally lived with her at her expense. All the children were of full age at the time of their mother's death. Three of them only resided permanently with her. Such was the substance of the testimony upon the question of damages. Such being the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs upon the question of the amount of damages, the defendant offered in evidence the will of Mrs. M. C. Long, duly probated, in which she devised and bequeathed all of her estate to her four daughters. To the reading of the will in evidence, the plaintiffs objected, and their objection was sustained, and the evidence excluded. This action of the Court raises the serious question in this case, and it is one which is of first impression in this Court. In an action for injuries resulting in death, can the defendant show, for the purpose of reducing the damages, that the plaintiffs have received, by devise or descent, property from the estate of the deceased? If such evidence be admissible in any case of like character, it was certainly admissible in this case. The authorities are not numerous, and the expressions of the Courts are in an apparent conflict upon the question. Among the cases relied upon in support of the negative is that of Railroad Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. 90. The defendant asked the Court to charge the jury "that if the persons for whose benefit this action is brought have received, in consequence of the death of said Barron, and out of his estate inherited by them from him, a pecuniary benefit greater than the amount of damages which could, under any circumstances, be recovered in this action, then, as a matter of law, they have, by the death of said Barron, sustained no actual injury for which compensation can be recovered in this action." Upon error to the Supreme Court of the United States, that Court held, in effect, that the charge was properly refused. The trial Court had, however, charged the jury, among other things, as follows: "In this case the next of kin are the parties who are interested in the life of the deceased. They were interested in the further accumulations which he might have added to his estate, and which might hereafter descend to them. The jury have the right, in estimating the pecuniary injury, to take into consideration all the circumstances attending the death of Barron, the relations between him and his next of kin, the amount of his property, the character of his business, the prospective increase of wealth likely to accrue to a man of his age, with the business and means which he had. There is a possibility, in chances of business, that Barron's estate might have decreased, rather than increased, and this possibility the jury may consider. The jury may also take into consideration that he might have married, and his property descended in another channel. And there may be other circumstances which might affect the question of pecuniary loss, which it is difficult for the Court to particularize, but which will occur to you. The intention of the statute was to give a compensation which the widow, if any, or the next of kin, might sustain by the death of the party; and the jury are to determine, as men of experience and observation, from the proof, what that loss is." It is apparent, we think, that evidence had been admitted of property received by inheritances by the beneficiaries from the estate of the deceased, and the case cannot be considered as a decision upon the question of the admissibility of such evidence. The Court do not even discuss the charges given and refused, but in course of their opinion say, in a general way: "The statute in respect to this measure of damages seems to have been enacted upon the idea that as a general fact the personal assets of the deceased would take the direction given them by law, and hence the amount recovered is to be distributed to the wife and next of kin in proportion provided for in the distribution of personal property left by a person dying intestate. If the person injured had survived, and recovered, he would have added so much to his personal estate, which the law, on his death, if intestate, would have passed to his wife and next of kin. In case of death by the injury the equivalent is given by a suit in the name of his representative." www. The suit was brought under the statute of Illinois which made the widow and next of kin the beneficiaries of the recovery, and directed that the amount recovered should be divided among them "in the proportion provided by law in relation to the distribution of personal property left by persons dying intestate." The Court seems to proceed — in part, at least upon the theory that the damage which the statute is intended to compensate is the loss which accrues to the widow and next of kin of the deceased, as distributees of his estate, by reason of his premature death; such loss being the difference between what the deceased actually left and what he would have left, had not his life been cut short by the wrong of the defendant. That difference would seem to be his probable future savings, had he lived. The proportion in which the recovery is to be distributed tends to indicate that this was the leading consideration in providing the right of action; for if the loss of any individual benefits, capable of pecuniary estimation, which would probably have accrued to any beneficiary during the life of the deceased, was to be compensated |