Hance showed cause, and Sir F. Thesiger, Solicitor-General, supported the rule. The judgments sufficiently explain the nature of the case. Cur. adv. vult. In this vacation (9th July), there being a difference of opinion on the bench, the learned judges who heard the argument delivered judgment seriatim. COLERIDGE, J. In this case, in which we have unfortunately been unable to agree in our judgment, I am now to pronounce the opinion which I have formed.1 . . This point is, whether certain facts, which may be taken as clear upon the evidence, amount to an imprisonment. These facts, stated shortly, and as I understand them, are in effect as follows: A part of a public highway was inclosed, and appropriated for spectators of a boat-race, paying a price for their seats. The plaintiff was desirous of entering this part, and was opposed by the defendant; but after a struggle, during which no momentary detention of his person took place, he succeeded in climbing over the inclosure. Two policemen were then stationed by the defendant to prevent, and they did prevent, him from passing onwards in the direction in which he declared his wish to go; but he was allowed to remain unmolested where he was, and was at liberty to go, and was told that he was so, in the only other direction by which he could pass. This he refused for some time, and during that time remained where he had thus placed himself. These are the facts; and, setting aside those which do not properly bear on the question now at issue, there will remain these: that the plaintiff, being in a public highway and desirous of passing along it in a particular direction, is prevented from doing so by the orders of the defendant, and that the defendant's agents for the purpose are policemen, from whom, indeed, no unnecessary violence was to be anticipated, or such as they believed unlawful, yet who might be expected to execute such commands as they deemed lawful with all necessary force,. however resisted. But, although thus obstructed, the plaintiff was at liberty to move his person and go in any other direction, at his free will and pleasure; and no actual force or restraint on his person was used, unless the obstruction before mentioned amounts to so much. I lay out of consideration the question of right or wrong between these parties. The acts will amount to imprisonment, neither more nor less, from their being wrongful or capable of justification. And I am of opinion that there was no imprisonment. To call it so appears to me to confound partial obstruction and disturbance with total obstruction and detention. A prison may have its boundary large or narrow, visible and tangible, or, though real, still in the conception only; it may itself be movable or fixed; but a boundary it 1 [WILLIAMS and PATTESON, JJ., concurred with the judgment of COLERIDGE, J.] must have, and that boundary the party imprisoned must be prevented from passing; he must be prevented from leaving that place, within the ambit of which the party imprisoning would confine him, except by prison-breach. Some confusion seems to me to arise from confounding imprisonment of the body with mere loss of freedom; it is one part of the definition of freedom to be able to go whithersoever one pleases; but imprisonment is something more than the mere loss of this power: it includes the notion of restraint within some limits defined by a will or power exterior to our own. In Com. Dig. Imprisonment (G), it is said: "Every restraint of the liberty of a free man will be an imprisonment." For this the authorities cited are 2 Inst. 482; Cro. Car. 209. But when these are referred to, it will be seen that nothing was intended at all inconsistent with what I have ventured to lay down above. In both books the object was to point out that a prison was not necessarily what is commonly so called, a place locally defined and appointed for the reception of prisoners. If, in the course of a night, both ends of a street were walled up, and there was no egress from the house but into the street, I should have no difficulty in saying that the inhabitants were thereby imprisoned; but if only one end were walled up, and an armed force stationed outside to prevent any scaling of the wall or passage that way, I should feel equally clear that there was no imprisonment. If there were, the street would obviously be the prison, and yet, as obviously, none would be confined to it. Knowing that my lord has entertained strongly an opinion directly contrary to this, I am under serious apprehension that I overlook some difficulty in forming my own; but, if it exists, I have not been able to discover it, and am therefore bound to state that, according to my view of the case, the rule should be absolute for a new trial. Lord DENMAN, C. J. [dissenting]. I have not drawn up a formal judgment in this case, because I hoped to the last that the arguments which my learned brothers would produce in support of their opinion might alter mine. We have freely discussed the matter both orally and in written communications; but, after hearing what they have advanced, I am compelled to say that my first impression remains. I consider these acts as amounting to imprisonment. That word I understand to mean any restraint of the person by force. In Buller's Nisi Prius, p. 22, it is said: "Every restraint of a man's liberty under the custody of another, either in son; a locking up would constitute an imprisonment, without touching. From the language of Thorpe, C. J., which Mr. Selwyn cites from the Book of Assizes, it appears that, even in very early times, restraint of liberty by force was understood to be the reasonable definition of imprisonment. I had no idea that any person in these times supposed any particular boundary to be necessary to constitute imprisonment, or that the restraint of a man's person from doing what he desires ceases to be an imprisonment because he may find some means of escape. It is said that the party here was at liberty to go in another direction. I am not sure that in fact he was, because the same unlawful power which prevented him from taking one course might, in case of acquiescence, have refused him any other. But this liberty to do something else does not appear to me to affect the question of imprisonment. A's long as I am prevented from doing what I have a right to do, of what importance is it that I am permitted to do something else? How does the imposition of an unlawful condition show that I am not restrained? If I am locked in a room, am I not imprisoned, because I might effect my escape through a window, or because I might find an exit dangerous or inconvenient to myself, as by wading through water, or by taking a route so circuitous that my necessary affairs should suffer by delay? It appears to me that this is a total deprivation of liberty with reference to the purpose for which he lawfully wished to employ his liberty; and, being effected by force, it is not the mere obstruction of a way, but a restraint of the person. The plaintiff did right to resist it as an outrageous violation of the liberty of the subject from the very first. Rule absolute. 57. WOOD v. CUMMINGS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. 1908 197 Mass. 80, 83, N. E. 318 SUPERIOR COURT, Essex County. Action by William L. Wood against Arthur C. Cummings. Verdict directed for defendant, and case reported to the Supreme Judicial Court. Judgment ordered for plaintiff. This was an action of tort in three counts: The first for assault and battery; second, for false imprisonment; and, third, for conversion of a lot of wood-working machinery. January 20, 1904, John F. Smith was adjudicated a bankrupt, and on February 29, 1904, defendant qualified as trustee of the estate Plaintiff held a mortgage on Smith's goods and chattels of the date May 28, 1900, which also covered the engine hereinafter mentioned, and of which there was a breach of condition in payment of principal and interest at the time of bankruptcy. February 24, 1904, defendant took possession of the shop and contents as trustee, and locked the door, keeping the key. March 2, 1904, defendant and plaintiff entered the shop together; defendant having the door locked behind them. After checking the property, defendant, on demand of plaintiff, had the door unlocked so he could leave. Plaintiff testified that he sustained no injury or damage from such act of defendant. Later plaintiff got permission from Mrs. Smith, who owned the premises, to enter the shop, and, finding defendant's lock on the door, broke it off and entered in defendant's absence, declaring his intention to take possession and foreclose his mortgage. Defendant appeared and endeavored to eject plaintiff bodily, but failed, and left. Plaintiff then locked the door with a padlock of his own. Plaintiff testified that he sustained no injury or damage from this act of defendant. Harrison Dunham and Oscar E. Jackson, for plaintiff. Alden P. White and Guy C. Richards, for defendant. KNOWLTON, C. J. The plaintiff's claim of damages for false imprisonment is not sustained by the evidence. The testimony shows that the locking of the door was not to imprison the plaintiff, but for another purpose. As soon as the plaintiff made known his desire to go out, the door was unlocked, and the plaintiff suffered no injury nor damage. At the time of the alleged assault the plaintiff had entered the shop with the permission of the owner. The defendant, appearing later, objected, and said he would try to put the plaintiff out of the shop. "At once they wrestled with each other, and after some time the defendant, not being able to put the plaintiff out, left the premises." Here was a use of force upon the person of the plaintiff, against his will and without justification in law. For this the plaintiff has a right of action, and may recover nominal damages. Com. v. Collberg, 119 Mass. 350, 20 Am. Rep. 328. . . . Judgment for the plaintiff for nominal damages. ... Topic 2. Imprisonment by an Officer of Justice (Arrest) 58. GENNER v. SPARKES KING'S BENCH. 1704 1 Salk. 79, 6 Mod. 173 GENNER, a bailiff, having a warrant against Sparkes, went to him in his yard, and, being at some distance, told him he had a warrant, and said he arrested him. Sparkes, having a fork in his hand, keeps off the bailiff from touching him, and retreats into his house. And this was moved as a contempt. Et per CURIAM. The bailiff cannot have an attachment, for here was no arrest nor rescous. Bare words will not make an arrest; but if the bailiff had touched him, that had been an arrest, and the retreat a rescous, and the bailiff might have pursued and broke open the house, or might have had an attachment or a rescous against him; but as this case is, the bailiff has no remedy but an action for the assault; for the holding up of the fork at him when he was within reach, is good evidence of that. 59. RUSSEN v. LUCAS NISI PRIUS. 1824 1 C. & P. 153 ACTION against the sheriff for an escape. The only point in dispute was, whether a person named Hamer was arrested by the sheriff's officer, and escaped. The officer having the warrant went to the One Tun Tavern in Jermyn Street, where Hamer was sitting. He said: "Mr. Hamer, I want you." Hamer replied, "Wait for me outside the door, and I will come to you." The officer went out to wait, and Hamer went out at another door, and got away. ABBOTT, C. J. Mere words will not constitute an arrest; and if the officer says, "I arrest you," and the party runs away, it is no escape; but if the party acquiesces in the arrest, and goes with the officer, it will be a good arrest. If Hamer had gone even into the passage with the officer, the arrest would have been complete; but, on these facts, if I had been applied to for an escape-warrant, I would not have granted it. Nonsuit. EXCEPTIONS from Rutland County Court; MUNSON, Judge. Action by Horatio U. Goodell against William W. Tower and others. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendants bring exceptions. Affirmed. Argued before ROWELL, C. J., and TYLER, START, WATSON, STAFFORD, and HASELTON, JJ. William W. Stickney, John G. Sargent, and Homer L. Skeels, for plaintiff. Butler & Moloney, for defendants. TYLER, J. This action is trespass for false imprisonment. The question arises upon the complaint upon which the warrant was issued. V. S. 5001, reads: "Sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, constables, police officers, other prosecuting officers, and all officers of societies for the prevention of |