Jordan began to blow those heavy blasts, until they got through." This was also objected to. The jury were required to find specially, among other things, how much damages they assessed in each action, "for negligence in blasting, including as well the mental anxiety, as the other source of damages.' The jury answered these questions; and in the case of Mrs. Wyman, they found the sum of $264. There is no evidence in the cases of any injury to the persons of either party or to their child; or of any wanton conduct on the part of the defendant or of his servants. Was the testimony objected to and admitted in relation to Mrs. Wyman's fear of her own or of her child's safety, legally admissible? As a general proposition, damages are recoverable when they are the natural and reasonable result of the defendant's unlawful act that is when they are such a consequence as in the ordinary course of things, would flow from such an act. This is the broad rule, covering all the elements of damages, some of which do not enter into every case. The rule though correct as a general abstract statement has its limitations in particular cases. It may include insult and contumely, but they do not exist in every case of personal injury. Personal injury usually consists in pain inflicted both bodily and mental. When bodily pain is caused, mental follows as a necessary consequence, especially when the former is so severe as to create apprehension and anxiety. And not only the suffering experienced before the trial, but such as is reasonably certain to continue afterward, as the result of the injury, rightfully enters into the assessment of damages. In trespass for assault and battery, the jury may consider not only the mental suffering which accompanies and is a part of the bodily pain, but that other mental condition of the injured person which arises from the insult of the defendant's blows. Prentiss v. Shaw, 56 Me. 427; Wadsworth v. Treat, 43 Me. 163. Or for an assault alone, when maliciously done, though no actual personal injury be inflicted. Goddard v. Grand T. Ry., 57 Me. 202; Beach v. Hancock, 27 N. H. 223; 2 Greene's Cr. Rep. 269. So in various other torts to property alone when the tortfeasor is actuated by wantonness or malice, or a wilful disregard of others' rights therein, injury to the feelings of the plaintiff, resulting from such conduct of the defendant, may properly be considered by the jury in fixing the amount of their verdict. But we have been unable to find any decided case, which holds that mental suffering alone, unattended by any injury to the person, caused by simple actionable negligence, can sustain an action. And the fact that no such case exists, and that no elementary writer asserts such a doctrine, is a strong argument against it. On the contrary it has been held that a verdict, founded upon fright and mental suffering, caused by risk and peril, would in the absence of personal injury, be contrary to law. Canning v. Williamstown, 1 Cush. 451. So it is said (in Lynch v. Knight, 9 Ho. L. 577, 598), that, "mental pain and anxiety, the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone." Again, in Johnson v. Wells, 6 Nev. 224 (3 Am. R. 245), after a very elaborate examination, it was held that pain of mind, aside and distinct from bodily suffering, cannot be considered in estimating damages in an action against a common carrier of passengers. If the law were otherwise, it would seem that not only every passenger on a train that was personally injured, but every one that was frightened by a collision or by the trains leaving the track, could maintain an action against the company. See an elaborate note by Mr. Wood in his edition of Mayne on Damages, 70 et seq. We are of the opinion, therefore, that Mrs. Wyman's testimony relating to her fears, as to her own personal safety, was erroneously admitted. Whether a fright of sufficient severity to cause a physical disease would support an action, we need not now inquire. We also think that her testimony, relating to her anxiety about her child's safety, was inadmissible. . . . We fail to perceive upon what principle of law the mother or father could recover for parental feelings in an action like the one at the bar. As to the action of Mr. Wyman - the jury found specially, as in his wife's case, a certain sum for mental anxiety, though less in amount, although there was no testimony upon that point coming from him. The two cases were properly tried together, and the wife must necessarily have had more or less influence upon the other, and cannot well be now separated. We therefore think exceptions should be sustained in both Exceptions sustained. APPLETON, C. J., DANFORTH, PETERS, and LIBBEY, JJ., concurred.1 cases. Topic 3. Loss of Privacy [See the cases post, under Title D, Mixed Harms, Nos. 333-336.] 1 [PROBLEMS: The defendant was trying to set fire to the house in which the plaintiff was, and he pointed a gun at her and told her that he would blow her head off if she did not go back into the house. She was frightened, took her children, ran away, caught cold from exposure and was ill. May she recover for the mental suffering? (1902, Kline v. Kline, 158 Ind. 602, 64 N. E. 9.) The plaintiff was unlawfully obliged to leave the defendant's train before her destination, and to walk along a side-track in which there was a culvert. She fell into this, and while there was frightened by the approach of cars being switched on the side track. She was not physically injured nor made ill. Could she recover for the fright? (1888, Stutz v. R. Co., 73 Wis. 147.)] SUB-TITLE (IV): LOSS OF LIBERTY (IMPRISONMENT) Topic 1. Imprisonment, in General 51. REGISTRUM BREVIUM (1595). Breve de imprisonamento (fol. 93). Quare vi & armis in ipsum A. apud N. insultum fecit, & ipsum verberauit, vulnerauit, imprisonauit, & male tractauit, & alia enormia &c. 52. REGISTRUM BREVIUM (1595). Breve de imprisonamento quosque finem et quoddam scriptum obligatorium fecisset (fol. 93). Pone B. etc. Quare vi & armis ipsum A. apud N. cepit, imprisonauit, & male tractauit, & ipsum sic imprisonatum abinde vsque T. duxit, & ipsum ibidem in prisona, quousque idem A. finem per vndecim solidos pro deliberatione sua habenda cum praefato B. ac quoddam scriptum obligatorium viginti librarum quod ipse praefatum B., occasione imprisonamenti praedicti non prosequetur, eidem B. fecisset, detinuit, & alia enormia &c. 53. W. S. An Exact Collection of Choice Declarations etc. diligently Perused and Translated into English for the benefit and helpe of young Clerkes. (1653. Part 2, p. 111.) Declaration in trespass and false imprisonment: I. I. lately of, etc. and B. P. lately of, etc. were attached to answer W. N. of a Plea, wherefore by force and arms, him the said W. at London, they took, imprisoned, and evill handled, and him there so in prison against the Law and Custome of the Realm of our Lady the Queen that now is, they long deteyned, and other harms to him they did, to the great Damage of him the said W. and against the Peace of our Lady the Queen, etc. And whereupon the same W. by I. W. his Attorney complaines, that the aforesaid I. and B. (such a day and year) by force and arms, that is to say, with Clubs and Knives, him the said W. at London, etc. they took, imprisoned, and evill handled, And him there in Prison against the Law and Custome of the Realm of our Lady the Queen that now is, they long, that is to say, for the space of thirty dayes they deteined, And other harms, etc. To the great Damage, etc. And against the Peace, etc. Whereupon he saith, he is worsted, and hath Damage, to the value of 300 pounds, And thereupon he brings his Sute, etc. 54. WRIGHT v. WILSON NISI PRIUS. 1699 1 Ld. Raym. 739 A. HAS a chamber adjoining to the chamber of B. and has a door that opens into it, by which there is a passage to go out; and A. has another door, which C. stops, so that A. cannot go out by that. This is no imprisonment of A. by C. because A. may go out by the door in the chamber of B.; though he be a trespasser by doing it. But A. may have a special action upon his case against C. Ruled by HOLT, C. J., in evidence at a trial at the Summer assizes at Lincoln, 1699, in an action of false imprisonment. And the plaintiff was nonsuit. TRESPASS for assault and false imprisonment. Plea, the general issue. At the trial at the Middlesex Sittings in Easter Term before Gurney, B., the following appeared to be the facts of the case: The plaintiff, who sued by his next friend, was an infant about ten years old. He was placed by his mother, who was a widow, at a school kept by the defendant at Stockwell. The terms of the defendant's school were twenty guineas a year, payable quarterly. The first quarter, which became due on the 29th of September, 1833, was duly paid. On the 24th of December in the same year, the plaintiff's mother went to the school and asked the defendant to permit the plaintiff to go home with her for a few days. The defendant refused, and would not permit the mother to see her son, and told the mother that he would not allow him to go home, unless the quarter ending on the 25th of December was paid. The mother remonstrated, and said she would pay the quarter's schooling in a short time, but it was not due until the next day. A few days afterwards, the mother went again to the defendant at his school, and demanded from him to see her son, and be allowed to take him home with her. The defendant refused. On the 31st of December, the mother went again with a friend, and made the same demand; but the defendant refused to let her see the plaintiff, or to allow her to take him home, and he then claimed another quarter's schooling, as a few days of the quarter after the 25th of December had then elapsed, and he insisted on keeping the plaintiff until that amount also should be paid. A formal demand was afterwards made, and on a writ of habeas corpus being sued out, the plaintiff was sent home, seventeen days having elapsed after the first demand by his mother. No proof was given that the plaintiff knew of the denial to his mother, nor was there any evidence of any actual restraint upon him. On these facts the learned Baron was of opinion that there was no evidence of an imprisonment to go to the jury, and he nonsuited the plaintiff. Comyn obtained a rule to set aside the nonsuit and for a new trial, against which cause was now shown by Hutchinson, for the defendant. The nonsuit was right. There was no corporal touch or restraint on the plaintiff. The form of the proceeding in trespass shows that there must be an actual force. . . Comyn and Butt, contra. The boy was sent by his mother to the defendant's school. She had authority to place him in the care of the schoolmaster, and she had authority to determine his continuance there. Now it was proved that the authority from the mother to the master was withdrawn, and the defendant could not justify the detention after such authority was withdrawn. [ALDERSON, B. The fallacy seems to me to be, that you assume, for the purpose of your argument, that every boy at school is in prison. If that were so, you would go a long way to convince us that when the authority to keep him there is at an end, his remaining at school might be an imprisonment. That, however, is not so with regard to a boy at school. In the case of a lunatic perhaps it may be different. A person of full age restrained as a lunatic, might probably be taken prima facie to be detained against his will.] The assent of a child of such tender years may perhaps be assumed, in the first instance, because the law will presume the assent of an infant to what is for his benefit; but that assent must be taken to be revoked when the contract for schooling is determined by the act of the mother. In the present case, the plaintiff was detained during the holidays, and it may fairly be presumed that a keeping at school during the holidays is against the will of a school-boy. [BOLLAND, B. The evidence did not bring the schoolmaster and the plaintiff into contact, so as to show that there was any the least restraint of the one upon the other.] Every detention against the will is a false imprisonment. . . . The only question is, whether there was any evidence to go to the jury of a detention against the will of the plaintiff. It is submitted that there was. BOLLAND, B. This was an action of trespass for assault and false imprisonment, brought by an infant by his next friend. . . . In the present case, as far as we know, the boy may have been willing to stay; he does not appear to have been cognizant of any restraint, and there was no evidence of any act whatsoever done by the defendant in his presence. I think that we cannot construe the refusal to the mother in the boy's absence, and without his being cognizant of any restraint, to be an imprisonment of him against his will; and therefore I am of opinion that the rule must be discharged. GURNEY, B. This plaintiff complains of an assault and false imprisonment. There was no evidence of any restraint upon him. There was no evidence that he had any knowledge of his mother having desired that he should be permitted to go home, nor that anything passed between the plaintiff and defendant which showed that there was any compulsion upon the boy; and there was nothing to show that he was conscious that he was in any respect restrained. . 56. BIRD v. JONES QUEEN'S BENCH. 1845 7 Q. B. 742 Rule discharged. THIS action was tried before Lord DENMAN, C. J., at the Middlesex sittings after Michaelmas term, 1843, when a verdict was found for the plaintiff. In Hilary term, 1844, Thesiger obtained a rule nisi for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection. In Trinity term, in the same year (June 5), Platt, Humfrey, and |