Applied Industrial EconomicsLouis Phlips Cambridge University Press, 1998. gada 24. sept. - 443 lappuses This reader provides a unique mix of American and European contributions to the study of particular markets, often combined with a critical evaluation of antitrust regulations, decisions or judgments. Part I explains market structure as a function of sunk costs and market size. Part II illustrates the central role of pricing schemes (including parallel pricing, delivered pricing and competition clauses) in sustaining equilibrium outcomes in oligopolistic markets. Parts III and IV give a game-theoretic foundation to competition policy and merger control. Louis Phlips offers a comprehensive introduction to the text in which he very carefully explains the reasoning behind his choice of papers, and provides a superb synthesis of the material. Particular highlights include the discussion and evaluation of antitrust regulations, which involve a systematic comparative analysis of European and American regulations, decisions and judgments in this area. |
No grāmatas satura
1.5. rezultāts no 91.
3. lappuse
... equilibrium number of firms sell their salt in a more or less competitive way and realize the equilibrium profits . 1.1 A two - stage game Why suppose that this game has two stages ? Why not suppose that the investments in setting up ...
... equilibrium number of firms sell their salt in a more or less competitive way and realize the equilibrium profits . 1.1 A two - stage game Why suppose that this game has two stages ? Why not suppose that the investments in setting up ...
4. lappuse
... equilibrium . Solving the second stage first , you get ' estimates of these incomes ' ( as Marshall calls the subgame equilibrium profits ) which ' directly govern supply ' , that is , which allow you to find the equilibrium N * ( in ...
... equilibrium . Solving the second stage first , you get ' estimates of these incomes ' ( as Marshall calls the subgame equilibrium profits ) which ' directly govern supply ' , that is , which allow you to find the equilibrium N * ( in ...
5. lappuse
... equilibrium prices are compatible with σ and the corresponding market structure , the game is solved backwards as explained above . However , once the game is actually played and circumstances change , inconsistency may indeed arise and ...
... equilibrium prices are compatible with σ and the corresponding market structure , the game is solved backwards as explained above . However , once the game is actually played and circumstances change , inconsistency may indeed arise and ...
6. lappuse
... ( equilibrium ) point , however , each producer would make a net loss of σ . It would therefore only make sense to enter the salt business if one were sure that nobody else would enter . More precisely , for any σ > 0 , N * = 1 : exactly ...
... ( equilibrium ) point , however , each producer would make a net loss of σ . It would therefore only make sense to enter the salt business if one were sure that nobody else would enter . More precisely , for any σ > 0 , N * = 1 : exactly ...
8. lappuse
... equilibrium level of total sunk costs , which has now become endogenous . The end result is that there will not be room in the market for more and more firms as market size increases : market structure does not become more and more ...
... equilibrium level of total sunk costs , which has now become endogenous . The end result is that there will not be room in the market for more and more firms as market size increases : market structure does not become more and more ...
Saturs
Game theory and industry studies An introductory overview | 33 |
Gametheoretic models of market concentration Sunk costs and market structure a review article | 52 |
Expanding markets Capacity expansion in the titanium dioxide industry | 62 |
Declining markets The devolution of declining industries | 81 |
Empirical evidence Exit from declining industries shakeout or stakeout? | 98 |
Industrial pricing and pricing schemes | 121 |
Intertemporal pricing schemes Experimental tests of consciously parallel behaviour in oligopoly | 123 |
Spatial pricing schemes On the strategic choice of spatial price policy | 152 |
Collusion and predation On the detection of collusion and predation | 269 |
Vertical restraints Vertical restraints in European competition policy | 284 |
Franchising agreements Economic assessment of competition law provisions applicable to franchising | 295 |
Joint RD ventures Cooperative and noncooperative RD in duopoly with spillovers | 318 |
Mergers and merger control | 325 |
Unprofitable exogenous mergers Losses from horizontal merger the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on CournotNash equilibrium | 327 |
Profitable horizontal mergers and welfare Horizontal mergers an equilibrium analysis | 340 |
Using the HerfindahlHirschman index Horizontal mergers comment | 368 |
Bestprice policies Facilitating practices the effects of advance notice and bestprice policies | 174 |
Vertical pricing schemes Vertical restraints and producers competition | 188 |
Price discrimination in a common market International price discrimination in the European car market | 196 |
Tacit collusion 1 Interfirm rivalry in a repeated game an empirical test of tacit collusion | 232 |
Tacit collusion 2 Collusive equilibrium in the great salt duopoly | 249 |
Competition policy | 267 |
Cournot and merger control Horizontal mergers reply | 375 |
Vertical mergers Vertical mergers in multiproduct industries and Edgeworths paradox of taxation | 382 |
Enforcement of the US merger guidelines Empirical evidence on FTC enforcement of the merger guidelines | 393 |
Enforcement of the European merger regulation The merger decisions of the European Commission | 413 |
436 | |
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advertising analysis announced antitrust assumption behaviour Bureau of Competition Bureau of Economics buyers capacity cent chapter coefficient Commission competition policy competitors concentration conscious parallelism consider consumers Cournot equilibrium decision demand discount duopoly efficiency elasticity entry barriers equation equilibrium price estimated European example exit exogenous firm i's firm's franchise function given Herfindahl index horizontal mergers implies import quota incentive increase Journal of Economics list price marginal cost market power market share market structure markups maximization merging firms monopoly Nash equilibrium non-cooperative non-price number of firms observed oligopolistic oligopoly output p₁ period plant players Pont possible pre-merger predictions price changes price competition price differences price discrimination pricing equation product differentiation profits proposition reduce repeated game resale price maintenance restrictions result retail prices rivals session static Nash strategies subgame-perfect substitution sunk costs tacit collusion theory titanium dioxide United Kingdom variables vertical restraints welfare zero