Applied Industrial EconomicsLouis Phlips Cambridge University Press, 1998. gada 24. sept. - 443 lappuses This reader provides a unique mix of American and European contributions to the study of particular markets, often combined with a critical evaluation of antitrust regulations, decisions or judgments. Part I explains market structure as a function of sunk costs and market size. Part II illustrates the central role of pricing schemes (including parallel pricing, delivered pricing and competition clauses) in sustaining equilibrium outcomes in oligopolistic markets. Parts III and IV give a game-theoretic foundation to competition policy and merger control. Louis Phlips offers a comprehensive introduction to the text in which he very carefully explains the reasoning behind his choice of papers, and provides a superb synthesis of the material. Particular highlights include the discussion and evaluation of antitrust regulations, which involve a systematic comparative analysis of European and American regulations, decisions and judgments in this area. |
Saturs
Game theory and industry studies An introductory overview | 33 |
Gametheoretic models of market concentration Sunk costs and market structure a review article | 52 |
Expanding markets Capacity expansion in the titanium dioxide industry | 62 |
Declining markets The devolution of declining industries | 81 |
Empirical evidence Exit from declining industries shakeout or stakeout? | 98 |
Industrial pricing and pricing schemes | 121 |
Intertemporal pricing schemes Experimental tests of consciously parallel behaviour in oligopoly | 123 |
Spatial pricing schemes On the strategic choice of spatial price policy | 152 |
Collusion and predation On the detection of collusion and predation | 269 |
Vertical restraints Vertical restraints in European competition policy | 284 |
Franchising agreements Economic assessment of competition law provisions applicable to franchising | 295 |
Joint RD ventures Cooperative and noncooperative RD in duopoly with spillovers | 318 |
Mergers and merger control | 325 |
Unprofitable exogenous mergers Losses from horizontal merger the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on CournotNash equilibrium | 327 |
Profitable horizontal mergers and welfare Horizontal mergers an equilibrium analysis | 340 |
Using the HerfindahlHirschman index Horizontal mergers comment | 368 |
Bestprice policies Facilitating practices the effects of advance notice and bestprice policies | 174 |
Vertical pricing schemes Vertical restraints and producers competition | 188 |
Price discrimination in a common market International price discrimination in the European car market | 196 |
Tacit collusion 1 Interfirm rivalry in a repeated game an empirical test of tacit collusion | 232 |
Tacit collusion 2 Collusive equilibrium in the great salt duopoly | 249 |
Competition policy | 267 |
Cournot and merger control Horizontal mergers reply | 375 |
Vertical mergers Vertical mergers in multiproduct industries and Edgeworths paradox of taxation | 382 |
Enforcement of the US merger guidelines Empirical evidence on FTC enforcement of the merger guidelines | 393 |
Enforcement of the European merger regulation The merger decisions of the European Commission | 413 |
| 436 | |
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Bibliogrāfiskā informācija
| Nosaukums | Applied Industrial Economics |
| Redaktors | Louis Phlips |
| Izdevums: | ilustrēts, jauns izdevums |
| Izdevējs | Cambridge University Press, 1998 |
| ISBN | 0521629543, 9780521629546 |
| Apjoms | 443 lappuses |
| Eksportēt avotu | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |