Applied Industrial Economics

Pirmais vāks
Louis Phlips
Cambridge University Press, 1998. gada 24. sept. - 443 lappuses
This reader provides a unique mix of American and European contributions to the study of particular markets, often combined with a critical evaluation of antitrust regulations, decisions or judgments. Part I explains market structure as a function of sunk costs and market size. Part II illustrates the central role of pricing schemes (including parallel pricing, delivered pricing and competition clauses) in sustaining equilibrium outcomes in oligopolistic markets. Parts III and IV give a game-theoretic foundation to competition policy and merger control. Louis Phlips offers a comprehensive introduction to the text in which he very carefully explains the reasoning behind his choice of papers, and provides a superb synthesis of the material. Particular highlights include the discussion and evaluation of antitrust regulations, which involve a systematic comparative analysis of European and American regulations, decisions and judgments in this area.

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Atlasītās lappuses

Saturs

Game theory and industry studies An introductory overview
33
Gametheoretic models of market concentration Sunk costs and market structure a review article
52
Expanding markets Capacity expansion in the titanium dioxide industry
62
Declining markets The devolution of declining industries
81
Empirical evidence Exit from declining industries shakeout or stakeout?
98
Industrial pricing and pricing schemes
121
Intertemporal pricing schemes Experimental tests of consciously parallel behaviour in oligopoly
123
Spatial pricing schemes On the strategic choice of spatial price policy
152
Collusion and predation On the detection of collusion and predation
269
Vertical restraints Vertical restraints in European competition policy
284
Franchising agreements Economic assessment of competition law provisions applicable to franchising
295
Joint RD ventures Cooperative and noncooperative RD in duopoly with spillovers
318
Mergers and merger control
325
Unprofitable exogenous mergers Losses from horizontal merger the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on CournotNash equilibrium
327
Profitable horizontal mergers and welfare Horizontal mergers an equilibrium analysis
340
Using the HerfindahlHirschman index Horizontal mergers comment
368

Bestprice policies Facilitating practices the effects of advance notice and bestprice policies
174
Vertical pricing schemes Vertical restraints and producers competition
188
Price discrimination in a common market International price discrimination in the European car market
196
Tacit collusion 1 Interfirm rivalry in a repeated game an empirical test of tacit collusion
232
Tacit collusion 2 Collusive equilibrium in the great salt duopoly
249
Competition policy
267
Cournot and merger control Horizontal mergers reply
375
Vertical mergers Vertical mergers in multiproduct industries and Edgeworths paradox of taxation
382
Enforcement of the US merger guidelines Empirical evidence on FTC enforcement of the merger guidelines
393
Enforcement of the European merger regulation The merger decisions of the European Commission
413
Index
436
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