Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT II Treaty): Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-sixth Congress, First Session ....U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979 |
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administration Admiral GAYLER Admiral HOLLOWAY agree ALCM amendment answer arms control assistant to Senator Backfire bomber basing mode believe buildup capability Chairman STENNIS COLBY committee concessions cruise missiles deploy deployment deterrence EXON fact going heavy bombers heavy missiles ICBM ICBM's IKLE intelligence intercontinental issue Joint Chiefs launch launchers limitations ment military Minuteman Minuteman III MIRVed national technical means NATO negotiating record NITZE nuclear forces nuclear weapons percent PIPES position President problem programs protocol provisions question ratified Rowny RUMSFELD Russians SALT agreement SALT II agreement SALT II Treaty SALT process Secretary Senator CANNON Senator COHEN Senator CULVER Senator EXON Senator HUMPHREY Senator JACKSON Senator JEPSEN Senator NUNN Senator TOWER Senator WARNER silos SLBM Soviet side Soviet Union statement strategic forces strategic nuclear targets Thank theater nuclear theater nuclear forces things threat throw weight tion unilateral United verification Vladivostok warheads WARNKE
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1225. lappuse - Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.
987. lappuse - Backfire" in the USA, is a medium-range bomber, and that it does not intend to give this airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. In this connection, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this airplane in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the USA Nor does it intend to give it such a capability in any other manner, including by in-flight refueling. At the same time, the Soviet side states that it will not...
885. lappuse - Union faced a position of both theater inferiority and strategic inferiority; they withdrew the missiles they were deploying. In the 1973 Middle East crisis, the theater and the strategic nuclear balances were more balanced; both sides compromised. It is hard to see what factors in the future are apt to disconnect international politics and diplomacy from the underlying real power balances. The nuclear balance is only one element in the overall power balance. But in the Soviet view, it is the fulcrum...
885. lappuse - our theater position was clearly unfavorable; we relied entirely on our position of strategic nuclear superiority to face down Chairman Khrushchev's ultimatum. In Cuba, the Soviet Union faced a position of both theater inferiority and strategic inferiority; they withdrew the missiles they were deploying." 49 Thus counterforce was a way back to the good old days of the Cuban missile crisis when the US rather than the USSR could threaten to "fight and win a nuclear war" and through force of arms gain...
1129. lappuse - It is customary in democratic countries to deplore expenditure on armament as conflicting with the requirements of the social services. There is a tendency to forget that the most important social service that a government can do for its people is to keep them alive and free.
884. lappuse - Union has had superior non-nuclear forces on the European central front and on its northern and southern flanks. This has been due in part to geography, the USSR enjoying the central position and interior lines, and, in part, to the greater effort that has been made by the USSR and the Warsaw Pact than by NATO.
1223. lappuse - President Brezhnev confirmed that the Soviet Backfire production rate would not exceed 30 per year. President Carter stated that the United States enters into the SALT II agreement on the basis of the commitments contained in the Soviet statement and that it considers the carrying out of these commitments to be essential to the obligations assumed under the Treaty.
885. lappuse - Soviet doctrine has always placed heavy emphasis upon what they call the "correlation of forces." In this term, they include the aggregate of all the forces bearing upon the situation—including psychological, political, and economic factors. Soviet officials took the view that the correlation of forces had been moving and would continue to move in their favor. They deduced from this the proposition that even though we might, at a given time, believe their proposals to be one-sided and inequitable,...
879. lappuse - ... game, in which one side's gains are equal to the other side's losses, and a non-zero-sum game, in which both sides can either win or lose. It was our contention that the nuclear relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is analogous to a non-zero-sum game, not to a zero-sum game. We argued that an agreement which provided essential equivalence, and which maintained or enhanced crisis stability, would add to the security of both sides, reduce the risk of nuclear war, do so at...
882. lappuse - If a launcher contains or launches an ICBM, that launcher shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMS.