purpose of defraying her funeral expenses and for a monument, but for his own personal purposes.

At all times prior to the receipt of the two letters above mentioned the bank received and obeyed, in reference to the fund, the orders of Mrs. Lewin only; and afterwards, until the death of Mr. Lewin, received and obeyed, implicitly, his orders in relation thereto.

On the 30th day of March, 1867, William Lewin, of Buffalo, in the state of New York, father of said Frederick, took out letters of administration upon his estate, in due form of law in the surrogate's court for the county of Livingston, in that state, within which county Geneseo is situated.

On the 17th day of April, 1867, letters of administration were issued by the court of probate for the district of New Haven, upon the estate of Frederick, to Luzon B. Morris, respondent, and on the 6th day of February, 1867, letters of administration were issued by said last named court to Henry A. Balcom, respondent, upon the estate of said Abby, the decree in each case describing the intestate as late of Geneseo in the state of New York and as having property in this state within the jurisdiction of the court. Upon these facts the case was reserved for the advice of this

court.

C. R. Ingersoll, for the respondent, Balcom.

Morris, for himself.

PARK, J.-The principal question in this case is in regard to the domicil of Mrs. Lewin at the time of her death. She died in the state of New York, and the administrator of her estate claims that her domicil at the time was in Connecticut; while the administrator of the estate of her husband claims that it was in the state of New York.

It appear by the finding of the court that her husband was a native of the state of New York; that he married Mrs. Lewin while temporarily residing in Connecticut; that immediately after their marriage they went to the state of Missouri, and resided there till the spring of 1862, when they returned to Connecticut, and after residing at various places in the state, became permanently located in the town of Branford. While their domicil con

tinued there, Mrs. Lewin received a bequest that had been left her by her brother. Sometime in the spring of 1866 Mr. Lewin and his wife left Branford with the intent to abandon his residence there, and went to Geneseo in the state of New York, where he remained till the death of his wife, which occurred in the month of July of the same year.

The character of Mr. Lewin's residence at Geneseo is thus described in the report of the committee. "He did not go to Geneseo with the intent to adopt that place as a place of permanent residence. He and his wife, being in feeble health, went to Geneseo for the purpose of spending the summer there in the house of his brother-in-law, in the hope that the health of himself and wife might be benefited by the change of air, and by the use of the water of certain mineral springs near Geneseo. From the time he left Branford until the death of his wife he had no definite intentions in regard to the selection of any place as the place of his future residence. So far as he had any intention on the subject it was, during the whole period of time, an intention conditional and uncertain, whereby all decision in his mind upon the question was left in abeyance, to be determined in the future by the turn which his wife's disease might take, and by other circumstances which night or might not arise."

In the month of August of the same year he left Geneseo and returned to Connecticut, and not long afterwards became permanently settled in the town of Windham. These facts render it apparently clear that Mr. Lewin was not domiciled in the state of New York at the time his wife died.

But it is claimed that, inasmuch as he was a native of the state of New York, and inasmuch as he left Branford with no intention of returning to that place to reside, and went to the state of New York, and remained there, in fact, for a time, no matter what the character of his abiding may have been, he became domiciled there, on the principle that a native domicil easily reverts. Would it be claimed that if Mr. Lewin had left Branford with the intent to take up his residence in the state of Ohio, and on his way sojourned a few days in the state of New York, that would be sufficient? And what real difference is there between that case

and the present? In both cases Mr. Lewin had no intention of permanently remaining in the state of New York. All the difference there is consists in the fact, that in one case his mind is made up in regard to his future residence and in the other it is not. His abiding in both cases is temporary. We said in another case upon the present circuit, that a temporary residence did not change its character by mere lapse of time. Whether it is longer or shorter it is temporary still. But the principle that a native domicil easily reverts applies only to cases where a native citizen of one country goes to reside in a foreign country, and there acquires a domicil by residence without renouncing his original allegiance. In such cases his native domicil reverts as soon as he begins to execute an intention of returning; that is, from the time he puts himself in motiont bona fide to quit the country sine animo revertendi, because the foreign domicil was merely adventitious, and de facto, and prevails only while actual and complete. The Indian Chief, 3 Rob. Adm. R., 17, 24; The Venus, 8 Cranch, 253, 280, 301; The State v. Hallett, 8 Ala., 159; Case of Miller's Estate, 3 Rawle, 312, 319; The Ann Green, 1 Gall., 275, 286; Catlin v. Gladding, 4 Mason, 308; Matter of Wrigly, 8 Wend., 134, 140.

This principle has reference to a national domicil in its enlarged sense, and grows out of native allegiance or citizenship. It has no application when the question is between a native and acquired domicil, where both are under the same national jurisdiction. It was so held in the case of Monroe v. Douglas, 5 Maddock, 379. In that case the question was between the native domicil of a party in Scotland, and a domicil of residence acquired by the same party in India, and the Vice Chancellor said he could find no difference in principle between the original domicil of the party and the acquired one in India. See also I American Leading Cases, 742.

If this principle does not apply to the case in question, then it follows from this finding that Mr. Lewin had no domicil in the state of New York when his wife died, but his domicil at that time remained in the town of Branford, in accordance with the maxims that universally prevail in relation to this subject, that every person must have a domicil somewhere, that he can have but

one domicil for one and the same purpose, and that a domicil once acquired continues until another is established. Abington v. North Bridgewater, 23 Pick., 170; Thorndike v. City of Boston, 1 Met., 242; Crawford v. Wilson, 4 Barb., 504; Rue High, Appellant, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 515; Somerville v. Lord Somerville, 5 Vesey, 750; Greene v. Greene, 11 Pick., 410; Walker v. Bank of Circleville, 15 Ohio, 288.

It is claimed further, that the bonds in question became the property of Mr. Lewin by donatio causa mortis. But it is clear that no gift was intended by Mrs. Lewin, as plainly appears by her letter to the officers of the bank, and besides, a gift of this nature must be made in contemplation of the approach of death and must be given to take effect only in case the donor dies. Raymond v. Sellick, 10 Conn., 480. Nothing of this kind appears in the case.

Again, it is claimed that the court of probate for the district of New Haven granted letters of administration on the estate of Mr. Lewin as domiciled in the state of New York; and it is insisted that this is conclusive on the subject. But the judgment of a court of limited jurisdiction is never conclusive of a jurisdictional question. Its jurisdiction may always be controverted. Sears v. Terry, 26 Conn., 273; Jochumsen v. Suffolk Savings Bank, 3 Allen, 87; 2 Redfield on Wills, 49.

We advise the Superior Court that the administrator of the estate of Mrs. Lewin is entitled to the property. In this opinion the other judges concurred.

I.

COMMERCIAL DOMICIL.

DICEY CONFLICT OF LAWS, APPENDIX, NOTE 4.*
PERSON'S CHARACTER DETERMINED BY DOMICIL.

In time of war the answer to the question whether a person is or is not to be considered an alien enemy is, in most cases at any rate, to be determined by reference, not to his nationality or allegiance, but to his trading residence or commercial domicil. Every *This "note" is inserted by permission of the American Publisher of "Dicey on the Conflict of Laws."

person domiciled in a state engaged in hostilities with our own, whether he is a born subject of that state or not, is to be regarded as an alien enemy; and,speaking generally, a person domiciled in a neutral country is to be regarded as for commercial purposes a neutral, even though he be in fact a British subject, or a subject of a state at war with England. "The position is a clear one, that "if a person goes into a foreign country, and engages in trade "there, he is, by the law of nations, to be considered a merchant of "that country, and a subject for all civil purposes, whether that "country be hostile or neutral; and he cannot be permitted to re"tain the privileges of a neutral character during his residence "and occupation in an enemy's country." A person's character, in short, as a friend or enemy, is in time of war to be determined by what is termed his commercial domicil. Persons who are commercially domiciled in a neutral country are, as far as belligerents are concerned, neutrals; whilst, on the other hand, persons commercially domiciled in a hostile country are, whatever their nationality or allegiance, to be considered enemies, for "persons resi"dent in a country carrying on trade, by which both they and the "country were benefited, were to be considered as the subjects of "that country, and were considered so by the law of nations, at "least so far as by that law to subject their property to capture by "a country at war with that in which they lived." Thus, if there be a war between England and France, a British subject residing and trading in France is an alien enemy; whilst a British subject or a French citizen who resides and carries on business in Portugal is, even though he may trade with France, a neutral.

II. NATURE OF COMMERCIAL DOMICIL.

The nature of the trading residence or commercial domicil, which determines a person's friendly or hostile character in time of war, may be made clear by comparing such commercial domicil with the domicil properly so called, which is referred to in the body of this treatise, and is, in this Note, termed for the sake of distinction a civil domicil. Each domicil is a kind of residence, each bears a close resemblance to the other, but they are distinguished by marked differences.