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erally held everywhere, and it is well settled in this state, that an executor or administrator appointed in another state has not, as such, any authority beyond the sovereignty by virtue of whose laws he was appointed." Denio, J. in Parsons v. Lyman 20 N. Y. 103, 112; citing Morrell v. Dickey 1 Johns. Ch. 153; Vroom v. Van Horne 10 Paige 549.

The same general doctrine is also concisely stated in a case in the Federal Supreme Court: "Every grant of administration is strictly confined in its authority and operation to the limits of the territory of the government which grants it; and does not, de jure, extend to other countries. It cannot confer, as a matter of right, any authority to collect assets of the deceased in any other state; and whatever operation is allowed to it beyond the origina! territory of the grant is a mere matter of comity, which every nation is at liberty to yield or to withhold, according to its own policy and pleasure, with reference to its own institutions and the intertsts of its own citizens." Story, J. in Vaughn v. Northrup 15 Pet. 1, 5.

Lewis, then, if legally administrator in Missouri, had no official authority in this State except such as by comity would be recognized; and the rules of comity might be determined either by usage, of which the judicial decisions would be evidence, or by statute. Some of these rules are general and are well settled. There are cases, for example, where it has been held that a foreign administrator has a right to collect and take possession of personal property, and remove it for the purposes of administration: "Doolittle v. Lewis 7 Johns. Ch. 45; Brown v. Brown I Barb. Ch. 189; Vroom v. Van Horne 10 Paige 549; s. c. 42 Am. Dec. 94; Riley v. Riley 3 Day 74; s. c. 3 Am. Dec. 262; Smith v. Guild 34 Me. 443; Rand v. Hubbard 4 Metc. 252; Marcy v. Marcy 32 Conn. 308; and where there are no domestic creditors or other claimants, there will be no occasion to question such cases. There may also be cases of payments to a foreign administrator which may be recognized, there being no conflicting administration. Williams v. Storrs 6 Johns. Ch. 353; Trecothick v. Austin 4 Mas. 16, 33; Wilkins v. Ellett 9 Wall. 740; Vroom v. Van Horne supra; Citizens' Bank v. Sharp 53 Md. 521. And

where an administrator, in the forum of his appointment, has assigned demands bona notabilia there, it may be correct to hold that his assignee may sue thereon here in his own name, as was held in Harper v. Butler 2 Pet. 239, and Peterson v. Chemical Bank 32 N. Y. 21, and cases there cited; as to which see Knapp v. Lee 42 Mich. 41.

But this case involves the validity of the assignment of a debt secured by a real-estate mortgage on lands in this State. It was decided in Cutter v. Davenport 1 Pick. 81, that the foreign administrator had no authority to make such an assignment; and this is followed in the recent case of Dial v. Gary 14 S. C. 573; s. c. 37 Am. Rep. 737. Whether these decisions would be followed in this State if there were no statute bearing upon the question, we do not care to inquire, because we think if the power to assign would exist independent of statute it does not exist under the statutes now in force.

The statutes provide for recognizing the authority of a foreign administrator when it becomes necessary to make sale of lands in this State, and prescribes the steps to be taken for that purpose. How Stat. §§ 6057-6061. If administration is needed. in this State for other purposes, new letters must be taken out; and an administration ancillary to one in another state would proceed like any other up to the time of accounting. And for the purpose of selling lands, it seems very clear that a public administrator could not be recognized in this State at all; for the statute contemplates the case of an administrator "appointed" in some other state or country, who shall produce and file in the proper court "an authenticated copy of his appointment." Section 6057. A public administrator having no appointment for the special case would not be within the terms of this statute.

But we may pass by without further remark any question of what Lewis might or might not have done had he undertaken to proceed in this State under its statutes. What he did in fact was to proceed without regard to the statutes and in contempt of authority which was being taken, in regular form at least, under them. And unless under such circumstances he had authority to

sell and dispose of the mortgage in suit, it must have remained the property of the estate.

Now a mortgage of lands is in this State a conveyance within the meaning of the recording laws, and goes upon record as such. How. Stat. § 5689. It becomes necessary to record it, therefore, to prevent its being cut off by subsequent conveyances. Id. § 5683. It is not allowed to be foreclosed under the power of sale until the mortgage and any assignment thereof are duly recorded. Id. § 8498. And no one could make a valid assignment of a mortgage which would be sufficient for the purposes either of foreclosure or of record, unless his own authority was of record so that the title made under a foreclosure would appear by the record to be complete. It follows that a foreign administrator could make no assignment of a mortgage in this State; and this is so well understood that it is not uncommon in this State to have ancillary letters taken out here for no other purpose than to assign mortgage securities. The case of Doolittle v. Lewis 7 Johns. Ch. 45, in so far as it recognizes the right of a foreign administrator to foreclose under the power of sale, would be inapplicable in this State by reason of the statutory provisions referred to.

But a foreign administrator would be equally powerless to discharge a mortgage. The discharge is for the purpose of relieving the record of the apparent mortgage lien, and this would not be accomplished unless the authority of the party assuming to discharge was itself of record. The statute imposes a penalty on the mortgagee, his personal representative or assignee who, when payment of the mortgage debt has been made, neglects or refuses, after demand, to discharge the mortgage. How. Stat. § 5704. But a foreign administrator who would be powerless to give a legal discharge could not be within the provisions of this section. Lewis therefore was assuming to sell a mortgage which he was without authority either to enforce or discharge.

But a perfectly conclusive objection to the validity of the sale of the mortgage made by Lewis is seen in the fact that there was at the very time an administration in this State. There is no ground for even a suggestion that that administration was invalid. The intestate left both property and debts in this State, and the

jurisdiction of the court which made the Michigan appointment was unquestionable. Administration in Michigan indeed, if the estate was to be preserved from such ruthless destruction as Lewis undertook to visit it with, was a necessity; and if he had had any proper sense of his office and a due regard to the rights of parties concerned, he would have recognized the Michigan administration, and have sought to act in harmony with it. Conflict was for any proper legal purpose wholly unnecessary.

No case has been called to our attention in which it has been held that after letters issued in one state or country a foreign administrator can be recognized there even for the purposes of a voluntary payment; and the cases like Vaughn v. Barret 5 Vt, 333; Young v. O'Neal 3 Sneed 55 and Ferguson v. Morris 67 Ala. 389, which deny the validity of such a payment generally, if questionable when no domestic appointment exists, are perfectly sound and reasonable if there is at the time a valid administration in the state. See Noonan v. Bradley 9 Wall. 304. 405. It is the duty of citizens of the state to recognize and defer to the judicial determination of its own tribunals, as much when they concern matters of administration as in other cases: Henderson v. Clarke 4 Litt. 277; Glenn v. Smith 2 Gill. & J. 493; 20 Am. Dec. 452; and this is especially true in a case like the present where nothing existed to bring in question the judicial determination of the Michigan court, except the bare assertion of his own authority by the foreign official. By the law of this State the title to this demand for all purposes of administration was in the Michigan administrator, who might put it in suit when due or assign it of record or discharge it of record. He was therefore the only person who could be safely dealt with in respect to it. The claim by the foreign official was inconsistent with these undoubted rights and was negatived by them.

The decree must be affirmed.
CAMPBELL, J., concurred.

JUDGMENTS.

HILTON v. GUYOT, 159 U. S. 113, (1895).

The first of these two cases was an action at law, brought December 18, 1885, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, by Gustave Bertin Guyot, as official liquidator of the firm of Charles Fortin & Co., and by the surviving members of that firm, all aliens and citizens of the Republic of France, against Henry Hilton and William Libbey, citizens of the United States and of the State of New York, and trading as copartners, in the cities of New York and Paris and elsewhere, under the firm name of A. T. Stewart & Co. The action was upon a judgment recovered in a French court at Paris in the Repuplic of France by the firm of Charles Fortin & Co., all whose members were French citizens, against Hilton and Libbey, trading as copartners as aforesaid, and citizens of the United States and of the State of New York.

The complaint alleged that the judgment of the French court remains in full force and effect; that the French court had jurisdiction of the subject matter, and of the parties; that the plaintiffs have been unable to collect the said judgment or any part thereof, by reason of the absence of the said defendants, they having given up their business in Paris prior to the recovery of the said judgment on appeal, and having left no property within the jurisdiction of the Republic of France, out of which the said judgment might be made; and that there is still justly due and owing from the defendants to the plaintiffs the sum of $195,122.47.

The defendants in their answer alleged that the plaintiffs had no just claim against the defendants; that the defendants were not present at Paris at the time of the suit; and that the defendants appeared by attorney solely for the purpose of protecting their property which was within the jurisdiction of the French court. The answer further alleged that there was not a full and fair trial in the lower French court, and consequently the judgment is void.

The answer further alleged that it would be against natural justice to enforce this judgment without an examination of the

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