have it control property that might be acquired in any foreign country, it was decided the after acquired property, held in the name of the husband, was not affected by the contract, and was subject to be disposed of by him, by will or otherwise, according to the laws of the actual domicil.

The case of Castro v. Illies, 22 Tex. 479, is a well considered case, and announces a doctrine which has its foundation in reason as well as in natural justice, viz: Where there has been a change of domicil, though there be an express contract, if it do not expressly provide, or the intention be not manifest, it is to apply to and govern all after acquired property, wherever the parties may reside, it will not affect real property situated in a new domicil. The reasoning in Saul v. His Creditors, supra, is cited in support of this view of the law, to which may be add.d LeBreton v. Myers, 8 Paige, 261; Kneeland v. Ensley, Meigs' R. 620; Gale v. Davis' Heirs, supra; Lyon v. Knott, 26 Miss. 548.

In the case at bar there is nothing in the contract, "speaking to the very point," that manifests any intention that all future acquisitions of property in foreign countries should be controlled by it. It will bear no such construction. As before said, it appears, on the face of the agreement, it was to be and could not be fully performed elsewhere than in the canton where the parties resided, in Switzerland. When it was entered into it could not have been the intention to change their domicil, and it certainly never entered the minds of the parties it should affect the property that might thereafter be acquired in foreign countries.

The position of counsel is not strengthened by the allegation in the bill, that, by the force and effect of the contract, as construed by the laws of the canton where the contracting parties resided, Marie Elizabeth would be entitled to the undivided onehalf of all the property wihch the husband then owned or should thereafter acquire during the marriage. It may be this would be the true construction had they remained in Switzerland, but, assuming the parties contracted with reference to the laws of their domicil, and that such laws entered into and formed a part of the contract itself, still, they could have no extra-territorial effect. Notwithstanding the local laws may form a part of the contract,

the extent of those laws is limited to the dominion of the sovereign power that enacts it. It is not by virtue of the laws of a foreign State, but by comity that exists between nations, that an antenuptial contract, executed there, is allowed to control as to the acquisition of property over our customs and positive laws. No contract, either express or implied, can give to the local laws a more extended force than they really had. In all marriages, the parties may be presumed to tacitly adopt the laws of their domicil, and to agree to be governed by them, but the obligation will be limited by the extent of those laws. Construing this contract as though the local laws of the canton constitute a part of it, it will not be any more obligatory for that reason in another jurisdiction. Outside the territorial force of local laws, such implied or tacit contract would cease to control the acquisition of property in another country to which they might remove. The laws of the matrimonial domicil do not travel with the parties, and no contract can give them vitality or effective force here. No State is bound to admit the force of a foreign law as controlling within its jurisdiction. By comity we permit express contracts to have the same force and effect as in the countries where made, but not their local laws. LeBreton v. Bouchet, 3 Martin, 60.

We are of opinion our laws must govern as to property acquired by appellant and his wife during their residence in this State. There is no express contract to the contrary. The contract was manifestly to be performed in the canton where the parties were domiciled when they entered into it. It is local in its effect and operation, and it could not have been the intention it should control the acquisition of property at any other place than the matrimonial domicil. Appellant, having changed his domicil by the consent of his wife, as we must presume, the applicatory law also changes. In the absence of any express contract to the contrary, the law of the domicil of the husband governs as to the acquisition of property.

The decree will be reversed and the bill dismissed.

. Decree reversed.

FOREIGN DIVORCE.

DITSON v. DITSON, 4 R. I. 87, (1856).

PETITION FOR DIVORCE. The petition represented the petitioner as of Little Compton, in the state of Rhode Island, and that she had resided within the state for the last three years; that she was married to George L. Ditson in the city of New York, in October, 1842; that she has at all times faithfully performed her duties as a wife, but that her said husband has treated her with extreme cruelty; has neglected and refused, being of sufficient ability, to provide necessaries for the subsistence, and has wilfully deserted her for the last three years, and been guilty of other gross misbehavior and wickedness repugnant to, and in violation of, the marriage covenant; that her said husband is not within this state. nor within fifty miles of Newport. Prayer, for a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony between the petitioner and her husband, and that the name of the petitioner be changed from her name of Mary Ann Ditson, to her maiden name of Mary Ann Simmons, and for further relief.

Accompanying the petition was an affidavit of the petitioner, stating that her husband was not a resident of this state, and was in parts unknown to the petitioner. The petition was filed in the clerk's office of the supreme court for the county of Newport, on the 9th day of July, 1856; and the clerk certified that he had given six weeks' notice of the application by publishing it in the Newport Mercury for that period next before the sitting of the court at the present August term.

It appeared that the petitioner, then Mary Ann Simmons, was married, without the knowledge or consent of her father, whilst a girl at school in New York, to George L. Ditson, an Englishman, to whom she had been introduced outside the school, the ceremony being performed by Dr. Spring on the 13th of November, 1842; that after marriage, Mr. and Mrs. Ditson went to Europe, and from thence to Cuba, where they resided for several years; that shortly after their return, Ditson went to Europe by himself, leaving his wife, then in a feeble and emaciated condition, without any provision, to be supported by her father, and was

gone about two years; that he returned, however, and lived with her again for a short period, treating her morosely and unkindly; but there was no proof of extreme cruelty, though he locked her up once in her chamber for making a purchase that displeased him, and treated her with neglect and spoke of her in a careless and indifferent manner. The last time he left her was in Boston, whence he went to Europe, saying just before he went, to a witness, "that he meant to go away, and did not care a damn for Boston or any body in it." Upon being thus deserted, the petitioner came to live with her father at Little Compton, R. I., of which place he was a native, and then a domiciled inhabitant. Ditson had been absent, at the time of filing the petition, for upwards of three years, during which time he had not once communicated by letter or message with his wife, or left, or made, any provision for her support, though of sufficient ability so to do. From the time of his desertion, the petitioner had lived with her father in Little Compton, except about three months of the time, which she had passed in Newport, R. I. During this time she had been wholly supported by her father, except, in what manner did not appear, the little that she had been able, by her own exertions, to do for herself. It was admitted that Ditson had never been domiciled in Rhode Island, or even, to the knowledge of any witness, been within the state. It was not known that he had any domicil in the country; he having resided since the marriage, either in Europe or Cuba, and having remained but a short time either in Boston or New York. No personal notice of the application for divorce had been given to him, and none attempted to be given; since, from his silence, the place where he resided or temporarily dwelt, was wholly unknown to the petitioner or to her friends.

Under these circumstances, the chief justice intimating a doubt concerning the jurisdiction of the court over the cause, desired the counsel for the petitioners to search authorities and present them to the court upon that subject; the court being satisfied that the petitioner had proved by the desertion of her husband without cause, and by his neglect to provide for her support, being of sufficient ability so to do, a case for divorce a vinculo under

the statute, provided the court had, under the circumstances proved, power and jurisdiction to grant her petition.

Francis E. Hoppin, for the petitioner, took the following points:

First, that the petitioner is an actual bona fide resident of Rhode Island, and had actually resided therein for upwards of three years before filing her petition; (Dig. 1844, pp. 264, 265,) coming to this state under circumstances which enabled her to gain a domicil here distinct from and independent of that of her husband. Harteau v. Harteau, 14 Pick. 181.

Second. That the petitioner being a domiciled inhabitant of this state, was entitled, in her desertion, to the protection and relief of its laws. Harding v. Alden, 9 Greenleaf, R. 140. Tolen v. Tolen, 2 Blackf. 407. There having been no change of residence by the petitioner for the purpose of evading the laws of any other state, the law of the place of actual residence of the petitioner must govern the dissolution of her marriage, irrspective of the place of its celebration. Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Johns. R. 434. Broden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. R. 120. Bradshaw v. Heath, 14 Wend. 407. Story's Confl. Laws, § 230, ed. 1836. Clark v. Clark, 8 Cushing, 385. Barber v. Root, 10 Mass. 260.Harding v. Alden, 9 Greenl. R. 140. Tolen v. Tolen, 2 Blackf. 140.

Third. To deny the petitioner relief under the circumstances of the case, upon the ground of want of jurisdiction over her husband, because he had not been served with personal notice, would enable a husband, especially a foreigner, as in this case, by deserting his wife, to deprive her of all the redress which the laws of this state provide for her as one of its citizens.

Fourth. To entitle the court to jurisdiction over the dissolution of the marriage of one of its citizens, it is sufficient if the court have jurisdiction over the petitioner, and personal service upon the other party to the marriage need not be, if it cannot be, made. Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, §§ 728, 730, 731, 732, 735, 739.

AMES, C. J. The "Act regulating marriage and divorce" in this state, requires, in words, no other jurisdiction in this court over the parties to a petition for divorce, than that the petitioner