the enemy, as expeditiously as possible), and secondly to continu them there without separating, until the business is decided; I an sensible beyond this object it is not necessary that I should say word, being fully assured that the admirals and captains of th fleet I have the honor to command will, knowing my precis object, that of a close and decisive battle, supply any deficienc in my not making signals; which may, if extended beyond thes objects, either be misunderstood, or if waited for, very probabl from various causes, be impossible for the commander-in-chi to make; therefore, it will only be requisite for me to state, in few words as possible, the various modes in which it may 1 r.ecessary for me to obtain my object . .

[COPYRIGHTED]

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD.

Honorable Mention, 1914

NAVAL POLICY

AS IT RELATES TO THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT, AND THE MAINTENANCE OF THE FLEET

By CAPTAIN JOHN HOOD, U. S. Navy

Motto: The interests of the Nation predominate all others

As the nation has grown the navy has grown until the naval appropriations made for the present fiscal year exceed one hunired and forty millions of dollars; and yet, with this large sum, the greatest peace appropriation for naval purposes in our history, only one ship of the first line was provided for.

During the past summer, in estimating and apportioning the resources of the country under the new tariff law, Senator mmons for the Senate, in a tentative allotment of funds, ted one hundred and forty-five millions of dollars to the and Representative Underwood of the House one hundred forty-eight millions for the coming fiscal year. These sums tenormous and only a very few years ago would have appalled il the people of the country. Even at the present day they stagmany thinking men; and there is a not inconsiderable, and possibly growing, number of people throughout the country askng. Why this great expenditure? and, Is the nation getting a fair return for the money expended?

With such an expenditure as authorized for the present fiscal year, and only one capital ship added to the fleet, it is difficult to frame answers to these questions which will satisfy reasonable men. That naval expenses increase as the navy increases with the growth of the nation is axiomatic. But, does the sea power of the nation, as represented by the fleet, increase proportionately with the growth of the nation and with the money appropriated? That is a question that may well come to any thinking man when

he considers the aggregate of the appropriations for the pas two years in connection with the fact that for each of these year only one battleship was added to the fleet. This question wil come with even stronger force should either of the sums men tioned above as tentatively allotted be appropriated for nava purposes during the present session of Congress, and again onl one battleship be provided for.

While nothing, created and managed by human agency can b made absolutely perfect, the writer of this essay believes tha great improvements can be made in existing conditions, and th nation given a fairer return in sea power for the money expende by changes in methods of legislation that are practicable, and t following a systematic policy of expenditure for the money appr priated.

There are, at the present time, approximately ninety-three mi lions of dollars per annum of the total naval appropriation th may be called a fixed charge, and this is increasing from year year. The expenditure of this, while supporting the navy in i present state, does not maintain or add to the sea power of th nation. If by any system or policy any portion of these fixt charges can be diverted to the improvement or increase of tl fleet, a great gain will have been attained; and there is no subje that should be of greater interest, not only to the navy itsel but to every lover of the navy and to every taxpayer of tl country, than any system or policy that will tend to reduce fix charges for the benefit of the fleet, and so to attain the greate sea power possible within the limits of the available funds.

Originality for all that will be advanced here is not claime The arguments and reasons given are the fruits of many yea of study and thought, and of many discussions and interchang of views with leading officers of the navy and others having th best interests of the nation and of the navy at heart.

GENERAL REMARKS

Up to the present time it cannot be said that any policy h governed the growth and development of our shore establis ment to the state in which it exists today. Beginning with t sail period, when the country was sparsely settled and strugglir for its existence, when land communication was of the crude and most difficult, and land transportation for bulky and heav

freight impracticable, and manufacturing in its infancy, navy yards were first established to meet the conditions of the day, where populations were more centered and material more availae and convenient. As the country has grown and expanded ter stations have been added to the establishment by the same natural laws, assisted by the local desires of different communies to have large government plants established within their limits, ith the consequent large expenditures of government money ong the people of those communities.

Once established, continuation of existing shore stations has teen along the line of least resistance. Yards which may have en valuable fifty or a hundred years ago may be valueless now th the changed conditions both in ship construction and in p capabilities. Where in a given area fifty or a hundred years o lack of transportation and facilities may have required two more stations, one may suffice now. Where the crude needs of a century ago may have planted a station to meet a local and restricted condition, that station may be so situated as to be useless for the greater needs of the great fleets of today with their wider range of action. Yet, however useless for the maintenance of the fleet an already established yard may have proved, there sa natural hesitation on the part of the government to abandon plant representing large previous expenditures; and there is. ariably an equally natural strong opposition to such abandonon the part of the local communities surrounding the plant, The viewpoint is colored both by self-interest and by local as sed to national interests.

The various shore stations, thus, have come into being to meet e needs of the moment, as expediency or sectional interest diced, and not in accordance with any comprehensive well-disted plan following a policy looking to the best good of the hole nation.

Lacking such a policy, the naval shore establishment of today presents, as a whole, the aspect of a makeshift, an attempt to meet present-day requirements with a plant established under entirely different circumstances, and, like all makeshifts, conduces to waste of public funds, and fails to ensure that maximum preparedness for war which the people as a whole have a right to demand.

All this has been a natural evolution, and must be one of the

great elements to be taken into consideration in the formulation of any policy for the guidance of the future. The establish ment as it exists today is the groundwork on which we mus build, and no immediate and abrupt change is either possible o probable. But our best thought and endeavor should be giver to the problem of evolving from what we now have, and being always guided by the fundamental underlying principles involved a policy for guidance hereafter which will eventually give to th nation all they have a right to expect-the maximum of effectiv sea power for the moneys appropriated for naval purposes.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The branch of naval policy here under consideration cover the entire shore establishment, from the central administratio in the Navy Department to the farthest base or naval station Any intelligent conception or discussion of it should be founde on the basic principle that the entire shore establishment exis solely for, and is an adjunct to, the fleet. It is on this conceptic that all the following discussion is based.

The sea power of a nation is measured by two elements: firs the strength and power of its fleet; second, the ability of th nation to maintain this fleet in the theater of operations in a co dition of readiness to use its strength and deliver its power. T first of these the primary element-is not the subject of th paper. It is to deal with the second that this is written, and e deavor will be made to outline a policy which will lead to a max mum of maintenance ability, as necessary for effective war as t existence of the fleet, at a minimum of cost to the people.

The desire of the people for an adequate navy, as express in the platforms of all political parties, leaves no doubt as to the attitude. Congress will always respond to the wishes of the peop and provide the necessary appropriations, when they can see a know that the appropriations are producing the result desir The producing of this result-an adequate navy—at a reasonal cost necessitates the using of the appropriations provided in su a way as to produce the greatest sea power that can be obtain within that limit of cost. The basic principle enunciated above the subordination of the shore establishment to the fleet-giv the rule by which Congress should be guided in apportioni moneys in drawing the naval appropriation bills, and the depa