2. Two of the complainants, at the time of the filing of the bill, were under age. The defendant contends that they could not disaffirm the contract and deed securing it during infancy, and that therefore there has been a misjoinder of parties.

We have found this contract and deed to be the fruit of bad faith, and hence void. This finding brings the case within the ruling in Fridge v. State, 3 Gill & J. 103, 20 Am. Dec. 463; Ridgeley v. Crandall, 4 Md. 442; Monumental Bldg. Asso. No. 2 v. Herman, 33 Md. 134, to the effect that a contract that a court can see and pronounce to be to the prejudice of the infant is void. There can be no doubt that had the defendant in 1900, at which time he claims to have performed his part of the contract, attempted to enforce that contract to the prejudice of these infants, equity would have had jurisdiction to stay his hands. The object of the general rule deferring the act of avoidance until the coming of age of the infant is his protection. When, therefore, it is apparent to the court that delay will work injury to the infant, the power of repudiation may be exercised immediately. Tyler, Infancy, sec. 29. In Andrews v. Hall, 15 Ala. 85, it was held that the guardian ad litem of an infant might, with the concurrence of the orphans' court, bring into the estate of an intestate advancements to the infant, and claim for the infant his or her share of the estate. The court said: "It was the duty of the guardian ad litem in this case, to present to the court the right of his ward to contribution, and the circumstances and conditions connected with it, so that the court could protect him by making the election which was essential to his interest." Why, then, may not a court of equity, in a case like the present, avoid a multiplicity of suits, and protect the interests of infant parties to a contract by permitting their guardian or next friend to represent them? We know of no reason. Surely a court of equity has the power, when it is apparent that infants are the victims of deceit, to award them the same relief that it is ready to award adults.

3. Complainants are not guilty of laches. While the deed -of trust was recorded two years after its execution, complainants, living in Maryland, and having no actual knowledge that

they had signed such an instrument, could not be charged with laches until something occurred which should have led them to make inquiry; in other words, until they had some reason to suspect the injury done them. George v. Ford (present term) 36 App. D. C. 315. Inasmuch as complainants did not discover the wrong that had been done them until late in 1907 or early in 1908, and almost immediately took steps looking to the bringing of the bill herein, which was filed within a year, it is apparent that they cannot be charged with unreasonable delay. Halstead v. Grinnan, 152 U. S. 412, 38 L. ed. 495, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641. They had no representative here, and there is no testimony that anything occurred between the time when they signed the papers and the time when Mr. Dumler was sent over here to see about the settlement of their grandfather's estate to lead them to suspect the real nature of those papers. Mr. Adriaans recorded his deed and quietly awaited developHe said nothing and did nothing likely to put complainants upon inquiry, and, so far as the record discloses, neither did Mr. Lewis. Notice ought never to be imputed to the victim of a deception unless his failure to obtain actual notice was the result of his own negligence; in other words, he who practises bad faith ought not to be permitted to invoke the doctrine of constructive notice in aid of his wrongdoing, unless, as above suggested, negligence on the part of the injured party has supervened.

ments.

One point remains. It was suggested in argument that the defendant is at least entitled to remuneration for the services actually performed by him to the benefit of the complainants, and that the court should have referred the case to the auditor for the ascertainment of the value of those services. The defendant in his answer, however, did not offer to accept compensation for services actually performed, as did his codefendant Lewis, but insisted on the letter of his contract. That contract being tainted with bad faith, we do not feel justified, upon the meager evidence before us, in prolonging this contest. We are not convinced that any necessary and valuable services were rendered complainants by the defendant.

The decree is affirmed, with costs.

Affirmed.

Statement of the Case.

[37 App.

RUDOLPH v. MOSHEUVEL.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; FIREMEN; PENSIONS; MANDAMUS.

1. Quare, whether the commissioners of the District of Columbia have power to dismiss a fireman from the service of the municipal fire department without the notice and hearing provided for by their own rules, which are given the force of law by statute.

2. The right of a member of the fire department of the District of Columbia, who has been injured while on duty, to retirement on a pension, is fixed at the time he is injured, provided he is permanently disabled and the injury is not the result of his own indiscretion; and the commissioners of the District of Columbia cannot, by dismissing him on charges thereafter made, deprive him of the pension.

3. An order directing the issuance of the writ of mandamus to compel the commissioners of the District of Columbia to assemble a medical board for the examination of the physical disabilities of the relator, a member of the municipal fire department, and on the report of the board showing disability, to grant the relator such pension as his disability warrants, was modified so as to direct the board to report whether the disability, if found to exist, was due to injuries received while in the line of duty, and not the result of relator's own indiscretion, and so as to strike out the provision commanding the commissioners, upon the coming in of the report showing relator's dis ability, to grant him a pension.

No. 2268. Submitted March 6, 1911. Decided April 3, 1911.

HEARING on an appeal by the respondents, the commissioners of the District of Columbia, from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia directing the issuance of the writ of mandamus to compel them to grant a pension to the relator. Modified and affirmed.

The COURT in the opinion stated the facts as follows:

This is an appeal by Cuno H. Rudolph, John A. Johnston, and William V. Judson, commissioners of the District of Co

lumbia, from an order directing a writ of mandamus to issue commanding them to grant a pension to the petitioner, Anthony J. Mosheuvel.

The petition alleges that relator became a private in the fire department of the District October 17th, 1896, was promoted to lieutenant July 1, 1900, and to captain August 31, 1905. That on March 20th, 1908, while engaged in the active performance of his duty at a fire in the city of Washington, he received an injury which has permanently disabled him, and which entitled him to a pension under the law. That he repeatedly demanded said pension of respondents, Cuno H. Rudolph, John A. Johnston, and William V. Judson, commissioners of the District of Columbia, which they refused. That they passed an order dismissing relator from the service as of August 31st, 1908. That said order was made without notice of charges, and without hearing, while he was under treatment for the injuries received as aforesaid.

The appellants were not commissioners when the proceedings herein were begun, but were substituted as parties defendant, instead of their predecessors.

Their answer to the petition admitted the employment and service of relator as alleged, but did not admit that he had been permanently disabled. It alleged that the chief engineer of the fire department, now deceased, made an official report to the commissioners on July 31, 1908, stating that relator had broken bones in his ankle and heel by a fall at a fire on March 20, 1908; that his appearance at the time indicated that he had been drinking, and that he believed the accident would not have occurred but for that condition. It was further alleged that no application had been made by relator for examination by a retiring board. That on January 16th, 1908, a board had been convened to investigate a complaint of official misconduct against relator and other members of his company. That said. board, before which relator appeared, reported to the chief engineer, February 7th, 1908, that the charges had not been sustained, and recommended that no further action be taken. February 12, 1908, the chief engineer referred this report to the

Statement of the Case.

[37 App. commissioners for their "consideration before further action is taken." That, on July 31, 1908, the said chief made a report and recommendation, in accordance with which the commissioners immediately entered an order dismissing relator "for the betterment of the service."

Issue was joined on the answer, and evidence was heard thereon before the court. Relator's evidence tended to show that he went to the fire on March 20, 1908, in obedience to an order, and in the performance of his duties broke nearly all the bones of his left ankle and severly sprained his right ankle. Has not been able since to perform duty as a fireman. That the member of the board of fire surgeons who attended him was of the opinion that he was permanently disabled, and had recommended that he be sent before the examining board for examination and retirement. That relator had an application for retirement to come up September 4th, but in the meantime was notified of his dismissal. That relator had had no notice of charges made against him by the chief engineer, had had no hearing thereon, or opportunity to show that he was not intoxicated when hurt, and knew nothing of the same until after his dismissal. A number of witnesses testified that relator was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor when injured, and that he was hurt, without his own fault, while performing his duty at the fire.

The respondents offered in evidence the rules regulating trials of firemen. These rules provide for trials of firemen upon complaints, before a board. Complaints by the chief engineer, his assistants, and foremen are required to be in writing, but not under oath; all others must be sworn to. A copy is furnished the accused, and he must be cited to appear before a board of officers convened to investigate the charges. The testimony is reduced to writing, and with the report and recommendation of the board, is forwarded to the chief engineer. The same is then forwarded to the commissioners by him, with his recommendation. Among the grounds upon which removal may be made, are use of liquor while on duty; disobedience; disrespect to a superior or others; inefficiency, or neglect of