CONSEQUENTIAL INJURIES. See RAILROADS, 5.
CONSIDERATION. See CONTRACTS, 2.
CONSPIRACY. See CRIMINAL LAW, 20, 21, 22, 33, 34, 36.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, 1; MASTER AND
SERVANT, 1-5; RAILROADS, 5; Statutes, 3, 5, 6.
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE. See NOTICE, 1.
CONTEMPT. See APPEAL AND ERROR, 14-17.
1. An attempt to corruptly influence a grand juryman is a contempt of
court, within the meaning of sec. 725, Rev. Stat. U. S. Comp. Stat.
1901, p. 583, although the offense was committed at the place of busi
ness of the juryman in a part of the city distant from the court-
house. (Following McCaully v. United States, 25 App. D. C. 404.)
Pierce v. United States, 582.
2. A person charged with contempt of court for attempting to corruptly
influence a grand juryman cannot purge himself of contempt so as to
require the court to discharge him, by denying under oath the charge
made. (Construing sec. 725, Rev. Stat.)
CONTRACTS. See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, 5, 6; AUCTIONS AND AUCTION-
EERS, 1; BANKS AND BANKING, 1; BROKERS, 1-3; CANCELATION OF
INSTRUMENTS; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES; INFANTS, 1; INSURANCE;
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY; SALES, 1.
1. A contract between a widow and heirs at law, providing for the am-
icable and economical settlement of the estate in which they are in-
terested, is one which the courts will not only uphold, but encour-
age. Hilton v. Rackey, 83.
2. Where a family settlement provides that the widow shall have control
of the real estate, with power to collect rents and pay charges,
expenses, and debts for one year, and that the estate shall then be
sold in a manner prescribed, and the proceeds distributed, one third
to the widow and two thirds to the heirs, the provision for the
distribution of one third to the widow is supported by a good
consideration, which is the amicable and economical settlement
of the estate. The limitation of one year applies only to the period
of control of the estate by the widow. Id.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. See RAILROADS, 4; STREET RAILROADS,
1, 5, 6, 8; TRIAL, 6.
CORPORATIONS. See LANDLORD AND TENAnt, 2; Principal and Agent,
CORRECTION OF DEEDS. See REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS.
COSTS. See APPEAL AND ERROR, 1, 2, 3; BANKRUPTCY, 1; PATENTS, 6.
COURT OF APPEALS, D. C. See COURTS, 2.
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND. See STARE DECISIS.
COURTS. See BANKRUPTCY, 1; CRIMINAL LAW, 2, 3; EQUITY, 2, 3; INTER-
STATE COMMERCE COMMISSION; MANDAMUS, 1; STARE DECISIS.
1. Courts should avail themselves of every opportunity to facilitate the
despatch of business, curtail cost, and discourage litigation, when
it can be accomplished with equal justice to all concerned. Me-
Namara v. Washington Terminal Co. 384.
2. This court, although a court of the United States, is not, strictly speak-
ing, a circuit court of appeals, notwithstanding its functions are
analogous by reason of its being an intermediate court of appeals
between the District of Columbia courts of original jurisdiction and
the Supreme Court of the United States. In re Mattulath, 410.
COURT TRUSTEES. See TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, 2-8.
CRIMINAL LAW. See APPEAL and Error, 6, 7, 15-17; BRIBERY; FOOD, 1;
JUDGMENT, 1, 2; STATUTES, 7, 8.
1. An indictment charging that the accused had procured a check from a
woman upon the false representation that he had a contract with
a builder to obtain money for the latter to enable him to buy
lumber in West Virginia, where it could be bought cheaper than in
this District, and that if she would "invest" money with him, the
accused, she would receive large profits from her investment,-
charges the crime of obtaining something of value by false pretenses,
and not the crime of embezzlement. Davis v. United States, 126.
2. The rule in the Federal courts to the effect that in a criminal case a
general judgment upon an indictment containing several counts, and
a verdict of guilty on each count, cannot be reversed on error if any
count is good and is sufficient to support the judgment, does not
apply to a prosecution in which the indictment charges distinct and
inconsistent offenses, such as obtaining money by false pretenses
and embezzlement. Id.
3. Where a special instruction asked by the accused on trial upon an
indictment, the first two counts of which charged obtaining money
by false pretenses and the other charged embezzlement, was to the
effect that if the jury found the accused guilty upon the first three
counts, they could not find him guilty on any other of the counts,
and it appeared that the first two counts were in mind, and it was
intended to bring to the court's attention the difference between
the two sets of counts, so that the jury would receive such instruc-
tion as would prevent the bringing in of an inconsistent verdict,-it
was held reversible error for the court to omit such an instruction.
Id.
4. In a criminal prosecution, it is not error for the court to refuse an
instruction asked by the accused to the effect that, because of an
adjudication by a court of another jurisdiction, made several years
before, that he was insane, and committing him to an asylum until
restored to sanity, it must be presumed that he was insane at the
time of the commission of the offense for which he is being tried,
and that the burden is upon the prosecution to overcome such
presumption, where it does not appear from such adjudication that
the form of insanity from which the accused was then suffering was
permanent in its character, and the evidence shows that the accused
when about to be discharged from such asylum had escaped there-
from. Id.
5. When the accused in a criminal case was separately convicted upon
two indictments, sentence under one of which was to begin upon the
date of the ending of the sentence under the other, the reversal of
the judgment of conviction under the latter indictment will not
necessitate a reversal of the judgment under the other, as the sus-
pended sentence will begin when the first sentence is out of the way,
whether by lapse of time or reversal of judgment. (Following
Harris v. Lang, 27 App. D. C. 84, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 124, 7 A. & E. Ann.
Cas. 141.) Id.
7. While it is permissible for the trial court to caution the jury not to be
influenced by the probable consequences of their verdict, as all respon-
sibility after verdict is with the court, it is error for the court to
put before the jury any considerations outside the evidence that
may influence them and lead to a verdict not otherwise possible of
attainment. Miller v. United States, 138.
8. Statements in the court's charge to the jury in a criminal prosecution,
to the effect that if they should find the accused guilty, the court
would hear evidence upon the question of his motive, and might not
send him to the penitentiary, although made to overcome the effect
on the jury of remarks of counsel, constitute reversible error, es-
pecially when, following a verdict of guilty upon two out of thirty
counts of the indictment, the accused is sentenced to the extreme
penalty of the law for the crime charged. Mr. Chief Justice
SHEPARD dissenting. ( (Citing Raymond v. United States, 25 App.
D. C. 555; Pickford v. Hudson, 32 App. D. C. 480; Frisby v. United
States, 35 App. D. C. 513.) Id.
9. Forgery is a statutory, and not a common-law, crime in this District,
and the offense must be charged as defined in the statute, irrespective
of common-law rules of pleading. Simon v. United States, 280.
10. Under sec. 843, D. C. Code, 31 Stat. at L. 1326, chap. 854, providing
that the crime of forgery may be committed either by falsely mak-
ing an instrument or by falsely altering it, with intent to defraud
another, it is not necessary, although preferable, to charge both
offenses in the indictment; and if one alone is charged, and the evi-
dence supports the charge, the indictment will be sufficient. Id.
11. The court considered the evidence as disclosed by the record on an
appeal in a capital case, to determine whether it was sufficient to
support a verdict of murder in the first degree, on the claim made by
counsel for the appellant in argument that the evidence at best
established only the crime of manslaughter, although the record
showed no objection made or exception taken to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the verdict or to the charge of the court, and
although there was no assignment of error in support of such con-
tention. Lomax v. United States, 414.
12. Statements or confessions made by one accused of crime to police
officers while under arrest are admissible in evidence against the
accused, if made without any offers by the officers of reward or
immunity. Id.
13. Wide latitude is allowed the prosecution in criminal trials, in ascer-
taining the motive that actuated the commission of the crime.
lowing McUin v. United States, 17 App. D. C. 323.) Id.
14. Remote threats may be as indicative of motive as those made imme-
diately preceding the commission of the crime, and especially is this
true where a threat made nine months before the crime was commit-
ted was accompanied by an attempt to use a deadly weapon, and
where there is evidence tending to show that the threats were re-
peated throughout the intervening period between the time in ques-
tion and the commission of the crime. Id.
15. Evidence as to reputation must be confined to that existing in the
community in which the person resided at and shortly preceding
the occurrence of the event with reference to which the evidence is
sought to be adduced. Id.
16. Evidence of the good reputation of the accused in a capital case at
her former home, 150 miles distant from the place where she resided
and where the crime was committed, is admissible, where it ap-
pears that the accused had not lived there for fourteen years, but
had made yearly visits there of about a month's duration each.
Id.
17. In the trial of one accused of murder of her husband, testimony of a
physician called by the accused as a witness, that on one occasion
about a year prior to the homicide he was called to attend the ac-
cused, who was suffering from bruises and injuries which she stated
at the time were inflicted by the husband, and that this statement
was not denied by the husband,—is inadmissible. Id.
18. A remark made by the prosecuting officer in his address to the jury,
on the trial of one accused of the murder of her husband, to the
effect that the witness, to whose room the accused sought admittance
immediately after the commission of the crime, would perhaps have
shared the fate of the husband if the door of the room had not been
locked, is not so prejudical to the accused as to require the reversal
of judgment of conviction, where the evidence, although circumstan-
tial, tended to show that the accused went to the house in a state
of mind fixed upon murder. Id.
19. Under sec. 935, D. C. Code [31 Stat. at L. 1341, chap. 854], an appeal
lies to this court by the United States, from a judgment of the su-
preme court of the District of Columbia, sustaining demurrers to
an indictment for violation of the act of Congress of March 1, 1909
(35 Stat. at L. 670, chap. 233; D. C. Code, secs. 869a, b, c, and d),
prohibiting bucketing and bucket shopping, and to abolish bucket
shops; and quashing the indictment and allowing the accused to go
without day. (Following United States v. Cadarr, 24 App. D. C.
143; and distinguishing United States v. Evans, 30 App. D. C. 58,
s. c. 213 U. S. 297, 53 L. ed. 803, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507.) United
States v. Cella, 423.
20. It is an offense against the United States to violate the provisions of the
act of Congress of March 1, 1909 (35 Stat. at L. 670, chap. 233),
prohibiting bucketing and bucket shopping and abolishing bucket
shops in the District of Columbia, and requiring prosecutions there-
under to be in the name of the District of Columbia; and therefore a
conspiracy to commit such an offense is indictable in the name of
the United States under sec. 5440, Rev. Stat. U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901,
p. 3676, relating to the crime of conspiracy against the United
States. (Citing Tyner v. United States, 23 App. D. C. 324; and
Geist v. United States, 26 App. D. C. 594.) Id.
21. In a charge of conspiracy, the conspiracy is the gist of the crime, and
certainly, to a common intent sufficient to identify the offense which
the accused conspired to commit, is all that is requisite in stating
in the indictment the object of the conspiracy. Id.
22. An indictment for conspiracy is sufficient where it clearly states the ob-
ject of the conspiracy, the time when and place where it was entered
into, and the manner in which it was to be carried out, although the
particular part to be aɛsumed or undertaken by each conspirator in
the consummation of the unlawful scheme is not set forth. (Citing
Hyde v. United States, 35 App. D. C. 451.) Id.
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