6. In construing a penal statute, the legislative intent and the evils sought to be overcome must be borne in mind, and force and effect given, if possible, to every part of the connected structure (citing District of Columbia v. Dewalt, 31 App. D. C. 331); and where general words are employed, their meaning should be restricted to the obvious scope of the statute. 7. The provision in the 1st section of the act of Congress of March 1, 1909 (35 Stat. at L. 670, chap. 233; secs. 869a, b, c, and d, D. C. Code), prohibiting bucketing and bucket shopping, and to abolish bucket shops, that unless a different meaning is plainly required by the context, the word "contract," when used in the act, shall mean “any agreement, trade, or transaction," does not invalidate the act as prohibiting all agreements, trades, and transactions, but refers only to the particular kinds of contracts elsewhere described in the act, namely, bucketing and bucket-shop contracts, or all agreements, trades, and transactions relating thereto. 8. Quare, Whether good faith on the part of a person dealing with the keeper of a bucket shop would constitute a good defense to a charge against him for the violation of the act of Congress of March 1, 1909 (35 Stat. at L. 670, chap. 233; D. C. Code, secs. 869a, b, c, and d) prohibiting bucket shopping in the District of Columbia. 9. In the prosecution of keepers of a bucket shop for violating the act of Congress of March 1, 1909 (35 Stat. at L. 670, chap. 233; D. C. Code secs. 869a, b, c, and d) relating to bucket shopping, the act will not be declared invalid because of the possibility that under it innocent customers might be penalized, as its provisions defining a bucket shop, and prohibiting the keeper of it from making bucketing contracts, are entirely separable from, and not dependent upon, the provisions relating to the other party to such contract. (Citing Hyde v. Southern R. Co. 31 App. D. C. 466.) No. 2313. Submitted October 3, 1911. Decided November 6, 1911. HEARING on an appeal by the United States from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sustaining demurrers to an indictment for criminal conspiracy, and discharging the accused. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Clarence R. Wilson, United States District Attorney, and Mr. Henry S. Robbins for the appellant. Mr. A. S. Worthington, Mr. C. L. Frailey, Mr. Wm. Quinter, Mr. John C. Gittings, Mr. J. M. Chamberlin, Mr. John E. Laskey, Mr. John G. Jackson, and Mr. Howard Taylor for the appellees. Mr. Justice ROBв delivered the opinion of the Court: The defendants, Louis Cella, Angelo Cella, Samuel Adler, William Fox, Robert Hall, Samuel Raymond, Oscar J. Rappel, E. M. Browning, Henry R. Duryee, and Charles R. Alley, appellees here, were indicted in the supreme court of the District for conspiracy under sec. 5440, Rev. Stat. U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3676, to commit an offense against the United States, to wit, the offense of being a keeper of a bucket shop in this District, in violation of "An Act to Prohibit Bucketing and Bucket Shopping, and to Abolish Bucket Shops," approved March 1st, 1909, 35 Stat. at L. 670, chap. 233. To this indictment the defendants severally demurred, and the court sustained the demurrers, quashed the indictment, and allowed the defendants to go without day. Thereupon the United States noted an appeal under sec. 935 of the Code [31 Stat. at L. 1341, chap. 854], and brought the case here. 1. We must first consider the motion which the defendants have filed to dismiss this appeal, the ground of the motion being that this court is without jurisdiction in the premises. The motion is without merit. In United States v. Cadarr, 24 App. D. C. 143, this court examined said sec. 935 of the Code, and sustained the right of the government to an appeal in an analogous case. There is nothing inconsistent with that ruling in United States v. Evans, 30 App. D. C. 58, affirmed in 213 U. S. 297, 53 L. ed. 803, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507. In that case the defendant had been put in jeopardy and a verdict of acquittal returned. The court ruled that a moot question only was presented, and that sec. 935 of the Code did not authorize an appeal in such a case. It is apparent, therefore, that the force of the decision in the Cadarr Case was in nowise impaired. 2. The point is also made that the bucket-shop act, being applicable only to the District of Columbia, and prosecutions thereunder, defendants insist, being required to be in the name of the District, a violation of said act cannot be said to be an offense against the United States within the purview of sec. 5440, Rev. Stat. This contention we are unable to sustain. While the District of Columbia, by act of Congress, has been created a municipal corporation having a right to sue and be sued, it has no sovereign power. As was said in Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U. S. 1, 33 L. ed. 231, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 19: "Its supreme legislative body is Congress. * * * Crimes committed in the District are not crimes against the District, but against the United States." See also Tyner v. United States, 23 App. D. C. 324; Geist v. United States, 26 App. D. C. 594; United States v. Campbell, 179 Fed. 762. We therefore rule that it is an offense against the United States to violate the provisions of the bucket-shop act, and hence that a conspiracy to commit such an offense is cognizable under the conspiracy statute of the United States. 3. The sufficiency of the indictment is challenged on the ground that it does not adequately inform the defendants of the charge against them. A brief analysis of the indictment will suffice to dispel any doubt as to its sufficiency. It charges that the defendants, naming them, on the 15th day of August, in the year 1909, and within the District of Columbia, "unlawfully did conspire, combine, confederate, and agree together, and with divers other persons to said grand jurors unknown, to commit an offense against the United States, to wit, the offense of being a keeper of a bucket shop in said District, that is to say, a room and place known as 1420 New York avenue, northwest, in said District, where certain contracts prohibited by the act of Congress approved March 1st, 1909, and entitled 'An Act to Amend an Act Entitled "An Act to Establish a Code of Law for the District of Columbia," relative to gambling, bucket shops, and bucketing,' were to be made, to wit, contracts respecting the purchase and sale, upon margins, of divers securities, to wit, securities of the following corporations, among others." This is followed by a list of corporations. The indictment then contains an averment of the essential characteristics of the bucketing contracts intended to be made, from which averment it plainly appears that those contracts were the ones prohibited by the bucket-shop act, and that the keepers of a place where such contracts were to be made would be the keepers of a bucket shop within the meaning of the statute. This averment ends with the words, it then and there being the design and intention of said defendants to keep such bucket shop and conduct the business of the same through said Henry R. Duryee." Then follows the overt acts, which it is conceded are sufficiently full and explicit. It must be remembered that in a charge of conspiracy the conspiracy is the gist of the crime, and that, as stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425, 52 L. ed. 278, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 163, "certainty, to a common intent, sufficient to identify the of fense which the defendants conspired to commit, is all that is requisite in stating the object of the conspiracy." Here the object of the conspiracy is clearly stated, the time when and the place where it was entered into. The manner in which it was to be carried out also sufficiently appears. It is true that the particular part to be assumed or undertaken by each conspirator in the consummation of the unlawful scheme is not set forth; but this is unnecessary. Such a requirement would impose too great a burden upon the government, and, in many instances, defeat the ends of justice. Each of these defendants is charged with having participated in the original conspiracy, and each, by his demurrer, admits this averment to be true. All, therefore, are equally guilty in the eyes of the law, as none withdrew before the commission of the overt acts. United States v. Britton, 108 U. S. 199, 204, 27 L. ed. 698, 700, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 531; Hyde v. United States, 35 App. D. C. 451, 494. This indictment is in substantially the same form as that which was sustained in Dealey v. United States, 152 U. S. 539, 38 L. ed. 545, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 680, 9 Am. Crim. Rep. 161. 4. We will now proceed to examine the so called bucket-shop act. This act constitutes secs. 869a, b, c, and d, of subchapter 5, entitled "Offenses Against Public Policy," of Chapter 19 of the Code, entitled "Crimes and Punishments." The 1st section reads in part as follows: "An Act to prohibit bucketing and bucket shopping, and to abolish bucket shops. The following words and phrases used in this act shall, unless a different meaning is plainly required by the context, have the following meanings: * * 'Contract' shall mean any agree * * * ment, trade, or transaction. * 'Bucket shop' shall mean any room, office, store, building, or other place where any contract prohibited by this act is made or offered to be made. * * 'Bucketing' or 'bucket shopping' shall mean: (a) The making of or offering to make any contract respecting the purchase or sale, either upon credit or upon margin, of any securities or commodities wherein both parties thereto intend, or such keeper intends, that such contract shall be, or may be, terminated, closed, or settled according to or upon the basis of the public market quotations of prices made on any board of trade or exchange upon which said securities or commodities are dealt in, and without a bona fide purchase or sale of the same; or (b) the making of or offering to make any contract respecting the purchase or sale, either upon credit or upon margin, of any securities or commodities, wherein both parties intend, or such keeper intends, that such contract shall be, or may be, deemed terminated, closed, or settled when such public market quotations of prices for the securities or commodities named in such contract shall reach a certain figure, without a bona fide purchase or sale of the same; or (c) the making of or offering to make any contract respecting the purchase or sale, either upon credit or upon margin, of any securities or commodities wherein both parties do not intend, or such keeper does not intend, the actual or bona fide receipt or delivery of such securities or commodities, but do intend, or such keeper does intend, a settlement of such contract based upon the differences in such public market quotations of prices at which said securities or commodities are, or are asserted to be, bought |