the location of its passenger platforms along its tracks ought not to be made to depend upon the varying notions and opinions of juries. One jury might consider the plan and location of a particular structure to be faulty and negligent; another might not. Each case involving the same construction would depend upon the motion or opinion of the jury impaneled to try it. A change made to conform to the opinion of one jury might later meet with the condemnation of another. In Dotson v. Erie R. Co. supra, the court considered the duty of a railway company in the matter of platforms at stations, and having said that it was its duty to maintain such as shall be safe for the use of passengers, proceeded to say: "But this use is to be exercised in conformity to the manifest purpose for which the structure in question is adapted. And so, a railroad company is only required to build platforms of sufficient dimensions to accommodate passengers getting on and off at their stations. [Citing Cases.] It is manifest that this duty requires the railroad company to construct its platforms sufficiently near to the rails that it will afford to passengers, including the aged and infirm, a safe exit to and from the trains. And it is a matter of common knowledge that, in performing this duty, the platforms along the best regulated railroads are built so near the rails that the projections from the engines and the cars will overlap to some extent the edge of the platform. While the extreme edge of the platform is perfectly safe for passengers when occupying it for the purpose to which it is manifestly adapted, it is a matter of common knowledge that it is a place of danger when occupied while trains are passing or likely to pass." Several decisions to the same effect are reviewed in the opinion of the court. In State use of Egner v. United R. & Electric Co. 98 Md. 297, 56 Atl. 789, plaintiff's intestate was standing on a platform by the side of an electric railway, intending to take passage with his family. Two cars were signaled in turn, but passed without stopping. The third one,. though signaled, passed at a speed of 30 or 35 miles per hour. The platform, about 15 feet long and 4 feet wide, was situated. so near the rail that the footboard or step of the passing car

extended over it about 18 inches, leaving a space 2 feet wide, on which persons could stand in safety. It had been in use for several years with safety to persons standing thereon. Egner was struck by the car and killed; none of the others was injured. There being no other evidence relating to the platform, the court affirmed a judgment for the defendant, entered on a directed verdict. See also Edgerton v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 6 App. D. C. 516. In that case plaintiff's intestate had been struck and killed by a passenger train while standing near the edge of the station platform. No negligence in the construction of the platform was alleged, but it was claimed that there was negligence in running the train rapidly by the same at the time, and under the circumstances. A verdict had been directed on the ground of deceased's contributory negligence, and the judgment thereon was affirmed. A single case is relied on by the appellee as establishing a doctrine contrary to those above cited. Dobiecki v. Sharp, 88 N. Y. 203-207. That the decision states a somewhat stricter rule than the others in respect of the obligation to one intending to become a passenger on one of defendant's trains, and occupying the platform for that purpose, may be conceded. In the light of the evidence as to the purpose of the use of the platform in this case, that question is of no importance. On the question actually involved here, the case is not in point. The party was struck by a passing train while standing on the platform. Parts of the cars extended from 3 to 5 inches over the platform. The evidence is not recited in the report of the case, but the opinion states that there was evidence tending to show improper construction of the cars, and later it was said: "The contention that the plaintiff was bound to show something more than an improper construction of the platform or cars, and that she was bound to prove that this negligence was the cause of the injury, is sufficiently answered by the remark that some of the evidence tended in that direction."

3. It appears from the plaintiff's evidence that deceased was sixteen years of age at the time of the accident, and there was no evidence tending to show that she was of less than ordinary

intelligence, and unable to appreciate the danger of walking near a railway track over which trains were constantly passing. There was nothing, therefore, to take the case out of the rule applicable to adults under like circumstances. It is unnecessary to consider other questions that have been argued.

For the reasons given, the judgment will be reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded for a new trial. Reversed.

BRIDE v. BAKER.

EQUITY; MARSHAL'S SALES; ESTOPPEL.

1. Equity looks to substance, and not form, and will not lend its aid to one whose sole ground for seeking such aid is based upon a technicality.

2. A party admittedly liable for costs for which a judgment has been rendered against another person, and who permits a marshal's sale in satisfaction of such judgment to be made of land belonging to him, but the title to which was in such other person until two days before the sale, when it was conveyed to him, cannot maintain a bill in equity to set aside the sale and the marshal's deed thereunder to the judgment creditor, merely because the latter knew that the property belonged to him and he recorded his deed before the sale; and it is immaterial, in the absence of any allegation of fraud, what amount of money was realized from the sale. (Citing American Sar. Bank v. Eisminger, 35 App. D. C. 51.)

No. 2267. Submitted April 4, 1911.

Decided May 1, 1911.

HEARING on an appeal by the plaintiff from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as a court of equity, dismissing a bill to set aside a marshal's sale and a deed made thereunder, together with a tax deed. Affirmed.

Statement of the Case.

The COURT in the opinion stated the facts as follows:

[37 App.

This appeal [by Cotter T. Bride] brings into review a decree of the supreme court of the District dismissing appellant's bill praying the setting aside of a marshal's sale and deed to appellee, Galen E. Green, as well as a tax deed from one Harris to said Green.

The facts necessary to the determination of the issues involved are substantially these: The early record title to lot 5, square 882, situate in the District of Columbia, and immediately involved in this controversy, was in the heirs of David Peters and others. On February 28, 1903, one Christopher B. Hunter executed a deed purporting to convey this lot and lot 4, adjoining, to James A. Gassaway, the deed containing a covenant of adverse possession by the grantor for more than twenty years. The appellant, Bride, was the real purchaser, Gassaway being an agent or trustee. The deed to Gassaway was immediately recorded. Subsequently, on December 7, 1903, Gassaway executed a deed covering both lots to Bride. This deed was withheld from record until July 24, 1906.

On February 4, 1904, Gassaway, acting for Bride, but proceeding in his own name, filed a bill seeking to have the title to the lots decreed good by adverse possession. On March 8, 1905, Martha A. Mayse, one of the appellees, filed a similar bill as to part of lot 4. She also filed a petition in the Gassaway case with supporting affidavits, as appears from evidence introduced by appellant, in which she averred that Gassaway and Robert Graham, one of the defendants in that proceeding, were "ignorant and impecunious colored men, used merely as lay figures to give the semblance of reality to the pretended suit to establish title, and that the real litigant is one Cotter T. Bride," and that both Gassaway and Graham were wholly dominated by said Bride. Leave to be admitted as a defendant was thereupon sought. Gassaway, after the filing of the Mayse petition for leave to intervene, entered his case dismissed as to lot 4, and, on March 30, 1905, received a decree purporting to establish his title as to lot 5.

On May 24, 1905, Graham and Gassaway, who had been made defendants in the Mayse suit to quiet title to the part of lot 4 claimed by her, filed separate answers, Gassaway still acting for Bride, although ostensibly for himself. Testimony was thereupon taken by the parties, and, on May 29, 1906, after hearing, a decree was entered for the complainant Mayse, and that she recover against the defendants Gassaway and Graham the costs of suit to be taxed by the clerk, execution to issue as at law. From this decree Gassaway and Graham entered an appeal, which, however, appears not to have been perfected. The costs were taxed at $129.40, and, on June 26th following, that is to say almost a month after the rendition of the decree, fi. fa. issued upon the judgment for costs. The same day the marshal levied upon said lot 5 as the property of Gassaway, his deed to Bride not then being of record, and, on July 26th, sold the same for $25, the expenses of the levy and sale being $32.28. The appraisers summoned by the marshal fixed the value of the lot at $1,055.60.

On May 21, 1907, Miss Mayse filed a bill against Bride setting forth the history of the litigation resulting in her decree as to lot 4 and judgment for costs, and praying for a special decree against Bride for said sum of $129.40. To this bill a demurrer was filed by Mr. Bride, alleging, among other things, the existence of an adequate remedy at law. This demurrer was sustained. On June 19, 1907, about a month subsequent to the filing of the Mayse bill seeking to charge him with the payment of her judgment for costs, Mr. Bride filed the petition herein, setting forth, inter alia, that the marshal, on July 26, 1906, the day of the sale of said lot 5, executed a deed to the defendant Green; that Gassaway, while holding the apparent fee simple title to said lot, "nevertheless took said title at the instance of this complainant as trustee;" that Green had constructive and actual notice of this fact at the date of said sale; that Miss Mayse was merely Green's agent; that Green had subsequently, on December 13, 1906, taken a quitclaim deed from one Job Harris to said lot 5, "apparently to bolster up his title;" that on December 19, 1906, Green and wife conveyed