shows, however, that the transaction related not only to real estate but also to personal property, and we see no good reason against holding that it is therefore severable, and such statute is not applicable as far as the personal property is concerned, such contract not being required to be in writing. As to this latter property, it may be said, further, that there is an allegation in the complaint that "plaintiff was, since the commencement of this action informed and he now believes, and he, therefore, upon information and belief, alleges that defendant purchased at the time of the purchase of the said land, all of the aforesaid personal property that was upon said premises and that was embraced in said Leebon's original proposition to sell, and which was separately valued, and by defendant purchased from said Leebon at the price of fifteen thousand dollars."

It is further contended by respondent that Walker's statement as set out in the seventh paragraph aforesaid was a promise to answer for the debt of Leebon, and therefore void under the provisions of subdivision 2 of said section 1624, pronouncing invalid "a special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, except in the cases provided for in section twenty-seven hundred and ninety-four." We are not inclined to agree with respondent in this connection. We think it may fairly be inferred from the language of the complaint that the agreement between plaintiff and the defendant constituted an independent contract. It appears, in other words, that plaintiff had first entered into a contract with the owner of the property for a commission of five per cent, but after producing a purchaser, said contract seems to have been rescinded by mutual consent, whereupon defendant, in consideration of obtaining the property at a lower price, promised to pay plaintiff a commission of five per cent upon what he should be required to pay for said real estate and personalty. We can perceive no necessary connection between this contract and the one made with the owner. Strictly speaking, it is not a promise to answer for the default of the owner, nor is it a novation.

In the demurrer, which was both general and special, it is claimed that the said complaint is uncertain, in that it cannot be ascertained whether the cause of action grows out of a claim for commission for the sale of real property or the sale of personal property, or what portion of the said two

thousand seven hundred dollars the commission is claimed for one or for the other. Furthermore, that it cannot be ascertained whether defendant ever promised to pay any commission or any sum whatever for the sale of the personal property, and that it cannot be ascertained whether or not defendant promised or agreed to pay any commission after or before any services were performed, if any were performed, by the plaintiff. These grounds of demurrer may be considered together. From paragraph 7 of the complaint, considered in connection with what precedes, the conclusion would follow that the parties had in view both the real and personal property, but in paragraph 8 we find this allegation:

"That on the return trip to Visalia on the occasion last aforesaid, defendant and plaintiff talked over the possibility of handling the property and defendant remarked to plaintiff, 'You are now interested in the deal, 5% on whatever price I pay for the property, and unless I can get it at a price a great deal below what Mr. Leebon now holds it at, I cannot handle it, therefore, if you make anything out of the deal you should assist me in buying the property as low as possible and if I could get the ranch for a fair price, and leave the personal property out, I think I could handle it, but I don't want to get mixed up with the chattel mortgage on the personal property.'

This would seem to qualify the promise as to the personal property and confine it to the realty. It does at least indicate an intention on the part of respondent that appellant should do nothing toward the purchase of the personalty, and we find that appellant acted upon the statement and actually performed no service for respondent in that particular.

As to the point in reference to the apportionment of the two thousand seven hundred dollars, it does appear, as we have seen, that the personal property was sold for the sum of fifteen thousand dollars, and it is a mere matter of computation to determine how much of the commission was claimed for that sale. Another ground of special demurrer was that "two causes of action are united in said complaint, the one for the commission growing out of the transfer of real property and the other for the commission growing out of the transfer of personal property, and said causes of action are not separately stated." It seems clear that this position is well taken, and that for this reason the complaint was

demurrable under subdivision 5 of section 430 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The other criticism, moreover, suggested by the general demurrer of respondent, seems to involve a fatal defect in the complaint. In considering it we must, of course, keep in view the fact that the contract with respondent was entirely distinct from the one made with the owner, and that the real property must be eliminated from consideration. Then the question arises whether plaintiff earned any commission, as against the defendant, for the sale of the personal property. If so, he must have performed some service for the defendant in connection with said sale. It is not sufficient that he may have earned his commission as against the owner by bringing the vendor and vendee together, since that service related to the first contract and had been completed when the second contract was made with the purchaser, and it would seem, on familiar principles, that the plaintiff, in order to earn his commission on the sale of said personalty, must have performed some service to effect said. sale, but we look in vain through the complaint to find any such allegation. It does not appear that plaintiff had any further communication whatever with the owner in reference to said personalty, nor that he made any effort to bring the parties together in relation to it. It is true he performed some service in regard to the real property, but that cannot be considered, as before stated.

In fact, immediately after the agreement relied upon by plaintiff, he was informed by defendant, as we have seen, that he, the latter, did not desire to purchase said personalty, and it seems defendant purchased it without the knowledge of plaintiff. We can see no principle, therefore, upon which it can be held that plaintiff can recover from defendant for said sale. The promise to pay, if made, was entirely without consideration, and cannot be enforced. It amounts to no more than this: Defendant says to plaintiff: "If I buy the whole of this property for less than eighty thousand dollars, I will pay you a five per cent commission on the purchase price." Defendant did thereafter purchase the personalty for fifteen thousand dollars without any aid whatever from plaintiff. Indeed, as we have seen, it was understood that plaintiff was to perform no service in that connection.

There was no benefit conferred upon defendant, no prejudice suffered by plaintiff in consequence of said promise, nor

was it intended that there should be. The promise, therefore, was without consideration, and void as far as the personal property was concerned. Or the promise may be considered as implying that the services would be performed, and since there was no performance, to its entire extent the promise failed.

We think the judgment should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.

Chipman, P. J., and Hart, J., concurred.

[Crim. No. 555. Second Appellate District.-October 25, 1917.] THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ROBERT R. ROGERS, Appellant.

CRIMINAL LAW-FALSE PRETENSES.-The evidence in this case is held to be sufficient to sustain the charge of false representations as to ownership of property sold by defendant.

ID. SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION CHARACTER OF MONEY OBTAINED.— An information charging the obtaining by false pretenses of the sum of six hundred dollars is sufficient without stating that such sum was "lawful money" or current coin of the United States.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Paul J. McCormick, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

C. A. Bridges, J. B. Tatlow, and Jesse R. Shafer, for Appellant.

U. S. Webb, Attorney-General, and Robert M. Clarke, Deputy Attorney-General, for Respondent.

JAMES, J.-Appellant was convicted of the crime of obtaining money by false and fraudulent representations and pretenses. He appeals from the judgment entered after his conviction by a verdict of the jury. The evidence presented in the trial court and brought here under the alternative method of appeal tells a convincing story of the consumma

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tion of a barefaced scheme by which a working girl was defrauded of her savings to the amount of six hundred dollars. The complainant testified that she, together with a girl friend, desired to purchase the lease and furniture of some lodginghouse which they might thereafter conduct. Through a friend they were introduced to this appellant, who appeared to be in the business of negotiating such deals; that appellant took them to a hotel which he said he could secure for them, and requested them to make a deposit so that he might bind the bargain. Thereupon he was given by the complain. ant a check for the sum of $25. Several days elapsed, at which time he reported to complainant that the negotiations were not entirely closed, and finally he reported that he was unable to make the deal for the house which he had exhibited, and told the complainant that he had another house which he wanted her to look at. This witness testified: "He told us that he had bought that place, he got that place, and he wanted us to go over and look at it; that he fell through with the other deal and he was going to give us that place instead of the Argus Hotel. . . . We went to see the place and it met with our approval. . . . He said the rent was $226, but he would get it for us for $150. He told us to move over there that night and take possession, that he would come over next morning and fix things." The complainant and her friend did move into the lodging-house and attempted to take possession, but they were ousted therefrom a few days later by the landlord. It appeared in testimony that the appellant neither acquired the ownership of the lease on the premises, nor the ownership of the furniture and furnishings. It further appeared that there were arrearages of rental due from the then tenant of the property to an amount in excess of four hundred dollars, which the landlord was insisting should be paid before he would consent to a transfer of the lease being made. The return of the money was demanded by the complainant, but the appellant did not return the same, and his arrest followed. It sufficiently appeared by every fair inference to be made from the oral testimony given that complainant relied upon representations as to the ownership of the lodging-house so made to her by appellant. It should be further stated that the total amount of six hundred dollars was paid over to appellant with intent that the money should be used in the purchase of the hotel