App.] Haley v. Dempsey, Exr. From the foregoing it will appear that counsel did not formulate any specific rule of law and request that such a charge be given. No court to whom such a remark was addressed could reasonably be expected to know what counsel claimed the law to be. If counsel desired to predicate error upon this omission of the court they should have indicated clearly what they claimed the law to be, and what charge they desired the court to give. (Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Lied, 9 Ohio App., 156.) But aside from the question of procedure, the court is of opinion that the trial court did not err in refusing to charge in the manner which counsel for plaintiffs in error urge in their brief. It is claimed that where a confidential relation is established and a gift made to a person in whom confidence is reposed, and such person participates in the drafting of the will, or makes suggestions for drawing it, a presumption of fraud or undue influence arises which the proponent has the burden of proof to overthrow. The word "presumption" is to some extent an ambiguous word, and many instances are found in the decisions in fraud cases, and in will contests, where it is used in more than one sense. Presumptions may be either of fact or of law. A presumption of law is a rule of law that a particular inference shall be drawn by a court or jury from a particular circumstance. A presumption of fact is a rule of law that a fact, otherwise doubtful, may be inferred from a fact which is proved. (Lawson on Presumptive Evidence [2 ed.], 639.) This distinction is adverted to in the case of Hutson v. Hartley, 72 Ohio St., 262, 268, 269, 270. Haley v. Dempsey, Exr. [14 Ohio Under the Ohio law the order of probate is prima facie evidence of the due attestation, execution and validity of a will, and when the order of probate is introduced in evidence the burden of proof in respect to all of these subjects rests on the contestants of the will. Mears v. Mears, 15 Ohio St., 90, and Hutson v. Hartley, supra. In the further progress of the trial there is no such change in the burden of proof and law as to require the court in its charge to the jury to instruct them that in respect to any particular issue or items of evidence the burden of proof is thrown back from the contestants to the proponents. While it is argued here that the effect of a charge as now contended for does not affect the burden of proof, the effect of such a charge would be to require the court to instruct contradictory presumptions in respect to the same subject-matter at the same time. Hutson v. Hartley, 72 Ohio St., 262, 268. The so-called presumption of undue influence arising out of confidential relations is neither a conclusive presumption nor a presumption of law. It is a mere inference of fact which the jury may draw. "While the jury may find undue influence as a fact from the fact that a beneficiary in confidential relations with testator drew the will, the court must not charge the jury as a matter of law so to find." Page on Wills, Section 414, page 492. See also Hall, etc., v. Hall, 78 Ohio St., 415, at page 416, where the supreme court held that the trial App.] Haley v. Dempsey, Exr. court erred in giving a charge which in substance told the jury what weight they should give to a particular item of evidence of facts which constituted a confidential relation. See also the discussion in the decision (not the syllabus) in Graham v. Courtright, 180 Ia., 394, 405-416. It is for the jury to determine what inferences of fact are properly to be drawn from the evidence adduced at the trial. The court would have been right in refusing to charge on what contestants now claim to be the law, even if the matter had been brought properly to its attention. For the error in the admission of the evidence as above set forth, the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. Judgment reversed and cause remanded. HAMILTON and CUSHING, JJ., concur. Buehrle v. Commissioners. [14 Ohio BUEHRLE V. THE COMMISSIONERS OF MAHONING COUNTY. County commissioners-Bridges-Determination of carrying capacity-Section 7572, General Code - Right to limit weight of loads-Sections 7246 and 7250, General Code, inapplicable, when-Maximum weight of loads-Injunction. 1. After the commissioners and surveyor of a county have ascertained the carrying capacity of a county bridge upon an improved highway of their county, and given the warning and notice required by Section 7572, General Code, any person driving thereon a loaded conveyance of greater weight than the carrying capacity of such bridge is subject to the fine and liability provided in that section. 2. The county commissioners cannot be enjoined from causing the arrest and conviction of persons driving over a county bridge on an improved highway in their county with a loaded conveyance of greater weight than the carrying capacity of such bridge, as ascertained under the provisions of Section 7572, General Code, although its carrying capacity is less than the weight allowed to be propelled over the improved highways and bridges thereon by Section 7246, General Code. 3. Section 7250, General Code, does not prohibit the commissioners of a county from ascertaining the carrying capacity of the bridges on the improved highway of the county under Section 7572, and limiting weight of the load that can be transported over such bridges to the carrying capacity thereof, although such capacity be less than the weight allowed by Sections 7246 to 7249, inclusive, General Code. (Decided April 1, 1921.) APPEAL: Court of Appeals for Mahoning county. Messrs. Henderson, Wickham & Maiden, for plaintiff. Mr. H. H. Hull, prosecuting attorney, and Mr. Thomas E. Thomas, for defendant. App.] Buehrle v. Commissioners. POLLOCK, J. This action comes into this court on appeal, and was submitted on the pleadings, evidence and argument of counsel. Some time prior to the bringing of the action in the court below, the county commissioners, together with the county surveyor, proceeded in compliance with Section 7572, General Code, to determine the carrying capacity of each of the county bridges in the county, including those on the improved highways thereof, and took the necessary steps under that section to give notice of the carrying capacity of each bridge, and caution all persons using the highways against driving over a bridge with a vehicle, including its load, of greater weight than the carrying capacity of such bridge. Plaintiff in his petition alleged that he is engaged in the business of hauling over the improved highways of the county with heavy trucks, and passing over the bridges on such highways with vehicles, including the load thereof, of greater weight than the carrying capacity of such bridges as determined by the commissioners and surveyor. Further, that he brings this action for the benefit of himself and others in like business. The plaintiff claims that the action of the commissioners in applying the provisions of Section 7572, General Code, to the bridges on the improved highways of the county, is in violation of the provisions of Section 7246 and following sections, which provide for the weight, surface of the tires and speed of vehicles operated over the improved highways and bridges thereon of the state. Plaintiff prays that an injunction may issue restraining the commissioners from limiting the right |