onyx are excepted from a railroad grant. Com'r to J. Guthrie Savage, Aug. 12, 1892. See, also, Com'r to W. H. Bell, April 12, 1894. Opal: Is a mineral if lands are most valuable therefor. Com'r to F. T. Palmer, July 19, 1894.

Ozocerite or Mineral Wax: Definition and discussion. The General Land Office will express no opinion, in advance of the submission of an actual case, as to whether or not it is subject to entry under the mineral laws. Com'r to J. Thomas Turner, May 27, 1892.

Paint Rock: Is a mineral. Hartwell v. Cammon, 2 Stock. Ch. (N. J.) 128.

A "deposit of mineral paint rock in place" is not subject to placer entry. (No opinion expressed as to whether or not paint rock is a mineral.) Charles A. Barnes, 7 L. D. 66.

Perodats: No opinion expressed. Com'r to T. S. Parker, March 22, 1892. Petroleum - Oil: Is a mineral. (Placer.) Com'r to Surveyors General, 1 C. L. O. 179; Com'r to A. A. Dewey, 9 C. L. O. 51; Downey v. Rogers, 2 L. D. 707; Roberts v. Jepson, 4 L. | D. 60; Samuel E. Rogers, 4 L. D. 284; Conlin v. Kelly, 12 L. D. 1; Piru Oil Co., 16 L. D. 117; Kier v. Peterson, 41 Pa. 357; Dark v. Johnston, 55 Pa. 164; Com'r to SurveyorGeneral California, Copp's Min. Lands, 160. Contra, Departmental decision of August 27, 1896, In re Union Oil Co.*

As the evidence shows that the oil placer mining claim was located in good faith, it is no defense to a trespass to say that mineral does not exist upon the mining claim. Van Horn v. State of Wyoming, 40 Pac. Rep. 964.

Petroleum Wax: No decisions have yet been rendered, and the authorities are silent as to the nature of the substance. Com'r to Bernard Snow, July 22, 1893. Potter's Clay (see Clay). Phosphatic Guano (see Guano). Phosphates: Are mineral. Com'r to Gainesville office, Dec. 11, 1889; Com'r to Gainesville office, April 15, 1890, 17 C. L. O. 30; Com'r to Gainesville office, May 20, 1890, 17 C. L. O. 74; Com'r to Gainesville office, May 21, 1890, 17 C. L. O. 75; Gary v. Todd, 18 L. D. 58.

Not excepted from railroad grants in Florida. Tucker v. Florida Ry. & Navigation Co., 19 L. D. 414.

Discussion of the act approved October

1, 1890 (26 Stat. 662). Gary v. Todd, 19 L. D. 475.

Not subject to homestead entry. Gary v. Todd, 18 L. D. 58.

The word "phosphates" should be inserted in non-mineral affidavits in agricultural entries in Florida. Instructions of April 25, 1890, 17 C. L. O. 51.

Lands in Florida claimed prior to April 1, 1890, under the homestead or pre-emption laws, and not known to be valuable for phosphate deposits at date of such claim, may be entered under such laws notwithstanding a subsequent discovery of such deposits. (Act approved Oct. 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 663.) Gary v. Todd, 18 L. D. 58.

Phosphate lands in Florida were not excepted from the grant of June 22, 1874 (18 Stat. 194), to the Florida Railway & Navigation Co. Tucker v. Florida Ry. & Navigation Co., 19 L. D. 414. Plumbago (see Graphite). Potash (Saltpeter - Nitrate of Soda): Is a mineral. Maxwell v. Brierly, 10 C. L. O. 50. Rock Salt (see Salines).

Salines · Salt: Is not a mineral within the purview of the statute. Cole v. Markley, 2 L. D. 847; Salt Bluff Placer, 7 L. D. 549; Southwestern M. Co., 14 L. D. 597; Hall v. Litchfield, Copp's Min. Lands, 321; Morton v. Nebraska, 21 Wall. 660; 12 Mor. Min. Rep. 451. Contra, State v. Parker, 61 Tex. 194; Com'r to J. A. Rollins, 1 C. L. O. 19.

Act for the disposal of salines. Jan. 12, 1877 (19 Stat. 221).

Instructions under the act. Circular of April 10, 1877, 4 C. L. O. 21.

Cannot be entered by land warrants. Morton v. Nebraska, 21 Wall. 660; 12 Mor. Min. Rep. 451.

Reserved by general policy. Morton v. Nebraska, 21 Wall. 660; 12 Mor. Min. Rep. 451.

Cannot be entered under the mining laws. Utah Salt Lands, 13 C. L. O. 53.

Can only be sold in those states which have a grant of saline lands. Not for sale in other states nor in the territories. Utah Salt Lands, 13 C. L. O. 53.

In Nevada they are subject to sale as mineral. Eagle Salt Works, 5 C. L. O. 4. Contra, Southwestern M. Co., 14 L. D. 597. (NOTE: The Eagle Salt Works entry was subsequently canceled because the lands were not subject to entry under the mineral land laws.)

Character of, a question of fact to be determined by investigation. H. C. Horton, 9 C. L. O. 121.

The general act (Jan. 12, 1877, 19 Stat. 221) provides for the sale of saline lands at auction for not less than $1.25 per acre.

Are not subject to sale and entry in Utah. Salt Bluff Placer, 7 L. D. 549.

Are not subject to desert land entry. Jeremy v. Thompson, 20 L. D. 299.

Are not subject to sale in Colorado. Hall v. Litchfield, Copp's Min. Lands, 321.

Rock salt is subject to entry and sale as mineral. J. R. Megarrigle, 9 C. L. O. 113. Contra, Southwestern M. Co., 14 L. D. 597.

Salt springs are not enterable under the mineral land laws. Pagosa Springs, 1 L. D. 562; Salt Bluff Placer, 7 L. D. 549.

Lands containing salt are excepted from the grant to the Central Pacific Railroad Company. Eagle Salt Works, 5 C. L. O. 4.

History of legislation concerning salt. Secretary to Governor of Alabama, Oct. 21, 1895, 21 L. D. 320. See, also, 10 L. D. 222.

In Nebraska some salines go to the state. Morton v. Nebraska, 21 Wall. 660; 12 Mor. Min. Rep. 451.

The return of lands as saline is not conclusive of their character, and if disproven they are subject to agricultural entry. Cole v. Markley, 2 L. D. 847.

A patent for saline lands (which, under the general law, were reserved) is void. Morton v. Nebraska, 21 Wall. 660; 12 Mor. Min. Rep. 451.

Slate: Is a mineral. Com'r to Stockton office, Oct. 23, 1874; Copp's Min. Lands, 143; Conlin v. Kelly, 12 L. D. 1.

In California slate should be entered under the act of June 3, 1878 (timber and stone act, 20 Stat. 89). Parks v. Hendsch, 12 L. D. 100.

Soda: Is a mineral. Downey v. Rogers, 2 L. D. 707; Circular of July 15, 1873, 1 C. L. O. 11.

Nitrate and carbonate of soda are mineral. Circular of July 15, 1873, 1 C. L. O. 11. Regulation governing the entry of, 1 L. D. 561.

Springs (Mineral): Are not subject to entry

under the mining laws and constitute no bar to an agricultural entry. Pagosa Springs, 1 L. D. 562; Charles Lennig, 5 L. D. 190; Morrill v. Margaret M. Co., 11 L. D. 563; Departmental decision of March 24, 1896, In re Smith v. Wallace.

Hot Springs of Arkansas are reserved. (Act of April 20, 1832, 4 Stat. 505.) Hot Springs Cases, 92 U. S. 698.

Stockwerke: Is a mineral. Circular July 15, 1873, 1 C. L. O. 11.

Stone: Is a mineral. Rosse v. Wainman, 14 M. & W. 859; S. C., 2 Exch. 800; S. C., 15 L. J. Exch. 67; Micklethwait v. Winter, 6 Exch. 644; S. C., 5 E. L. & E. 526; S. C., 20 L. J. Exch. 313; Midland R. R. Co. v. Checkley, Law Rep. 4 Eq. 24; Freezer v. Sweeney, 8 Mont. 508; 21 Pac. Rep. 20; Johnston v. Harrington, 5 Wash. State, 73; 31 Pac. Rep. 316. Contra, Wheeler v. Smith, 5 Wash. State, 404; 32 Pac. Rep. 784.

Land containing valuable deposits of building stone is enterable under the placer mining laws. H. P. Bennett, Jr., 3 L. D. 116.

Stone valuable only for building purposes is not subject to entry under the provisions of chapter 6, title XXXII, United States Revised Statutes. (But see act approved August 4, 1892, 27 Stat. 348.) Conlin v. Kelley, 12 L. D. 1.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

GENERAL LAND OFFICE,

WASHINGTON, D. C., October 12, 1892. Registers and Receivers United States Land Offices:

GENTLEMEN-Attached is a copy of the act of congress of August 4, 1892, entitled "An act to authorize the entry of lands chiefly valuable for building stone under the placer mining laws."

The first section of said act extends the mineral land laws already existing so as to bring land chiefly valuable for building stone within the provisions of said law to the extent of authorizing a placer entry of such land. The proviso to said first section excludes lands reserved for the benefit of the public schools or donated to any State from entry under the act.

In cases that may arise hereafter in reference to any lands subject to entry under the mining laws, you will be governed by said act in admitting such entries. The proper instructions for your guidance in so doing may be found in official circular of December 10, 1891, entitled "United States Mining Laws and Regulations Thereunder," to which you are referred, and your special attention is called to the law and instructions therein relating to placer claims.

It is not the understanding of this office that the first section of said act of August 4, 1892, withdraws land chiefly valuable for building stone from entry under any existing law applicable thereto.

The second section of said act of August 4. 1892, makes the timber and stone act of June 3, 1878 (20 Stat. 89), applicable to all

AN ACT to authorize the entry of lands chiefly valuable for building stone under the placer mining laws. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That any person authorized to enter lands under the mining laws of the United States may enter lands that are chiefly valuable for building stone under the provisions of the law in relation to placer mineral claims: Provided, that lands reserved for the benefit of the public schools or donated to any State shall not be subject to entry under this act.

SEC. 2. That an act entitled "An act for the sale of timber lands in the States of California, Oregon, Nevada, and Washington Territory," approved June third, eighteen hundred and seventy-eight, be, and the same is hereby, amended by striking out the words "States of California, Oregon, Nevada, and Washington Territory" where the same occur in the second and third lines of said act, and insert in lieu thereof the words, "public-land States," the purpose of this act being to make said act of June third, eighteen hundred and seventy-eight, applicable to all the public-land States.

SEC. 3. That nothing in this act shall be construed to repeal section twenty-four of the act entitled "An act to repeal timberculture laws, and for other purposes," approved March third, eighteen hundred and ninety-one.

Approved August 4, 1892. (27 Stat. 348.) Prior to the act of August 4, 1892 (27 Stat. 349), a placer location could not be legally made for land containing only deposits of glass-sand and building stone, and the act of that date could not validate such a location previously made, in the face of an intervening homestead claim. Clark v. Ervin, 16 L. D. 122; Florence D. Delaney, 17 L. D. 120; Thorne v. Kinsey, 18 L. D. 416.

The act of August 4, 1892 (27 Stat. 348), authorizes a placer entry of land chiefly valuable for building stone. Minnekahta Stone Mine, 15 L. D. 256.

Land containing building stone, fire-clay, limestone, marble or gypsum, in paying quantities, is enterable under the placer laws. Hayden v. Jamison, 16 L. D. 537.

A previous location of a stone placer was validated by the act of August 4, 1892, in the absence of adverse rights. Minnekahta Stone Mine, 15 L. D. 256.

Where land is claimed by one person under the act of August 4, 1892, and by another under the act of June 3, 1878, the question to be determined is one of priority. Shepherd v. Bird, 17 L. D. 82.

A location of a placer claim containing a stone deposit will not defeat a prior railroad selection. Com'r to Helena office, Oct. 20, 1892.

The act of August 4, 1892, provides that stone lands reserved for the benefit of public schools, or donated to any State, shall not be subject to entry under said act. Joseph H. Harper, 16 L. D. 110.

The act of August 4, 1892, does not constitute lands chiefly valuable for building stone "mineral lands," in the general sense in which the term "mineral" is used, in reservations of "mineral lands" from grants to States for school purposes. South Dakota v. Vermont Stone Co., 16 L. D. 263.

A mineral entry of land principally valuable for ordinary building stone, allowed under the then existing practice (prior to Departmental decision, In re Conlin v. Kelly, 12 L. D. 1), excepts the land so entered from the operation of a subsequent grant to a state for school purposes, and may be passed to patent. Paris Gibson, 21 L. D. 327.

A placer location of land containing building stone was made in 1889. A pre-emption declaratory statement was filed by a settler the same year. In 1891 deposits of fire-clay were alleged to have been discovered. Held, that as the placer location was based upon a discovery of building stone without legal warrant, the subsequent discovery of fireclay would not defeat the agricultural claim. (NOTE.-The real reason for the lecision was probably failure to prove existence of valuable deposits of fireClark v. Ervin, 17 L. D. 550.

e

Sandstone of "superior quality for bui'ding and ornamental purposes," and as such extensively utilized, is a mineral, independent of the act of August 4, 1892. McGlenn v. Wienbroeer, 15 L. D. 370; Van Doren v.. Plested, 16 L. D. 508.