The defendant, being master of an English merchant vessel lying in the territorial waters of Chili, near Valparaiso, contracted with that government to take the prosecutor and his companions from Valparaiso to Liverpool, and they were accordingly brought on board the defendant's vessel by the officers of the government and carried to Liverpool by the defendant under his contract. Then, can the conviction be sustained for that which was done within the Chilian waters? We

answer no.

We assume that in Chili the act of the government towards its subjects was lawful; and although an English ship in some respects carries with her the laws of her country in the territorial waters of a foreign state, yet in other respects she is subject to the laws of that state as to acts done to the subjects thereof.

We assume that the government could justify all that it did within its own territory, and we think it follows that the defendant can justify all that he did there as agent for the government and under its authority. In Dobree v. Napier, 2 Bing. N. C. 781, the defendant, on behalf of the Queen of Portugal, seized the plaintiff's vessel for violating a blockade of a Portuguese port in time of war. The plaintiff brought trespass; and judgment was for the defendant, because the Queen of Portugal, in her own territory, had a right to seize the vessel and to employ whom she would to make the seizure; and therefore the defendant, though an Englishman seizing an English vessel, could justify the act under the employment of the Queen.

We think that the acts of the defendant in Chili become lawful on the same principle, and therefore no ground for the conviction.

The further question remains, Can the conviction be sustained for that which was done out of the Chilian territory? And we think it can. It is clear that an English ship on the high sea, out of any foreign territory, is subject to the laws of England; and persons, whether foreign or English, on board such ship, are as much amenable to English law as they would be on English soil. In Regina v. Sattler, 1 D. & B. C. C. 525, this principle was acted on, so as to make the prisoner, a foreigner, responsible for murder on board an English ship at sea. The same principle has been laid down by foreign writers on international law, among which it is enough to cite Ortolan, "Sur la Diplomatie de la Mer," liv. 2. cap. 13.

The Merchant Shipping Act, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 267, makes the master and seamen of a British ship responsible for all offences against property or person committed on the sea out of her Majesty's dominions as if they had been committed within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England.

Such being the law, if the act of the defendant amounted to a false imprisonment he was liable to be convicted. Now, as the contract of the defendant was to receive the prosecutor and the others as prisoners on board his ship, and to take them, without their consent, over the sea to England, although he was justified in first receiving them in Chili,

yet that justification ceased when he passed the line of Chilian jurisdiction, and after that it was a wrong which was intentionally planned and executed in pursuance of the contract, amounting in law to a false imprisonment.

It may be that transportation to England is lawful by the law of Chili, and that a Chilian ship might so lawfully transport Chilian subjects; but for an English ship the laws of Chili, out of the state, are powerless, and the lawfulness of the acts must be tried by English law. For these reasons, to the extent above mentioned, the conviction is affirmed. Conviction confirmed accordingly.

LORD MANSFIELD, C. J., in REX v. VAUGHAN, 4 Burr. 2494, 2500 (1769). The argument is strong that these statutes do not extend to Jamaica, though they were enacted long before that island belonged to the Crown of England. If Jamaica was considered as a conquest, they would retain their old laws, till the conqueror had thought fit to alter them. If it is considered as a colony (which it ought to be, the old inhabitants having left the island), then these statutes are positive regulations of police, not adapted to the circumstances of a new colony; and therefore no part of that law of England which every colony from necessity is supposed to carry with them at their first plantation. No Act of Parliament made after a colony is planted is construed to extend to it, without express words showing the intention of the legislature to be that it should.'

SECTION II.

THE ORIGIN AND CHANGE OF LAW.

BLANKARD v. GALDY.

KING'S BENCH. 1693.

[Reported 2 Salkeld, 411.]

IN debt on a bond, the defendant prayed oyer of the condition, and pleaded the statute E. 6. against buying offices concerning the administration of justice; and averred, That this bond was given for the purchase of the office of provost-marshal in Jamaica, and that it concerned the administration of justice, and that Jamaica is part of the revenue and possessions of the Crown of England: The plaintiff replied,

that Jamaica is an island beyond the seas, which was conquered from the Indians and Spaniards in Queen Elizabeth's time, and the inhabitants are governed by their own laws, and not by the laws of England: The defendant rejoined, That before such conquest they were governed by their own laws; but since that, by the laws of England: Shower argued for the plaintiff, that, on a judgment in Jamaica, no writ of error lies here, but only an appeal to the Council; and as they are not represented in our Parliament, so they are not bound by our statutes, unless specially named. Vide And. 115. Pemberton contra argued, that by the conquest of a nation, its liberties, rights, and properties are quite lost; that by consequence their laws are lost too, for the law is but the rule and guard of the other; those that conquer, cannot by their victory lose their laws, and become subject to others. Vide Vaugh. 405. That error lies here upon a judgment in Jamaica, which could not be if they were not under the same law. Et per HOLT, C. J. & Cur.,

First, in case of an uninhabited country newly found out by English subjects, all laws in force in England are in force there; so it seemed to be agreed.

Secondly, Jamaica being conquered, and not pleaded to be parcel of the kingdom of England, but part of the possessions and revenue of the Crown of England, the laws of England did not take place there, until declared so by the conqueror or his successors. The Isle of Man and Ireland are part of the possessions of the Crown of England; yet retain their ancient laws: That in Davis 36. it is not pretended, that the custom of tanistry was determined by the conquest of Ireland, but by the new settlement made there after the conquest: That it was impossible the laws of this nation, by mere conquest, without more, should take place in a conquered country; because, for a time, there must want officers, without which our laws can have no force: That if our law did take place, yet they in Jamaica having power to make new laws, our general laws may be altered by theirs in particulars; also they held, that in the case of an infidel country, their laws by conquest do not entirely cease, but only such as are against the law of God; and that in such cases where the laws are rejected or silent, the conquered country shall be governed according to the rule of natural equity.

Judgment pro quer.

1 Another report of the same case may be found in 4 Mod. 222. In that case the Court is reported to have said: "And therefore it was held, that Jamaica was not gov erned by the laws of England after the conquest thereof, till new laws were made: for they had neither sheriff or counties; they were only an assembly of people which are not bound by our laws, unless particularly mentioned. In Barbadoes all freeholds are subject to debts, and are esteemed as chattels till the creditors are satisfied, and then the lands descend to an heir; but the law is otherwise here; which shows that though that island is parcel of the possessions of England, yet it is not governed by the laws made here, but by their own particular laws and customs."

Acc. Earl Derby's Case, 2 And. 116; Mem- 2 P. Wms. 75. See Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164; Airhart v. Massieu, 98 U. S. 491. — ED.

THE ADVOCATE-GENERAL OF BENGAL v. RANEE SURNOMOYE DOSSEE.

JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL. 1863.

[Reported 2 Moore's Privy Council, new series, 22.]

THEIR Lordships' judgment was now delivered by The Right Hon. LORD KINGSDOWN.

The question in this case arises on the claim of the Crown to a portion of the personal estate of Rajah Kistonauth Roy, who destroyed himself in Calcutta on the 31st of October, 1844, and was found by inquisition to have been felo de se.

We understand that the Rajah had a residence in Calcutta, though his Raj, or Zemindary, was at some distance from that city. He was a Hindoo both by birth and religion.

On the morning of the day on which he destroyed himself he made a will, by which he left a large portion of his property to the East India Company for charitable purposes.

The will was disputed by his widow, who was his heiress, and a suit was instituted by her against the East India Company and others, to determine its validity. It was agreed between the litigating parties that the question should be tried by an issue at law. The widow insisted, amongst other objections, that the testator was not in a fit state of mind to make a will at the time of its execution.

The issue was tried, and a verdict was found by the judges against the will, upon what ground does not distinctly appear, and the verdict was acquiesced in by the Indian Government.

If the Crown, by virtue of the inquisition, was entitled to all the personal property of the Rajah, the validity or invalidity of the will was, as regards his personal estate, of no importance.

Now, the inquisition had found that the goods and chattels of the Rajah when he committed self-murder amounted within Calcutta to Rs. 9, 87, 063, and without the town of Calcutta to Rs. 2, 89, 500; and it stated that all his property was claimed by the widow.

No claim of any part of it appears at that time to have been set up by the East India Company on behalf of the Crown, and very large sums were from time to time, by the order, or with the consent of the Indian Government, paid over to the widow in the years 1846 and 1847.

A portion, however, of the Rajah's personal estate, amounting to between six and seven lacs of Rupees, was secured in the Supreme Court, in order to provide for the payment of life annuities to two ladies, both then living. The existence of these charges seems to have been the only reason why this fund was not transferred to the widow with the rest of the estate.

One of the annuitants is now dead, and the fund reserved to answer

her annuity is of course set free. This fund is now claimed by the Indian Government under the finding on the inquisition of 1844.

It is stated in the affidavit of a gentleman who was manager for the widow on the death of her husband, that he was advised in 1844, by three English counsel of eminence, whom he names, that the verdict on the inquisition might be set aside on the ground both of misdirection by the coroner, and as being against the weight of evidence, but that proceedings were not taken for that purpose, because the government represented, through its law agents, that no claim would ever be made under the verdict.

If the facts be such as we have stated, it is impossible not to feel some surprise at the present demand; and, if we differed from the court below, it would deserve much consideration, whether a claim which seems to have been abandoned in 1844, ought now to be entertained. But these facts do not seem to have been noticed by the judges in India; there may possibly be circumstances with which we are unacquainted to account for the course taken by the government, and we think it better to dispose of the case on the merits.

At what time then, and in what manner, did the forfeiture attached by the law of England to the personal property of persons committing suicide in that country, become extended to a Hindoo committing the same act in Calcutta?

The sum of the appellant's argument was this: that the English Criminal Law was applicable to natives as well as Europeans within Calcutta, at the time when the death of the Rajah took place, and the sovereignty of the English Crown was at that time established; that the English settlers when they first went out to the East Indies in the reign of Queen Elizabeth took with them the whole law of England, both civil and criminal, unless so far as it was inapplicable to them in their new condition; that the law of felo de se was a part of the criminal law of England which is not inapplicable to them in their new condition, and that it, therefore, became part of the law of the country.

Where Englishmen establish themselves in an uninhabited or barbarous country, they carry with them not only the laws, but the sovereignty of their own State; and those who live amongst them and become members of their community become also partakers of, and subject to the same laws.

But this was not the nature of the first settlement made in Indiait was a settlement made by a few foreigners for the purposes of trade in a very populous and highly civilized country, under the government of a powerful Mohammedan ruler, with whose sovereignty the English Crown never attempted nor pretended to interfere for some centuries afterwards.

If the settlement had been made in a Christian country of Europe, the settlers would have become subject to the laws of the country in which they settled. It is true that in India they retained their own laws for their own government within the factories, which they were