States was mobilized, together with such voluntary efforts otherwise available throughout the various districts concerned. At the request of the Governors of Kansas and Missouri, the President declared a national disaster, in accordance with the terms'of Public Law 875, commonly known as the Disaster Relief Act (appendix 2). In accordance with Executive Order 10221, dated March 2, 1951, the authority for the administration of disaster relief had been placed in the Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency (appendix 3). On July 14, the President directed Raymond M. Foley, Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency (appendix 2), to implement his authority in the immediate situation (appendix 4). On July 18, Congress by joint resolution appropriated $25 million for disasterrelief purposes (appendix 5). On July 19, the President delegated to Charles E. Wilson, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, the authority to "direct and coordinate the activities of the Federal departments and agencies toward the restoration of the general economy in the area" (appendix 6). On July 20, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization designated A. E. Howse as his personal representative with full authority to take such action as might be necessary (appendix 7). In the meantime, the President and Charles E. Wilson flew over the area with A. E. Howse, who had made a thorough inspection of the disaster and its problems, both on the ground and by air. A general plan for coping with the situation was immediately adopted, wherein it was decided that the vast resources of the various departments and agencies of the Federal Government would be utilized to the maximum possible extent on an emergency basis. Mr. Howse immediately established an emergency committee in Kansas City, Mo., consisting of some 61 departments, bureaus, and agencies of the Federal Government. A corresponding emergency committee was established similarly in Washington. Each committee contained agency representatives authorized to make immediate decisions with respect to problems concerning the flood (appendixes 8 and 9). Generally speaking, flood problems divided themselves into three categories. The first phase comprises the struggle for existence against water and fire. These destructive elements were combated ably by the Corps of Engineers and the entire resources of the Department of Defense installations in or near the areas. At the peak of the effort, nearly 20,000 service personnel were involved. The Air Force and Navy airlifted some 3,000 tons of matériel, including drugs and serums essential for health purposes. The remarkably small loss of life among some 385,000 persons displaced by floodwater is a silent tribute to the combined efforts of the Federal forces and the personnel of the States and municipalities affected by flood water. In this connection, it should be pointed out that civil defense' programs existing at the time of the disaster were completely inadequate to cope with the emergency. A disaster transversing more than one State line and extending through multiple city limits presented the sort of problem for which no adequate preparation had been made. Only the timely and extensive use of military forces prevented heavy loss of life. It may be pointed out that the civil defense program is based on the theory that, in hostile attacks, the military will be otherwise occupied and that voluntary civil defense forces will assume the major burden of civilian protection. Also, it was quite apparent that the States themselves must develop their own disaster legislation which can be made immediately available perhaps in a manner similar to the statutory provisions now in effect in the States of Nebraska and Minnesota (appendix 32 and 33). Further, it is apparent that an orderly disaster and rehabilitation plan should be developed and made available for emergencies of this nature, in which plan proper functions should be assigned to both civilian authorities and private organizations such as the Red Cross, Salvation Army, and similar groups. The second phase embraces the alleviation of misery and human suffering and the immediate relief necessary for food, shelter, and health. The combined action of the various Federal, State, and city agencies not only contributed some measure of comfort to the stricken people but, also, it appears that a miracle was accomplished. Flood sufferers were fed, clothed, and housed in such shelter as was immediately available prior to the furnishing of trailers and various temporary housing accommodations. No epidemics or plagues resulted in spite of the heat, accumulations of dead animals, and mass destruction of water and sanitary facilities throughout vast portions of the flooded area. The coordination of Federal relief activities discharged primarily through the States and cities was handled by Raymond M. Foley, the Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency. In turn, A. E. Howse, of the Office of Defense Mobilization, cooperated fully in these respects and used his authority over materials controls and allocations to insure first priorities for all essential needs. The third phase includes the problem of rehabilitation of the general economy. Transportation, communications, industry, and agriculture had been paralyzed in a manner never before experienced in our country. The gigantic task of reconstruction was started even before the floodwaters subsided. An order of essentiality was established, and experts and supplies were flown in in ever-increasing volume until rail transportation was reestablished. Emergency offices were organized in Kansas City, and rehabilitation teams visited each town in the area to provide such immediate assistance with respect to materials and financing as the need indicated. Federal regulations and controls were relaxed where necessary, and the entire flooded area received first priority on all goods and services subject only to the most critical defense projects. On August 13, exactly 4 weeks after the height of the flood, A. E. Howse recommended to Charles E. Wilson a complete flood-rehabilitation program (appendix 11). On August 20, the President sent a special message to the Congress, transmitting a report relative to the flood disaster, recommending a complete program of rehabilitation, and requesting an appropriation of $400 million with which to carry out the program (appendix 12). On August 9, Mr. Howse requested the Governor of Kansas (appendix 15) and the Governor of Missouri (appendix 21) to appoint an advisory committee for their respective States. The committees themselves were predetermined by function in order that the principal departments of the State government and all the principal segments of the economy within the State be properly represented (appendixes 16 and 22). The rehabilitation program was developed in conjunction with these State advisory committees (appendixes 17, 18, 23, and 24), which have been so organized that each State is now thoroughly familiar with the problem involved and has in existence the nucleus of an organizational structure with which to begin rehabilitation operations immediately following such action as may be taken by the Congress (appendixes 20, 26). On August 15, Mr. Howse appointed representatives of the principal segments of the economy in the area to a committee on Federal financing of flood rehabilitation, under the chairmanship of H. G. Leedy, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (appendix 29). The committee examined all of the Federal financing programs in the field (appendix 30) and recommended certain basic approaches involving the financing of the rehabilitation effort (appendix 31). The plan recommended by the President was developed in cooperation with the many Federal agencies whose representatives at the scene of the disaster were unanimous in their opinions as to the general needs of the situation (appendix 14). Similarly, the people, organizations and officials of the affected communities are virtually unanimous in their opinions as to the needs of the situation. The measures of the request now before the Congress fall into three main categories. First, there is the proposal to provide direct economic recovery assistance for the restoration of private productive plant; e. g., plant, farm, or home, with a maximum of $20,000 payable to any one claimant. This direct aid will be administered on the basis of need and will be confined to those whose remaining assets, if any, are insufficient to finance their return to productivity. There is nothing new or unprecedented in direct financial aid from the Federal Government in an effort to maintain the economy of the country by building up the productivity of its citizens. The drought of the 1930's which created the Dust Bowl was a national disaster which could be met only by national action. The disaster cost was one with which no single farmer or group of farmers, no county or group of counties, and no single State could cope. Not only was the cost too great but protective and constructive measures had to be taken across State lines. The result has been of immeasurable benefit to all the people. It is notable that in carrying out these emergency land-conservation measures the Federal Government customarily provided at least 80 percent of the cost. In various forms, direct rehabilitation assistance has been provided to the veterans of our wars on the principle that the damage caused by war service to their careers should be restored in part by direct payments. Incidentally, about 10 percent of the beneficiaries of this bill will be veterans. Another analogy is the Philippine War Claims Act by which private persons were indemnified for war damage. Direct economic recovery assistance is essential in a disaster of this unprecedented magnitude where the damage is beyond the resources of the States and communities. Products of this area are needed by the entire country and will not be available unless direct and immediate assistance is given. It may be noted that the large national corporations whose risks are spread in multiple locations in various sections of the country and whose income-tax position involves a 72percent tax rate, generally speaking, may enjoy an advantage not available to single entrepreneurs. Second, there is the proposal to provide liberal loans for reconstruction and rehabilitation over and above those loans now available through the various Federal agencies. Once the home owners, farmers, or contractors have been placed in a position where they can use liberal credit, such credit should be made available on a realistic basis and in some relative proportion to the borrower's ability to repay. Third, there is the program of Federal flood insurance so that it will not be necessary in the future to resort to the first and second measures outlined above in the event of other floods. The lack of a national system of flood-disaster insurance is now a major gap in the means by which a man can make his home, his farm, or his business secure against events beyond his control. It is a basic requisite to the rapid reopening of plants in the flood region. Enough conversations have been held with representatives of the various insurance associations to indicate that a mutual program involving both private companies and Federal assistance can be evolved. The Federal Government is already concerned with a large number of national insurance programs, such as FDIC, FHA, etc. It is contemplated that the fund now requested of the Congress, if approved, will be administered by a small policy-making organization through the established agencies and departments of the Government. The total sum of $400 million is requested on an emergency basis with authority and unused funds to expire next June 30, at which time all outstanding obligations would be taken over by the various agencies concerned. It is proposed that this Flood Administration be established on an emergency basis and that it not become a bureaucratic haven. It is contemplated, as outlined in the attached administrative and organization documents, that the entire sum can be administered for approximately one-tenth of 1 percent in administrative costs. It is recommended that this emergency relief matter be considered separate and apart from any long-term flood-control and/or water-conservation programs. A comparison of disaster damages and Federal assistance costs for the 1951 flood and previous (1927 and 1937) floods (see appendix 34) indicates that the appropriation requested in aggregate figures is well within the established ratio of Federal relief costs to flood damage. In the 1937 Ohio-Mississippi flood, relief and damage ratio was 7 percent. Some disaster relief operations in the late 1940's exceeded 10 percent. The present disaster relief ratio is approximately 10 percent without allowance having been made for the recognized principle of compound damage ratio of dislocation. In other words, a series of small floods, each totaling small amounts of damage, will provide certain impacts. A single major flood will result in compound costs and will occasion economic dislocations in which the costs are multiplied by successive repercussions. Thus, the fact that the 1951 flood was five or six times larger than the 1937 flood does not indicate that the same ratio of disaster relief activities should apply. If the compound-damage ratio of dislocation is recognized, then a reasonable Federal assistance ratio may be calculated at approximately 30 percent. An analysis of the data presently available reveals that 1. In terms of magnitude, the 1951 flood damage is nearly five times greater than that of any single previous major catastrophe, and also it is in excess of the total of all flood damages for the years 1902 to 1941. 2. Emergency allocations by the Federal Government are at present less than one-fifth of the usual relief assistance provided. 3. In consideration of the magnitude of the compound economic dislocations involved, a calculation of the ratio of proposed restoration cost to flood damage places the amount requested within the percentage formerly considered to be a proper Federal share and below that of the trend of Federal flood-relief assistance. It may be asked whether we as a Nation can afford to make payments to private citizens even when they have suffered from a great natural disaster. But a better question might be whether we can afford not to give such help. Studies of conditions in the flooded area indicate that, without this help, a large portion of the farmers, small-business men, and home owners either will not be able to recover from this disaster or they will regain their economic health only after a long struggle during which they will not contribute their share to the national production. The request now before the Congress proposes measures of recovery which will more than justify the cost in benefits to the devastated region immediately and to the whole country within a comparatively short period of time. The importance of such a program to the flooded area is obvious. The importance to the rest of the country is just as great if not quite so plain. Summary of direct property damage caused by great flood of 1951 I. Agriculture (including land damage, crop losses, farm homes II. Nonfarm homes. V. Public utilities. VII. Private community facilities (including churches, hospitals, Grand total. FLOOD REHABILITATION PROGRAM $483, 303, 346 49, 100, 250 10, 649, 788 1, 612, 447, 500 7, 591, 697 251, 676, 007: 1, 427, 100 2, 416, 294, 688 (Statement in justification of F. R. 5259, by A. E. Howse, personal representative of Charles E. Wilson, Director of Defense Mobilization, whose duties are "to direct and coordinate the activitics of the Federal departments and agencies toward the restoration of the general economy of the (flood) area") (Reference: President's message to Congress, August 20, 1951.) The floods in July 1951, along the Kansas, Missouri, and Mississippi Rivers and their tributaries constitute the greatest natural disaster in the history of this country. Furthermore, that blow comes at a time when the Nation is straining every effort to achieve greater economic strength, one of the pillars of our national security and welfare. The devastation constitutes a national disaster which calls for a national remedy as proposed in the President's message to Congress of August 20, and in H. R. 5259 now before the Appropriations Committee. The effects of the flood so far have been felt chiefly in the river valleys stretching for a length of a thousand miles where the waters inundated parts of 140 cities and towns and almost 5,000,000 acres of the best farm land in the world. The people of this area and their neighbors have borne the brunt of the disaster. But such a destructive force does not stand still. It will be felt next year by all of us in terms of less food, fewer necessities and comforts, and more stringent economic controls unless ve make now, at once, a national effort equal to the national disaster. The heaviest damage is concentrated in Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Illinois, which fall within the scope of the present bill. At the peak of the flood, 385,000 people were displaced. Nearly 2 months later, some 15,000 families were still unable to return to their own homes. Nearly 6,000 businesses, employing hundreds of thousands of workers, were severely hit, and many of them have not yet been reestablished, some because they have not the means to do so, others because their customers are prostrate. Entire villages and large sections of thriving cities are indistinguishable from the bombed-out urban areas of Europe. All great floods are many weeks in the making and for this one, as in the case of the greatest flood of all time, it rained for 40 days and 40 nights. Late in May the rains began, and throughout June and early July were punctuated with local cloudbursts so strategically placed that they might have been directed by a skillful enemy bent upon inflicting the maximum damage. In one place, 12 inches of rain fell in 11 hours. Over many localities the precipitation was 30 inches in less than 10 weeks-more than the average annual rainfall. Pouring down the tributaries of the Kansas River-the Smoky Hill, Saline, Solomon, Republican, Big Blue, Osage, and others-thence into the Missouri at Kansas City, these rains relentlessly built up a volume of water greater than any ever recorded in the area. Stream flow in central Kansas, for example, was 70 times normal in July. The previous high mark was set in 1844, and it had not been believed that this ever could be surpassed. Then, as the stricken area was digging out of the mud, the rains came again. It had been recognized that with dikes and levees weakened or destroyed by the flood, even a minor rise in the rivers could be disastrous. On September 1, the waters began to rise, and many families, recently returned to damaged homes, fled once more. In North Topeka, Kans., 8,000 persons flooded out in July were obliged to seek higher ground. The crowded industrial sections of Argentine and Armourdale in Kansas City, where many thousands of workers live, were partially evacuated. New damage was relatively small, although much land again was under water, and rivers lapped within inches of the tops of levees while volunteers labored fractically to strengthen the mud walls. The fear of renewed floods has paralyzed the energies of many communities, the people knowing they are unable to cope with the problem out of their own resources. THE PROPERTY DAMAGE Appraisals of the material loss are still incomplete, but fairly reliable estimates are now available. However, it is characteristic of great disasters that appraisals of the damage grow as the full nature of the devastation unfolds. In this case, the early estimates of something more than a billion dollars had to be progressively raised as the truth became known, and as unsuspected losses were revealed. For example, when the floodwaters went down, thousands of homes were inspected and many of them pronounced structurally safe, but as the land dried out, unsuspected undermining of foundations which had been hidden by silt was revealed. Many weeks after the water receded and even after clearing of silt and debris had been accomplished, these structures collapsed. One such home collapsed in a pile of lumber with only the porch standing. Affixed to one pillar was the week-old label "safe." Again, as walls dried out, boards and plaster were warped and twisted, electric wiring was revealed as defective, fixtures were found to be unsafe. Therefore, the revised figures of property loss now total more than $2,000,000,000, with probably another billion sacrificed through loss of income. A report from the Governor of Kansas, dated September 6, 1951, which reflects the recommendations of his flood advisory committee, says: "The estimates generally accepted are $1,000,000,000 as a physical proprety loss; however, that does not take into consideration the loss sustained by railroads and other transportation facilities, communication facilities, industrial plants, and small businesses being out of business for a period of 30 days or more. Το say that the total loss to private property in the State of Kansas will approach the $2,000,000,000 mark would appear to be a reasonable estimate." Farm damage The Department of Agriculture's latest reports inform us that 34,000 farms were wholly or partially inundated by floodwaters. Extensive damage was done by the heavy rains and runoff to crops, waterways, terraces, and other soil conservation installations on an additional 198,000 farms. It must be kept in mind that these are among the richest producers in the land. Thirty-four thousand miles of fences were destroyed or badly damaged, enough to girdle the continental United States more than three times. More thousands of miles of drainage ditches have been broken, wells polluted, ponds impaired, fixed machinery ruined. About 28,700 farm buildings, including homes, were destroyed or badly damaged. Floodwaters on the three and one-half million acres of cropland in the immediate flood area turned $111,000,000 worth of growing crops into a total loss. The excessive runoff resulting from the heavy rains destroyed another $273,000,000 in crops in the disaster area. To this damage must be added losses in livestock, which except for poultry and small pigs, were relatively low, loss of household goods and equipment, damage to electrical appliances and motors, loss of farm-stored grains. Even more difficult to calculate is the damage to the farmer's principal capital resource, his land. Some farms are covered with sand and gravel to such a depth-6 feet sometimes— that they never can be tilled again. Others are not so deeply covered that they |