certain extent (in the present state of society at least) a beneficial proneness in man, to rely on the judgment and authority of those who are elevated above himself in rank or riches. From the irresistible associations of the human mind, a feeling of respect and deference is entertained for a superior in station, which enhances and exalts all his good qualities, gives more grace to his movements, more force to his expressions, more beauty to his thoughts, more wisdom to his opinions, more weight to his judgment, more excellence to his virtues. Even the wisest find it difficult to keep themselves from this illusion; and in society at large it is apt to be so strong, that there are always individuals, who, from mere servility, or blind veneration, will do what they conceive will be agreeable to their superiors, even when not the slightest wish is expressed to direct them.

Hence the elevated men of society will always maintain an ascendancy, which, without any direct exertion of influence, will affect the result of popular elections; and when to this are added the capabilities which they possess, or ought to possess, from their superior intelligence, of impressing their own opinions on other classes, it will be seen, that, if any sort of despotic control were justifiable, it would be superfluous for any good purpose.

The propensity of mankind is, not to make choice of an individual for a desirable office on account of his bare merits, of his mere aptness to discharge its functions, estimated by their own independent understandings; but it is, even in a pernicious degree, to give him their suffrages on account of the opinion entertained of him, and the favour manifested towards him, by those whom they wish to please, and whose judgment they have been accustomed to respect.

The error of confounding the different kinds of influence here adverted to, may be fairly charged on Mr. Canning, when, in his celebrated anti-reform speech at Liverpool, he said, "I hold it to be frantic to suppose, that, from the election of members of parliament, you can altogether exclude by any contrivance, even if it were desirable to do so, the influence of property, rank, talents, family connection, and whatever else, in the radical language of the day, is considered as intimidation or corruption."

The artifice of confounding two things under one name (often unconsciously resorted to) seems indispensable to a bad cause. No one of any weight in the controversy ever thought of excluding all influence. The advocates of what has been called purity of election maintain two very

simple propositions, which Mr. Canning would have found it difficult to gainsay, on any theory of morals which he might venture upon :--1. That an elector is morally bound to give his vote to that candidate whom he regards as best fitted for the office. 2. That the acts of conferring upon him or promising him any benefit, and inflicting upon him or threatening him with any evil, in order to cause him to vote otherwise, are morally wrong. They therefore necessarily condemn that influence of property, rank, talents, family connections, or of any thing else which is employed in committing such an act of moral turpitude; but any influence which cannot be brought under this description, they leave unassailed and unopposed. What they condemn is power over the will, employed directly and purposely to control a vote, the direction of which is a matter of duty to the individual who has to give it.

CHAPTER V.

ON ELECTIONS.

Ir has been the object of this Treatise, to arrange the various parts of the subject in such an order that each should prepare the mind of the reader for that which succeeds it. If the attempt to do this has been at all successful, the consideration of the questions which belong to the present chapter will have been greatly facilitated.

Those parts of the representative system which have already come under examination, have generally attracted more attention, and been regarded as of more consequence, than the part we are now to treat of. They are doubtless of high importance; but it must be obvious to a very cursory glance, that how admirable soever might be our arrangements, in respect to the number, composition, and other circumstances of a representative assembly, and how wisely soever the electoral body might be constituted in relation to the business to be done, yet all the purposes of

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these judicious regulations might be defeated by a vicious mode of proceeding at elections. It is vain to constitute an electoral body on the best principles, unless an effectual mode is adopted for ascertaining its genuine sentiments; and vain to have a properly-regulated legislature, if the men who compose it are permitted to win their way into the national council by degrading practices, or are sent under conditions which incapacitate them from discharging the proper functions belonging to members of a deliberative assembly. Let us then proceed to examine, in the present chapter, what is the best method of collecting the suffrages of the electors, and the proper way of conducting the other business of elections.

SECTION I.

On the Process of taking Votes.

In prosecution of the design just sketched, we have first to enter upon the inquiry how the votes of the electoral body are to be collected. The questions to be examined under this head are not numerous, but one of them at least is of high importance.