approved by said Commissioners, to lay upon said bridge and across" certain specified streets in the city the single electric railway and to connect therewith "its tracks to be constructed over its right of way in Alexandria County, Virginia." Provision was also made for the use of the tracks "for the purpose of crossing said bridge and securing connection into the city of Washington" by one or more other railway companies upon satisfying the Commissioners that it had refunded a proportional part of the cost of the work as might be agreed upon between the companies as equitable compensation for the privilege. Upon failure to agree, the Supreme Court of the District was empowered to determine the amount. The company using the track was required to "keep the bridge floor and the pavement between the rails" and for a given distance outside in repair to the satisfaction of the Commissioners who, upon failure so to do, were authorized to make the repairs and collect the cost, and upon default in payment "to prevent the operation of said cars by the exercise of their police authority."

Section 8 authorizes the Commissioners to permit the cars" across said bridge and in M and Thirty-sixth Streets to be operated by the underground electric system or by overhead trolley, as they may deem desirable." Then appears the following:

"SEC. 9. That the operation of the cars upon the track herein authorized shall be under the direction and control of the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, who are hereby authorized to make such regulations in regard to speed, character, and weight of cars, time of operation, and fare to be charged as they may deem necessary or desirable; and any company violating any regulations of said Commissioners made under the authority of this section shall be subject to a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars for each and every offense, to be recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction at the suit of said Commissioners, and in default of the payment of such fine the Commissioners are hereby authorized to exercise their police authority to prevent the operation of the cars of the company so defaulting."

The Great Falls & Old Dominion Railroad Co. accepted the provisions of the act and made the required deposit. The bridge superstructure was changed or rebuilt by the Commissioners and, under their supervision and in accordance with plans approved by them, the company laid across the bridge and on M Street the single electric track authorized by the statute. But it seems that the location on the site in question of the track connecting the bridge track with the company's right of way in Alexandria County was approved by the Secretary of War. (Military Reservations, Call, 1910, p. 396.)

1. Is the site under the administrative control and jurisdiction of the Secretary of War? This amounts to asking whether it is within the jurisdiction of the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, for these two are the only competing. jurisdictions. Nothing else is suggested to take the site out of the normal control of the Secretary of War.

This suggestion seems, when analyzed, to resolve itself into three distinct propositions:

(a) That the site is within the District of Columbia in the sense, at least, that, by virtue of an extension of their powers, it is within the general governmental jurisdiction of the Commissioners of that District.

(b) That it is within the jurisdiction of the Commissioners because it is an appurtenance of the Aqueduct Bridge which, by the act of July 18, 1888 (25 Stat. 314), was placed under their jurisdiction.

(c) That it is within the jurisdiction of the Commissioners because, by the act of January 29, 1903 (32 Stat. 781), they were given certain powers with respect to the location of the tracks of the Great Falls & Old Dominion Railroad Co. across the Aqueduct Bridge.

(a) Starting with the settled proposition that, prior to the purchase, the approaches to the bridge on the Virginia side, and a fortiori the soil on which they rested, were within the State of Virginia (Alex. Canal R. & B. Co. v. District of Columbia, supra), the present phase of the inquiry reduces itself to this: Did the purchase of this land, in connection with the purchase of the bridge, by the Sec

retary of War on behalf of the United States, followed by the placing of the bridge under the "jurisdiction of the Commissioners" operate to extend the limits of the District of Columbia over land formerly part of Virginia and thereby subject it to the general administrative control and jurisdiction of the Commissioners of the District in their capacity as such? Unless such be the case, any power the Commissioners may have in the premises must be an express statutory power conferred upon them as a special agency of the Federal Government.

It is believed that this question will be answered by briefly considering what the District really is and what is the legal status of its Commissioners. The District which has been named "Columbia " is defined in the Constitution. It is "such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the Government of the United States." Nothing can form part of the District which does not answer that description. The cession having been made and accepted and the boundaries of the District fixed, it became a territory with defined limits. It is, moreover, a distinct, separate political community, the sovereignty of which is, absolutely and for all purposes, lodged in the United States. (Met. Railroad Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U. S. p. 1, 8-9; Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 269). Such is its constitutional status as a distinct territory with defined boundaries, subject to the exclusive legislation of Congress.

Considered from the viewpoint of administrative organization, it is also a municipal corporation, a municipal body politic. (Act of June 20, 1874 (18 Stat. 116, c. 337); act of June 11, 1878 (20 Stat. 102, c. 180); Met. Railroad Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U. S. 1, 7.)

The administration of this corporation is lodged in the Commissioners who are administrative officers with ministerial powers only. (District of Columbia v. Bailey, 171 U. S. 161, 176.) They are officers of a definite legal person, the municipal corporation of the District of Columbia. distinct from the Government of the United States and not

a department thereof. As such, their powers are coextensive with and confined by the limits of the municipal corporation which they administer. (Coates v. District of Columbia, 42 App. D. C. 194, 198.)

It is to be noted that exclusive jurisdiction over the territory constituting the seat of government is not dependent in any wise upon ownership by the United States of any portion of the land within such territory.

Now, the purchase by the Secretary of War of land in the State of Viriginia for whatsoever purpose, whether for a dockyard, an arsenal, or an approach to a bridge in the District of Columbia, obviously does not, though followed by a cession from the State, constitute a cession and acceptance by Congress of Territory for the seat of government. Land owned by the United States contiguous to the District of Columbia and bought for a special purpose does not thereby become a part of the District of Columbia any more than land purchased for a similar purpose which is not contiguous to the District of Columbia. It follows, therefore, that the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, by virtue of their office, have no jurisdiction over the approaches to the bridge which lie outside the limits of the District of Columbia.

(b) Have the Commissioners jurisdiction of the site, by virtue of the provision of the act of July 18, 1888 (25 Stat. 314), by which the bridge was placed under their jurisdiction?

This provision was an item in an appropriation bill for the expenses of the government for the District of Columbia. Under the caption "Care of bridges," money was appropriated for the construction and repair of the local bridges "including retaining wall on M Street at the approach to the new free bridge across the Potomac." The interpolated general provision, "which bridge is hereby placed under the jurisdiction of the Commissioners," read with its context in the light of the nature and purposes of the act, necessarily relates to the bridge as a structure within the District of Columbia. What is the jurisdiction under which the bridge is to be placed? Clearly the juris

diction then vested in and exercised by the Commissioners in their capacity as the administrative officers of the municipal corporation for which Congress was appropriating. The bridge had just been finished and opened to the public. So far, it had been under the control of the Secretary of War, who had purchased and rebuilt it. As a bridge in the District, Congress was now subjecting it to the jurisdiction of the officers of that District, who by the organic act (June 11, 1878, c. 180, 20 Stat. 102) were charged with submitting as part of their estimates the cost of constructing, repairing, and maintaining “all bridges authorized by law across the Potomac River within the District of Columbia." The words under consideration indicate no intention to extend the limits of the District of the seat of government, or to create the Commissioners of the District a special agency for the administration of land outside of it.

It is said that the tract of land embracing the Virginia approach to the bridge is an appurtenance to the bridge and "jurisdiction over the bridge" necessarily carries jurisdiction over the approach. But what does "jurisdiction" here mean? Not custody and maintenance only, but government and police as well. If this phrase gives the Commissioners jurisdiction over this site for one purpose, it gives jurisdiction for all purposes, the same complete jurisdiction they exercise over land within the limits of the District. This is a strong thing to do upon the mere notion of an appurtenance. While the land across the river may perhaps be said, in an engineering sense, to be an appurtenance to the bridge, it is not so in a juridical sense.

It would not have passed by a conveyance of the bridge simpliciter. It is against the fundamental conceptions of the common law that land should be appurtenant to land or to an adjacent structure. (Harris v. Elliott, 10 Pet. 26, 54; Potomac S. Co. v. Upper P. S. Co., 109 U. S. 672, 685.) And the same principle must apply in a question of jurisdiction over land where there are no words to carry the land, as such.