Passing the Buck: Congress, the Budget, and Deficits

Pirmais vāks
University Press of Kentucky, 2004. gada 1. janv. - 284 lappuses

In the past thirty years, Congress has dramatically changed its response to unpopular deficit spending. While the landmark Congressional Budget Act of 1974 tried to increase congressional budgeting powers, new budget processes created in the 1980s and 1990s were all explicitly designed to weaken member, majority, and institutional budgeting prerogatives. These later reforms shared the premise that Congress cannot naturally forge balanced budgets without new automatic mechanisms and enhanced presidential oversight. So Democratic majorities in Congress gave new budgeting powers to Presidents Reagan and Bush, and then Republicans did the same for President Clinton.

"Passing the Buck" examines how Congress is increasing delegation of a wide variety of powers to the president in recent years. Jasmine Farrier assesses why institutional ambition in the early 1970s turned into institutional ambivalence about whether Congress is equipped to handle its constitutional duties.

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Origins and Significance of Delegation of Power
11
Reforming the Reforms A Brief History of Congressional Budgeting
26
1974 Budget Act Congress Takes Control
51
Congress Attacks Deficits and Itself with GrammRudmanHollings
82
Old Problems and New Tools of SelfRestraint The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990
129
Stop Us Before We Spend Again The LineItem Veto Act of 1996
165
Understanding Delegation of Power
215
Notes
225
Bibliography
267
Index
272
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