James Barker, Esquire May 11, 1994 failed in that time period, in the mid-1980's, that if Procedurally, it should be noted that the Minority is currently engaged in one ef the most profound checks and balances philosophical engagements with the Executive branch in the modern history of the Congress. This engagement carries far greater implications than any judgment relating to a particular embarrassment of a particular public official at a particular time because at issue is precedent whether in future circumstances the oversight capacities of Congress can be hamstrung if the Majority party of Congress is the same as that in control of the Executive branch and chooses to refrain from its oversight obligations in order not to embarrass its party's or leader's standings. It is precisely because the majority party in Congress has refused to uphold the law 1..., has yet to hold statutorily required oversight hearings; has refused to respect the rules of the House -1... the rights of the minority to call witnesses; and has refused to uphold its constitutional responsibilities to oversee the Executive Branch that the role of the minority is magnified. Just as in tolerant societies it is important to bend over backwards to protect the rights of minorities, in a legislative environment it is imperative that majoritarian party biases not be allowed to run roughshod over minority party rights. In this context, your letter neglects to note what Senator Riegle stressed in March on the Senate floor: that the RTC is required by statute to provide semi-annual reports to the Committee. Indeed, within 30 days after submission of each semi-annual report by the RTC, the Thrift Depositor Protection oversight Board must appear before the Committee for hearings. You have a statutory obligation to cooperate with hearings relating to the November 1, 1993 semiannual report as well as a statutory obligation to appear before the Committee within 30 days of the submission on April 29, 1994, of your most recent semi-annual report. FIRREA sets forth seven categories of infusmalion that the Ovarsight Board must addrana, including "progress in selling assets" of resolved institutions "costs incurred by the (RTC) in managing and selling assets" acquired by the RTC, estimates of income from assets acquired by the RTC; assessment of potential sources of additional funds for the RTC, and estimates of the remaining exposure of the United States resulting from thrift institutions. Many of the documents being withheld by the RTC such as investigatory files, banking records, contract information, bidder James Barker, Esquire May 11, 1994 information, and examination reports are directly relevant to these statutory areas of inquiry. It is artificial and inaccurate for the RTC to assert that the statutory responsibilities of the Ranking Member of the committee of jurisdiction are so limited as to entitle said Member of Congress no greater access to information than any other member of the public. The whole purpose of congressional oversight is for Congress to detect and have access to material that allows for detection of wrongdoing that would otherwise escape public attention. What makes the RTC issue somewhat unique as far as the oversight responsibilities of Congress is concerned is that semi-annual hearings are mandated by statute. Beyond the hearing issue, however, it should be stressed that Congressional oversight does not relate exclusively to whether a Congressional Committee Chairman schedules a particular hearing on a particular matter at ■ particular time. While oversight often culminates in a hearing, frequently it does not. Congress has responsibility to oversee a myriad of programs for which time does not exist for close scrutiny. In addition, for reasons of lack of personal interest or lack of personal time or concern for political ramifications, a Chairman may not schedule hearings on a wide number of subjects. This does not mean that other Members of Congress, particularly those on the Committee of appropriate jurisdiction, should not reasonably expect cooperation from the Executive branch in carrying out their individual oversight responsibilities. In addition to obligations established under FIRREA and the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, the Committee's role in oversight of the RTC and OTS is buttressed by the House Rules as modified under the Legislative Reorganisation Act of 1970 Paragraph 2 of House Rule X providing for the Committee's "General Oversight Responsibilities" states: (b) (1) Each standing committee ... shall review and study, on a continuing basis, the application, administration, execution, and effectiveness of those laws, or parts of laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of that committee and the organization and operation of the Federal agencies and entities having responsibilities in or for the Administration and execution thereof, in order to determine whether such laws and the programs thereunder are being implemented and carried out in accordance with the intent of the congress and whether such programs should be continued, curtailed, or eliminated."" Information requests and questions by Committee Members related to RTC and OTS operations are authorized under the Committee's general oversight authority. The purported confidentiality concerns asserted in your letter are contrivances. The RTC has, throughout its history, released this same type of information -- financial records, examination reports, board minutes, and so forth to Members of Congress and their staffs acting in their official capacities during investigations of such thrifts as Lincoln, Silverado, Centrust, and Columbia. Madison Guaranty is both defunct and subject to extensive publicity, it is hard to imagine how release of the documents could damage it competitively or harm the reputation of any law-abiding officers or directors. Apart from the involvement with Madison Quaranty of certain present and former high-ranking members of this Administration, there would appear to be no justification for treating Madison Guaranty documents any differently from those of other failed thrifts. The purpose of oversight is to expose information, even if it may prove embarrassing to government policy or government officials. To preclude disclosure is to employ closed society techniques and undercut fundamental tenets of American democracy. There are few more effective antidotes to impropriety and abuse of power in a democracy than sunshine. in this context, the RTC's determination to thwart legitimate congressional oversight is at odds with historical practice, the statutory mandate of FIRREA, relevant case law, and -- last but not least common sense prerequisites of open government in an open society. The sun must be allowed to shine in. Otherwise, abusive actions that cannot be reviewed will invite repetition. Shielding information to protect public officials from public accountability is not the American way. Sincerely, འཛི་ན Jam. Leach Attachment 1. NATURE OF ACTION This is an action by the Ranking Minority Member of the Committee on Banking. Finance and Urban Affairs of the United States House of agencies, the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") and the Office of Thrift responsibility and authority to oversee Defendants derives from the power of .2. Congress to legislate as set forth in Article of the United States Constitution, from the Rules of the United States House of Representatives, and from statutes. Plaintiff sa Ranking Minority Member serving in a Congress controlled by the same party that controls the Executive Branch. For that reason, Plaintiff's rigorous discharge of Mis oversight responsibilities is particularly important to the citizens' confidence in their govemmental institutions. 2. The documents at issue pertain to Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Association in Little Rock, Arkansas ("Madison Guaranty"), which was placed in conservatorship by federal regulators in 1989 and resolved in 1990 at a reported oost to United States taxpayers of approximately $67 million. As with their supervision of other failed thrift institutions – such as Lincoln Savings and Loan Association of Irvine, California: Silverado Savings and Loan Association of Denver, Colorado; Centrust Savings and Loan Association of Miami, Florida; Columbia Savings and Loan Association of Beverly Hills, California; and others-- Defendants' handling of Madison Guaranty has come under the scrutiny of the Committee in the exercise of its oversight responsibilities. 3. Unlike those prior situations, in which Defendants honored requests for documents from the Ranking Minority Member of the Committee. Defendants have improperly asserted numerous grounds for refusing to release to Plaintiff critical documents concerning Madison Guaranty. On information and belief, Defendents' decision to withhold these documents was influenced, at least in part, by instructions to suppress the documents communicated to Defendants by the Chairman of the Committee on March 10, 1994. Defendants' compliance with thees |