BILLETS EN BREVET.-PRESCRIPTION.

COUR DU BANC DE LA REINE, EN APPEL,

Montréal, 20 juin 1872.

Coram DUVAL, J. en C., CARON, J., DRUMMOND, J., BADGLEY, J., MONK, J.

JEAN-BAPTISTE PIGEON, Père, (Demandeur en Cour Infé

rieure), Appellant; et JEAN-BAPTISTE DAGENAIS, (Défendeur en Cour Inférieure), Intimé.

Jugé :-Que les billets notariés, en brevet, ne sont pas des billets auxquels la prescription de cinq ans est applicable. (1)

Par son action, le demandeur réclamait $200, montant d'un acte de reconnaissance, ou billet passé en brevet, à Montréal, le 22 janvier 1858, Belle et son confrère, notaires, et laquelle somme le défendeur devait lui payer à son ordre et à demande. Le défendeur plaida la prescription de cinq ans, sec. 31 du ch. 64, St. Ref. du B. C. La Cour Supérieure, à Montréal, (BEAUDRY, J.), a maintenu l'exception de prescription, et a déclaré le billet prescrit. Ce jugement est comme suit: "La "Cour, considérant que le billet sur lequel la présente action "est basée, est payable à l'ordre du demandeur, à demande, et, quoique notarié, est susceptible de transport par endosse"ment, et sujet à la prescription de cinq ans, en vertu des dispositions exprimées dans le chapitre 64 des Statuts Refondus pour le Bas-Canada, que nulle action n'a été portée sur ce billet dans les cinq années de sa date, et que, conséquemment, ce billet est prescrit; maintient l'exception "en premier lieu plaidée par le défendeur, et déboute l'action "du demandeur, avec dépens." Le demandeur ayant interjeté appel de ce jugement, la Cour du Banc de la Reine a renversé ce jugement:

6.

(1) Une obligation consentie en brevet, par acte devant notaires, par laquelle le débiteur promet payer à son créancier, ou à son ordre, le montant de la dette, n'est pas un billet promissoire sujet à la prescription de cinq ans décrétée par la section 31 du chap. 64 des Statuts Refondus du Bas-Canada de 1861, intitulé: "Acte concernant les lettres de change et les billets " (Séguin uit LaSalle et Bergevin, C. B. R., en appel, Montréal, 7 mars 1865, DUVAL, J. en C., AYLWIN, J., MEREDITH, J., DRUMMOND, J. et MONDELET, J., renversant le jugement de C. S., Montréal, 24 mars 1864, SMITH, J., 16 D. T. B. C., p. 415; 8 J., p. 94; 15 D. T. B. C., p. 438, et 11 R. J. R. Q., p. 222. Voyez dans le même sens : Lacoste vs Chaurin, C. C., Montréal, 13 novembre 1863, BERTHELOT, J., 7 J., p. 339, et 11 R. J. R. Q, p. 221. Gravel vs Beaudoin C. C., Joliette, 16 novembre 1863, LABERGE, J. A., 7 J., p. 289, et 11 R. J. R. Q., p. 221. Voyez en sens contraire: Morin vs Legault dit Deslauriers C. C., Montréal, 17 février 1859, SMITH, J., 3 J., p. 55, et 7 R. J. R. Q., p. 360. Crevier vs Sauriole dit Sansouci C. C., Montréal, 27 mai 1862, SMITH, J., 10 D. T. B. C., p. 336, et 11 R. J. R. Q., p. 227.)

DRUMMOND, J., dissenting, held that, according to our law and the Code, the document was a promissory note, and subject to the five years' prescription. His Honor referred to a former decision in appeal, in which a contrary doctrine had been laid down. That decision, however, he believed to be incorrect in principle.

BADGLEY, J., felt that this was an awkward case, from the circumstances of the judgment rendered by this Court in Seguin and Bergevin, in 1865. The action was on a note en brevet, being the common form of a promissory note before two notaries, but containing nothing more or less than an agreement to pay a sum of money. It contained the substance of an english promissory note, but in another form. The difficulty in the case was this: We have a law of prescription applying to promissory notes which says that, if no action be brought within five years, the claim is lost. A case similar to the present came before this Court, in 1865, and was decided by Justices DUVAL, AYLWIN, MEREDITH, DRUMMOND and MONDELET, and they held that prescription did not apply to a document such as this, and they reversed the judgment of the Court below. He, Mr justice BADGLEY, must say that his own opinion was in favor of applying the law of prescription to these promissory notes, until the precedent referred to was established. He had no doubt that many cases had occurred since that decision, and the jurisprudence then settled by the Court of Appeals had been acted upon. The judgment of the Court of Appeals stated, on that occasion, most distinctly that this was not a form of promissory note to which our Statute of Limitations applied at all. He considered it better to follow the old rule stare super vias antiquas than to make a new rule now. The case of 1865 and this case were precisely similar in every respect. If there was anything wrong in the rule then laid down, the Legislature might interpose and correct it. He was, therefore, for confirming the judgment.

CARON, J., concurred with BADGLEY, J., in holding the precedent binding, and believed the case referred to had been correctly decided.

MONK, J., said the only question was whether the prescription of five years applied. He was inclined to think it did; but the judges were brought face to face with a decision of this Court holding the reverse. It was a little embarrassing to find one of the judges who sat on that occasion taking a different view now. And, although one decision, if it were utterly unfounded or erroneous did not make a jurisprudence, yet, that was not the case here, for some of the learned judges who sat in the case of 1865 were still strongly

of opinion that that judgment was correct. This was quite enough to make him, Mr Justice MONK, hesitate in departing from their views, and to incline him to abide by the former decision, and more specially as there was a great deal to be said on both sides.

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Le jugement de la Cour d'Appel est en ces termes: "La "Cour, considérant que le document sur lequel repose l'action 'du demandeur en Cour de première instance, n'est pas un "billet dans le sens de la loi de ce pays, à l'égard duquel la prescription invoquée en cette cause puisse s'appliquer; "Considérant, par conséquent, qu'il y a erreur dans le juge"ment rendu par la Cour Supérieure, à Montréal, le 1er juin 1870, en autant qu'il maintient la première exception du "défendeur intimé, dans et par laquelle ce dernier invoquait "la prescription de cinq ans applicable aux billets promissoires, et déboute le demandeur de son action, cette Cour "casse, et met de côté ledit jugement, et, procédant à rendre le jugement que la Cour de première instance eut dû rendre, "déboute le défendeur intimé de son exception de prescription, et maintenant l'action du demandeur, condamne le "défendeur." Dissentiente, l'Honorable juge DRUMMOND. (17 J., p. 21; 2 R. C., p. 470)

BÉLANGER & DESNOYERS, avocats de l'appelant.

DORION, DORION & GEOFFRION, avocats de l'intimé.

AMENDMENT TO DECLARATION.

SUPERIOR COURT, Montreal, 31st October, 1872.

Coram TORRANCE, J.

CONTANT vs LAMONTAGNE et al.

Held--That plaintiff will not be allowed to amend his declaration by adding allegations having reference to matters occurring subsequent to the institution of the action.

The action was instituted in August, 1871. On the 17th October, 1872, plaintiff made a motion to amend his declaration "puis darein continuans" in adding, at 14th line of the 3rd page, as an alditional paragraph, the following words: que, de fait, le vingt septembre dernier (1872), le demandeur, poursuivi par la Corporation de Montréal, comme susdit, sous n° 1157 des dossiers de cette Cour, aurait été condamné à payer la somme de quatre cent soixante et "quatorze piastres et quarante-sept centins, etc." The Court

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held that such an amendment could not be made. Motion rejected. (17 J., p. 24)

J. DOUTRE, Q. C., for plaintiff.
BONDY, for defendant.

INSCRIPTION EN FAUX.

COUR DU BANC DE LA REINE (EN APPEL),

Montréal, 15 septembre 1874.

Présents: MONK, J., TASCHEREAU, J., RAMSAY, J., SANBORN, J., et SICOTTE, J. ad hoc.

CHARBES HORACE LAMONTAGNE, (Défendeur en première instance), Appelant; et EDOUARD CONTANT, (Demandeur en première instance), Intimé.

Jugé:-par la Cour du Banc de la Reine (en appel): Que la copie d'un acte notarié, ne sera pas déclarée fausse, parce qu'on ne trouverait pas la minute de cet acte, dans le greffe du notaire qui comporte l'avoir reçue, qui a été déposé au greffe après son décès, s'il est constaté que le notaire a reçu cet acte.

Held:-(by the Superior Court) 1. That in the case of an inscription en faux of a notarial deed and of the copy thereof produced, the party availing himself of such deed or copy is bound to produce the original deed or adduce reasonable evidence of its loss or destruction, his mere assertion that it has been lost being wholly insufficient.

2. That in the present instance the copy produced was forged.

3. That where the Judge is of opinion, as in this case, that forgery and perjury have been committed, he will, as a matter of duty, order the offenders to be prosecuted for these crimes.

This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Superior Court, at Montreal, JOHNSON, J., on the 27 March,

1873.

Here follow the remarks made by Mr Justice JOHNSON, in the Superior Court, and the judgment of the said Court.

PER CURIAM: This cause comes upon an inscription en faux incident. The plaintiff brought his petitory action, founded on a deed of sale made to him by defendant, on the 6th of April, 1863, and alleges that defendant, thereby, sold to him the usufruct of certain real estate, in this city, but that he, plaintiff, soon afterwards, verbally agreed with defendant that the latter might continue in the occupation of it for a time. To meet this demand, defendant pleads a deel of reconveyance from plaintiff to defendant's wife, dated the 15th of May, 1864. It is against this deed, produced by defendant that plaintiff has inscribed en faux. According to the practice in such cases, the party producing the instrument

impugned was called upon to declare whether he availed himself of it or not, and, if he did avail himself of it, to produce the original, in order that the forgery alleged might be investigated. The defendant met this by a notion praying acte of the declaration he made that he could not produce the minute, inasmuch as it had been accidentally lost, and could not be found; and produces what he calls a copy of it, which he says he got from the Registry office. Our law does not fix the practice to be followed in case of the non-production of the minute. The French Code de Procedure assimilates the consequences of non-production of the original or minute to those of the refusal of the party to declare whether he intends to avail himself of it. The Art. 166 of our Code merely says: "If the defendant in improbation fails, within the delay prescribed, to make such declaration, or declares that he does not intend to make use of the document, it is rejected from the record, and if the con"clusions demand it, is also declared null." In the present case, defendant did not fail to make his declaration, and did not declare that he did not intend to make use of it. On the contrary, he declared, in good time, that he intended to make use of the copy, because the original minute was lost. The plaintiff, thereupon, moved that, inasmuch as defendant had not produced the minute, the pretended copy which he did produce, might be rejected from the record. This last motion was, by an interlocutory judgment of 31st May, 1871, dismissed, on the ground that there are only two cases under our law in which such motion could be granted. They are those already mentioned in art. 166. Neither of them occurs here; but the right of defendant to produce and make use of secondary evidence does not depend merely upon this article of the Code. Art. 1217 of the Civil Code enacts that, when the original of any notarial instrument has been lost by unforeseen accident, a copy of an authentic copy thereof makes proof of the contents of the original, provided that such copy be attested by the notary or other public officer with whom the authentic copy has been deposited by judicial authority, for the purpose of granting copies thereof. Art. 1218 also makes copies of actes enregistered as full evidence -when the originals are lost. There is nothing in these articles to authorize the production of any copy at all where, as in the present case, the minute as well as the copy have been inscribed against as faux, except when the original has been lost by accident. This places the production of the copy precisely upon the same ground as that of any secondary evidence, unless it can be successfully contended that the simple assertion of loss, without proof or search, or presump