unlimited authority, can the same be said of a legislature, whose powers are defined and expressly limited? Another answer may be given, equally conclusive in my opinion. Judges are not to reason and lay down rules on suppositions, gratuitously made, for the purpose of creating embarrassment in the administration of justice. Mr Justice Blackstone says: "If the Parliament does wrong, he knows of no power that can afford relief." I ask when has the Imperial Parliament interfered with private contracts? When State necessity has compelled such an interference, has not the contracting party been fully indemnified? Instead, therefore, of indulging in suppositions never realized, it is prudent for judges to reserve their opinions to be pronounced when the Legislature has committed the injustice, and not until then. From the above remarks, it is evident to me that the Legislature of Quebec has exceeded the boundary of legislation prescribed to it. The question now to be decided is, can this Court interfere? I can have no hesitation in answering "Yes." The same law which has prescribed boundaries to the Legislative power has imposed upon the judges the duty of seeing that power is not exceeded. Were it otherwise, the Courts of this country must enforce a compliance with an Act of the Local Legislature of Quebec in a matter expressly and exclusively delegated to the Parliament of Canada. Take, for instance, an Act of the Local Legislature on a matter within the classes of subjects set forth it the 91st paragraph, the Criminal Law among others,would any judge sentence a man to the Penitentiary in virtue of an Act of the Local Legislature? Further, would the courts acknowledge the binding obligation of an Act of the Local Le gislature on bankruptcy or insolvency; or in an Act conferring on a foreigner the rights of a natural born subject? Decidedly not. Then, where is the line of distinction to be drawn? What Acts of the Local Legislature are the courts of Justice of the country bound to enforce, and what not? Their duty, in my opinion, is clearly and distinctly pointed out in the Act of the Imperial Parliament above referred to. It has been argued that the power of dissallowing Acts of the Local Legislature is given by the Imperial Parliament to the Governor General, and therefore that the Courts of Justice have no other duty to perform than that of yielding obedience to the Act. I confess that the extreme weakness of the argument on this point struck me as soon as the words were spoken. I could not believe that the Imperial Parliament had vested in the Governor General the right of deciding on the legality of a law, and at the same time denied this right to the judges of the land. Such, I was certain, was not the spirit of English legislation. On reference to the Imperial Act, I find it affords not the slishtest ground for such and argument.

MONK, J-I agree with my colleagues the Chief Justice and Mr Justice Drummond in this case. At the time of the argument I was inclined to the opinion expressed by Judges Caron and Badgley, but, upon careful consideration, I think we have the right, and that, in fact, it is our duty, to disregard a law of the Local Parliament if it be in conflict with the Imperial Act which confers a Constitution upon the Dominion. It is satisfactory to me to know that my brother Caron is also of that opinion, though he differs from the court upon the ground that there is no conflict in this case. Several learned judges of the Dominion and many textwriters, whose decisions and authority are applicable to this case, uphold this view of our powers, and I therefore readily yield to what appears to be the more approved doctrine. It is said that our decision will lead to consequences of the gravest character. It this be so, the fault is not ours: we have the Imperial Act, which undoubtedly we are bound to obey and to enforce. If we find a local law in conflict with its provisions, we have no more right to give that effect, than we should a by-law of the Corporation contrary to a local law. But, assuming this doctrine as to the powers and duties of this court to be sound, does. this Act trangress the Dominion Act? Does there exist the conflict contended for by the respondent? It is argued, and with considerable force, I think, that only general legislation on insolvency was reserved to the Dominion or Federal Parliament, and that this Act not possessing that character, it does not come within the prohibition. The law, however, does not, expressly or by clear implication, make that distinction, and, in that case, this court would not probably feel justified in doing so. The local Act says in plain English that the Union St-Jacques, being insolvent, unable to meet its liabilities and engagements, and not being able to induce the respondent and other ladies to accept a conposition, the power of the Locai Parliament is invoked to legalise a reduction of the claims, in other words, to compel the interested parties to accept a forced composition. All this is said and enacted, in less precise, in milder words, yet, this is a concise statement of the case. The whole Act means insolvency and forced composition: nothing more and nothing less. If this is true, then the letter of the Imperial Act is plainly violated, and although I have some doubts as to whether that statute meant to prohibit the Local Parliament from legislating on insolvency in matters of the nature brought before us, yet there is a judgment of the Court below, and my doubts are not strong enough to induce me to disturb it, more especially under the circumstances of this case.

DRUMMOND, J:--This is a case deserving more than ordinary consideration, not from the amount of money at stake, but

from the importance of the constitutional question involved in it-namely, whether the Courts of this country have power, I would not say, in formal terms-to annul-but to refuse obedience to the commands of the manifold Legislative Bodies of this Dominion when they issue in matters with which the Imperial Parliament has given them no authority to deal, or inhibited them from interfering. To explain the facts of the case and the grounds upon which the judgment appealed from was given, I avail myself of the observations made by his Honor Mr Justice TORRANCE because they express my opinion, -my view of the whole matter, in clear and concise terms. Remains the question, as to how the Tribunals of Federal Governments should deal with enactments made by the divers Legislatures beyond the limits of the legislative powers assigned to them respectively, by the Charters or Constitutions to which they owe their existence. I do not hesitate to say that the duty of the Courts is to disregard, or refuse obdience to, all such enactments, as null and void. In support of this position, I quote, in the first place, the opinions of some great Publicists and Jurisconsults who have defined the duties of Judges, in relation to the conflicting laws of Federal, or Composite Governments, organized by social compact between Independent States: Austin, one of the most profound of all writers in the English language, on the philosophy of Law and Jurisprudence, says: "To illustrate the nature of a composite state, I will add the following remark to the foregoing general description.-Neither the immediate tribunals of the common or general government, nor the immediate tribunals of the several united governments, are bound, or empowered, to administer or execute every command that it may issue. The political powers of the common or general government are merely those portions of their several sovereignties, which the several united governments, as parties to the federal compact, have relinquished and conferred upon it. Consequently, its competence to make laws and to issue other commands, may and ought to be examined by its own immediate tribunals and also by the immediate tribunals of the several united governments. And if, in making a law or issuing a particular command, it exceed the limited powers which it derives from the federal compact, all those various tribunals are empowered and bound to disobey. And since each of the united governments, as a party to a federal compact, has relinquished a portion of its sovereignty, neither the immediate tribunals of the common or general government, nor the immediate tribunals of the other united governments, nor even the tribunals which itself immediately appoints, are bound, or empowered, te administer or execute every command

that it may issue. Since each of the united governments, as a party to the federal compact, has relinquished a portion of its sovereignty, its competence to make laws and to issue other commands, may and ought to be examined by all those various tribunals. And if it enact a law or issue a particular command, as exercising the sovereign powers which it has relinquished by the compact all those various tribunals are empowered and bound to disobey... For every political power conferred on the general government, is substracted from the several sovereignties of the several united governments. From the sovereignty of that aggregate body we may deduce, as a necessary consequence, the fact which I have mentioned above, namely, that the competence of the general government, and of any of the united governments, may and ought to be examined by the immediate tribunals of the former, and also by the immediate tribunals of any of the latter. For since the general government, and also the united governments, are subject to that aggragate body, the respective Courts of Justice which they respectively appoint, ultimately derive their powers from that sovereign and ultimate legislature. Consequently those Courts are ministers and trustees of that sovereign and ultimate legislature, as well as of the subject legislature by which they are immediately appointed. And, consequently, those Courts are empowered, and are even bound to disobey, wherever those subject legislatures exceed the limited powers which that sovereign and ultimate legislature has granted or left them." (Vol. II, p. 26) Alexander Hamilton, one of the most eminent statesmen and publicists this Continent has produced,-in n° 78 of the Federalist, wrote: There is no position which depends on clearer principles than that every act of a delegated authority contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised is void. No legislative act therefore contrary to the Constitution can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers, may do, not only what their powers authorize, but what they forbid." In the case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137, Marshall, C. J., of the Supreme Court of the United States, made use of the following expressions in giving judgment: "The original and supreme will organizes the government and assigns to different departments their respective powers. It may either stop here, or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments. The government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the Legislature are defined and limited,

and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the Constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are inposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal prohibition. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the Constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it, or that the Legislature may alter the Constitution by an ordinary act. "Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The Constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the Legislature shall please to alter it. If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law; if the latter part be true, then written Constitutions are absurd attempts on the part of the people to limit a power in its own nature illimitable. Certainly all those who have framed written Constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and, consequently, the theory of every such government must be that an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void. This theory is essentially attached to a written Constitution, and is consequently to be considered by this Court as one of the fundamental principles of our society. It is not, therefore, to be lost sight of in the further consideration of the subject." Having established the supremacy of the constitution, and the nullity of all legislative acts passed in contravention of its principles, Marshall, C. J., thus continued his judgment: "If an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void, does it, notwithstanding its validity, bind the Courts and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory; and would seem at first view an absurdity too gross to be insisted It shall, however, receive a more attentive consideration. It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret If two laws conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the Constitution; if both the law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the Court must either decide that case conformably to the law disregarding the

on.