does not establish the position assumed. It is to our Code we should refer when considering the various modes in which verdicts can be dealt with (See article 422). Now, it is upon this very ground the verdict is about to be set aside. This is one of the cases for a new trial and not for an arrest of judgment. Art. 431 states the grounds in reference to arrest of judgment. I consider the last words of the article very intelligible. How can the judges below know whether their judgment will be arrested in the Court of Appeals or not? The other portion of the article is perfectly clear. Having read the article bearing upon judgments non obstante veredicto, His Honor called attention to the dictum that the Court may render judgment only in the case of an action being unfounded in law, and its insufficiency apparent on the face of it. He continued-then, I say the only case in which a verdict can be set aside, and the action dismissed, is upon a motion non obstante veredicto. The only case in which the trial can be set aside is on a motion for a new trial, on account of insufficiency of evidence, or excessive damages. There is here a motion for a new trial, but it is on record as submitted too late, or after the delay allowed by the law. We cannot break through positive law, to do substantial justice. I believe it will be done by granting the motion for a new trial. I have come to the decision to join the majority of the Court, in order to obtain precisely the same ends I would have obtained by granting the motion for a new trial. I trust it will never be invoked to show that I am of opinion a verdict could be set aside on motion for arrest of judgment --for any other reason than what appeared on the face of the record. It is only where there is no case made out on the face of the declaration that the action can be dismissed non obstante veredicto. (16 J., p. 225.) The appellant B. C. A. GUGY, Esq., for himself. Messrs. PARKIN, Q. C., & HOLT, Q. C., for respondent. RECUSATION OF A JUDGE IN APPEAL. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH, IN APPEAL, Quebec, Dec. 1872. Present: DUVAL, C. J., CARON, J., DRUMMOND, J., BADGLEY, J., and MONK, J. GUGY, appellant, and BROWN, respondent. Held: That, in every case of recusation of a judge in Appeal, two days' notice must be given to the opposite party; that the recusation must be sustained by affidavit, and that authentic copies of such affidavits must be previously communicated to the adverse party. TOME XXII. 27 In this case the appellant recused the Chief Justice, upon, amongst other grounds, the fact of rancorous and persistent personal hostility to him the appellant. Upon the recusation being presented, the Chief Justice retired, and the Court was then composed of CARON, DRUMMOND, BADGLEY, and MONK, J. J. After statement of the case by the appellant and argument by him, the Court held that in every case of the recusation of a judge, two days' notice must be given to the opposite party, that the recusation must be sustained by affidavits, authentic copies of which must be previously communicated to the adverse party. It was stated that both the Code and the Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals required the observance of these formalities. That although neither the Code or the Rules of Practice made special mention of recusations, yet this proceeding comes under the general provisions respecting incidents before the Court not appearing on the face of the Record. Mr. Justice MONK dissented from this ruling, being of opinion that recusations were highly exceptional proceedings and did not come under the general rule as to notice. In regard to the production of affidavits such a requirement, he thought, was in the discretion, and might, in some cases of an extraordinary nature, be insisted upon by the tribunal. (3 R. C., p. 45.) B. A. C. GUGY for appellant. Messrs. PARKIN, Q. C., & HOLT, Q. C., for respondent. OBLIGATION ILLEGALE. COUR DE CIRCUIT, St-Hyacinthe, 26 mars 1872. Coram SICOTTE, J. PERRAULT US COUTURE. Jugé :-Qu'une promesse faite par un enchérisseur à un autre enchérisseur, à une vente judiciaire, de lui payer une certaine somme, pour lui faire cesser ses enchères, constitue une obligation illicite, et que la somme ainsi promise ne peut être recouvrée en justice. Le shérif du district de St-Hyacinthe vendait, en vertu d'une exécution, dans une cause de la Cour Supérieure, un immeuble sur lequel le demandeur et le défendeur mettaient des enchères. Le défendeur proposa au demandeur que, si ce dernier voulait cesser d'enchérir, il lui paierait la somme de $15. Le demandeur accepta, et cessa d'enchérir. Le demandeur poursuivit le défendeur pour les $15 convenues, et l'action alléguait qu'attendu la cessation des enchères du demandeur, l'immeuble fut adjugé au défendeur à des conditions avantageuses, grâce à l'abstention du demandeur. Une défense en droit fut faite par le défendeur, niant le droit d'action du demandeur, sur le principe que cette obligation était contre les bonnes mœurs, et contre l'ordre public. SICOTTE, J.: Notre Code, art. 989 et 990, donne la règle générale relative au défaut de cause des obligations, dans les termes suivants: "Le contrat sans considération, ou fondé sur une considération illégale, est sans effet. La considération est illégale quand elle est prohibée par la loi, ou contraire aux bonnes mœurs ou à l'ordre public." La loi qui n'a pas le rigorisme minutieux d'un moraliste sévère, défend toutefois de faire tort à autrui, et rend toute personne capable de discerner le bien du mal, responsable du tort causé par sa faute. Toute manœuvre, combinaison pour faire tort à autrui est chose mauvaise en soi. On ne peut fonder un droit sur une telle manœuvre, dont le but et le résultat sont de nuire à autrui. Les ventes judiciaires, ordonnées pour l'aquittement des jugements, sont d'un intérêt d'ordre public; l'intérêt général, comme celui des créanciers et des débiteurs, est que le bien se vende pour le plus haut prix. Une entente entre les enchérisseurs, pour empêcher ce résultat, pour faire tort au créancier comme au débiteur, en prévenant et éloignant les enchères, est chose immorale, contraire à l'équité, à la justice, et punissable. Suivant l'enseignement de Larombière, au nombre des causes contraires aux bonnes mœurs, ou doit compter les causes injustes, c'est-à-dire, celles qui offensent la bonne foi et l'équité essentielles aux relations entre les hommes. La cause sur laquelle repose le contrat invoqué par le demandeur, est injuste; le contrat est sans effet. Action déboutée. (16 J.. p. 251; 4 R. L., p. 73.) FONTAINE & MERCIER, avocats du demandeur. TARIFF OF ATTORNEYS. SUPERIOR COURT, IN CHAMBERS, Montreal, 20th April, 1872. Coram TORRANCE, J. FORTIER VS TRUDEAU. Held:-That, on a judgment for $50, and costs of the lowest class of the Superior Court, the new tariff, existing at the date of the judgment, for cases under $200, must apply. This action was instituted on the 15th March, 1871, for damages laid at $3500, for slander of a medical man, in his professional conduct, as well as for addressing to him opprobrious epithets. Judgment was given for $50, on 30th March, 1872, with costs to be taxed as in an action of the lowest class of the Superior Court. The Prothonotary taxed the costs at $83.25, as in an action under $400. GEOFFRION petitioned for revision of the taxation, contending that there was a new tariff for cases under $200, and that the judgment was according to the lowest tariff, in the discretion of the judge rendering the judgment. TAILLON, è contra, cited Brennan vs Molson, vide p. 420, post. The Judge in Chambers granted the petition, and held that, by the judgment, the tariff applicable was the tariff in force here, since February last, for cases in the Superior Court under $200. (16 J., p. 252.) L. O. TAILLON, for plaintiff. DORION, DORION & GEOFFRION, for defendant. TARIFF OF ADVOCATES. SUPERIOR COURT, IN CHAMBERS, Montreal, 26th January, 1872. Coram TORRANCE. J. BRENNAN US MOLSON. Held: That until the promulgation of a tariff for cases of the Superior Court under $200, the tariff over $200 must apply. (1) This was an action of damages, instituted on the 4th of January, 1871. for $400, and judgment was rendered, on 29th, December, 1871, for $189, and costs. The costs were taxed by the Prothonotary as in a cause over $200. ROSE, for defendant, applied to have the taxation revised, contending that the tariff applicable was the tariff of the Circuit Court, in cases under $200, there being no tariff of the Superior Court, in Montreal, in force for cases of that amount; that to uphold the present taxation would be to apply the tariff of the Superior Court to a class of cases for which it was never intended. DORMAN, è contra, cited C. C. P. 28, 478, 9. Quebec Act, 34 Vict. c. 4, A. D. 1870, amending C. C. P. 1054. TORRANCE, J., took time to consider, and, after conference with his colleagues, at Montreal, and inquiry of the Chief (1) A new tariff applicable to these cases was registered at Montreal, in February 1872. Justice, as to the practice at Quebec, decided that the taxation must stand. Petition rejected. (16 J., p. 252, 253.) S. W. DORMAN, for plaintiff. RITCHIE, MORRIS & ROSE, for defendant. CERTIORARI. SUPERIOR COURT, Montreal, 29th February, 1872. Coram TORRANCE, J. Ex parte LOUISA PALMER, Petitioner for certiorari. Held-That a notice of application for a writ of certiorari, within the six months following conviction is not sufficient, if the application itself be not made until after the expiration of such six months. PER CURIAM: A motion was made, to quash a conviction under the liquor law. The question has been submitted on the merits. There is no difficulty in quashing the conviction, as not having been made in due form. The prosecuting party has raised the objection that the application for the writ was not made within six months. I thought, at first, that, the judge having allowed the writ to issue, I had nothing further to do with this question of the issue of the writ within the six months. The facts are these: The conviction was made on the 25th April last; on the 24th October of the same year almost six months after the day of the conviction, notice was given to the Recorder that an application for certiorari would be made, and the judge ordered the writ to issue. The Act 13 Geo. II: says that no writ of certiorari shall be granted to bring up a conviction, where the application has not been made within the six months. It is not where notice has not been given, but where the application has not been made within the six months. Here the application was clearly made after the expiration of the six months. On this ground the motion of the prosecutor must be granted, and the writ of certiorari quashed, annulled and set aside, with costs. Writ of certiorari quashed. (16 J., p. 253.) CHAPLEAU & MACMAHON, for petitioner. |