constituted law, in such case the judiciary are powerless. It may not have been a right thing to do, it may even have been unprecedented; of this I am not called upon to express my opinion, but the Provincial Legislature, notwithstanding, had the power to do it, and acted upon their powers. The parties interested had their recourse, they should have applied in time to the Dominion Executive to exercise its power of disallowance; there is no other legal mode of evading an existing act, and if that course is not applied for or not adopted, the act, of necessity, stands supreme as a law. Assuming then, that the act is in all respects, valid and constitutional, the rules for the guidance of the judiciary, as applicable in Great Britain in respect of legislative acts, also govern here. Dwarris, at page 646, says: "The general and received doctrine certainly is, that an act of Parliament, of which the terms are explicit and the meaning plain, cannot be questioned, or its authority controlled in any Court of Justice." Even in the United States where the Constitution has given to the Judicature the power and right of examining their legislative acts, that power is restricted to the discovery of violations of the Constitution or of its provisions; but at the same time they all admit, as a settled principle, that the legislature is the supreme power in the State, and if the act be within the Constitution, in other words, within the powers attributed to the exercise of the action of the legislature, it is paramount to all judicial authority, and perforce must be obeyed by Courts of Justice, who are only the ministers and expounders and not the makers of existing laws. It is within the principle of the supreme power of the legislature that what are denominated private acts of Parliament introduced and passed for the settlement of particular matters of estates, are not only considered but at the same time upheld as common assurances amongst those interested in their provisions, but do not go beyond to strangers or parties not interested in them, the rule being founded in wisdom and justice, because as it is laid down "every person is considered as assenting to a public act, yet he is not so far a party as to give up his interest." It is true this act may be called a private act, although it is designated as a public act by the legislature, yet it may be observed that however supreme the power of the legislature may be in such cases of binding private rights by acts of Parliament, caution should be duly exercised in reference to them. Still, whether public or private, the act is existing law, and in a case of an act of the legislature of Ontario, such a private act as this was upheld by the Court of Appeals for that Province.

There,

it was an act by which an important condition of a duly executed and recognised will was set aside and controlled by an act of that legislature, which like this, was assented to and stood allowed. I refer to the case of the will of the late Hon. Mr Goodhue. Chief Justice Draper and five other Judges of the Court concurred in opinion as to the the legislative validity of the act, although they differed as to the expression and interpretation of the terms enacted in it. I cannot do better than repeat some of the citations made in that case as to the assumption by Courts of Justice to override a legislative act. In Logan vs Burslem 4 Moore P. C. R., 296, Lord Campbell says: "As to what has been said of an Act of Parliament not binding if it is contrary to reason, that can receive no countenance from any Court of Justice whatever. A Court of Justice cannot set itself above the legislature. It must suppose that what the legislature has enacted is reasonable; and all, therefore, that we can do, is to try to find out what the legislature intended. If a literal translation or construction of the words would lead to an injustice or absurdity, another construction possibly might be put on them, but still it is a question of construction, and there is no power of dispensation from the words used." Mr Sedgwick, in his Treatise upon statutory and constitutional law, argues unanswerably that the judiciary have no right whatever to set aside, or arrest or nullify a law passed in relation to a subject within the scope of legislative authority, on the ground that it conflicts with their notions of natural right, abstract justice or sound morality, p. 187. And Chancellor Kent, 1 Com., 408, writes: "Where it is said that a statute is contrary to natural equity or reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the cases are understood to mean that the Court is to give them a reasonable contruction. They will not, out of respect and duty to the law giver, presume that every unjust or absurd consequence was within the contemplation of the law, but if it should happen to be too palpable to meet with but one construction, there is no doubt in the english law of the binding efficacy of the statute." To the opinions of these able men might be added those of other eminent jurists, Sir W. Blackstone, for example, amongst the number who fully corroborate what is above stated. Now, if unreasonable acts of Parliament are not thus, by authorities cited, allowed to be set aside by Courts of Justice, because, as old Chief Justice Hales, cited by Dwarris, says "it was magis congruum that acts of Parliament should be corrected by the same pen that drew them, than be dashed to pieces by the opinion of a few judges;" or, as observed by Lord Chancellor

Ellesmere, "that when the three estates have spent their labour in "making a law, three judges on the bench shall "destroy and frustrate their pains, advancing the reason of a particular Court above the judgment of all the realm," it is manifest that an act within the precise power of the Provincial Legislature to enact, cannot be ignored by our Courts of Justice. There is nothing, therefore, to sustain the opinion that the Provincial Courts have jurisdiction to override or set aside Provincial Legislative Acts coming within the classes of matters as above enumerated in the 92nd section of the Dominion Act. And here I may be again permitted to say, that as to the object of the act in question falling within the exclusive power of Dominion Legislation as being a matter of bankruptcy and insolvency reserved for the Dominion Legislature, Judge CARON has fully answered this objection, and I shall not further remark upon it. Upon the whole I consider that the Statutes of the Quebec Legislature are binding upon all the residents in the province, when made in relation to the matters within the Provincial Legislature, that the Statute in question in this case is valid and binding upon the parties affected thereby and upon this and all Courts of Justice of Quebec, and that the judgment of the Circuit Court, to use its own expression, is unconstitutional, and in effect and fact an unauthorized judicial repeal of the act and an illegal assumption of disallowance only left to the Governor General; and therefore that the judgment appealed from is incorrect and ought

to be set aside.

CARON, J., dissentiens: L'acte d'incorporation dont il s'agit en cette cause n'a rien d'extraordinaire; il contient les clauses que l'on trouve généralement dans les actes de cette espèce, et il est certain que la législature qui l'a passé avait juridiction pour le faire. Or si elle avait cette juridiction, elle avait également le droit de le modifier à la demande des intéressés, à moins que ce pouvoir ne lui eût été enlevé par une autorité supérieure à la sienne. C'est ce que prétend l'intimée, appuyée dans cette prétention par le jugement dont est appel, lequel déclare que le Statut Impérial (l'Acte d'Union) a ôté à notre législature le droit de statuer sur les sujets réglés par l'acte d'incorporation, invoqué par l'intimée; l'appelante soutenant le contraire, la question à décider est celle de savoir si cet acte impérial a de fait enlevé à notre législature le pouvoir de faire à l'acte d'incorporation en question les changements et modifications dont se plaint l'intimée et qu'elle soutient être nuls et de nul effet. Je suis d'avis que non. En passant l'acte dont se plaint l'intimée, l'on n'a pas touché aux lois de banqueroute sous l'empire desquelles,

la société en question n'est jamais tombée. Il paraît absurde de prétendre qu'une société fondée dans le but de celle-ci, soit de nature à se trouver en banqueroute ou en faillite. Non, cette société de bienfaisance, fondée dans le but de pourvoir aux besoins des pauvres membres qui en font partie, s'est aperçue après quelques années d'expérience que les conditions qu'on leur avait imposées sur leur demande étaient trop onéreuses et détruiraient la société et le but qu'on se proposait en la fondant, et alors les membres ont demandé à la législature de faire les changements qu'ils ont suggérés, de nature à remédier à l'état de malaise et d'embarras dans lequel elle se trouvait. La législature locale, en accordant ce qui était demandé, n'a sûrement pas touché les loi sgénérales réglant la faillite, la banqueroute et l'insolvabilité; c'est un acte particulier qui n'a rien de commun avec les lois générales sur ces différents sujets. Quand même, il en serait autrement, et que, de fait, l'acte en question aurait trait à cette sorte de lois, rien ne constate que la société qui demandait la passation de cet acte était vraiment dans un état de faillite et de déconfiture; ce n'était pas se déclarer dans un tel état que de demander des changements de nature à améliorer sa position. Chaque jour l'on voit des incorporations demandant à la législature des changements, des amendements à leur charte, sans qu'il put venir en tête à qui que ce soit de prétendre que c'est un signe de faillite ou de déconfiture. Il en est de même dans le cas actuel. La société a représenté que les obligations qu'elle a à remplir sont onéreuses, et peuvent entraver sa prospérité et sa durée, mais ce n'est pas là alléguer qu'elle soit dans. un état de déconfiture. Je renverserais donc le jugement et renverrais l'action de la demanderesse. Lors de la nouvelle audition qui a eu lieu en cette cause, l'on a suggéré que c'était moins par suite du statut impérial que la législature locale était sans juridiction sur le sujet dont il s'agit, mais que c'était parce que l'acte d'amendement fait par la législature locale contient une déviation aux droits conférés aux membres de la société St. Jacques, par leur acte originaire d'incorporation; qu'en vertu de cet acte, l'intimée avait des droits acquis auxquels l'acte d'amendement portait atteinte, ce qui le rendait nul, en autant que l'intimée y était concernée. Cette prétention me paraît outrée; si elle était admise, les banques et autres sociétés une fois incorporées ne pourraient plus obtenir de changement à leur charte, pour la raison donnée dans le cas actuel, c'est à savoir, que ces changements, tout avantageux qu'ils pourraient être au plus grand nombre des actionnaires, pourraient affecter les droits et les intérêts de quelques-uns d'eux, et que, partant, dans cette appréhension,

la législature ne devrait jamais accorder d'amendement aux actes d'incorporation. Une autre observation à faire est que si véritablement la société est en faillite ou déconfiture, la loi passée par la législature locale et dont se plaint l'intimée, est tout à fait dans l'intérêt de l'intimée, puisque en acceptant ces dispositions, l'intimée pourra recevoir de suite la somme fixée, au lieu de sa rente, tandis que dans ce cas elle courrait le risque de ne pas être payée de cette rente. Je persévère donc dans l'opinion que le jugement doit être infirmé et l'action de l'intimée renvoyée avec dépens.

DUVAL, CH. J.: It is undoubtedly true that the authority of the Imperial Parliament is supreme, and, in its exercise, cannot be controlled by the judicial power. Such is the received doctrine in England. But can this be said of the Legislature of the Province of the Quebec, whose powers are conferred by an Act of the Imperial Parliament, defined and limited in language generally admitting of little doubt? Unquestionably not. When the authority is supreme, it cannot be questioned, but when it is limited it is the duty of the judges to see that the limits prescribed have not been exceeded. The powers conferred on our Provincial Legislature are defined by the Imperial Act, 30-31 Victoria, Chapter 3, Paragraph 92 and the following, On the subjects set forth in these paragraphs it may legislate, but no power is given to it to impair the obligation of contracts, a power which has ever been considered as contrary to every principle of sound legislation. In a free State, every man has a right to dispose of his property on his own terms, provided these are not contrary to law. The contract once made is as binding on the Legislature as it is on the individual. Applying this to the present case, I ask what would be said of an Act of the Legislature of Quebec, enacting that a man who had sold his house for fifteen hundred pounds should accept twelve hundred in full payment? And yet this is precisely the case before the Court. The Union St-Jacques entered into a contract with the husband of the respondent, by which it bound itself to pay a certain sum of money to the latter after the death of her husband, should she survive him. It is this amount which the widow claims, and which the Union St-Jacques refuses to pay. Let now the authority of Blackstone be invoked, and his opinion expressed in volume one, page 90, be referred to, "that if Parliament will positively do what is wrong, he knows of no power in the ordinary form of the Constitution that is vested with the authority to control it." To this the limited power of our Legislature above mentioned is a conclusive answer. Admitting that the judicial power in England cannot interfere but must blindly submit to superior and