law, was sufficient so to do. The court does not regard these considerations as warranting the conclusion that, under the Municipal code, the words" by-law" and "resolution" are, as regards a municipal corporation, by any means interchangeable terms. The code distinguishes between them, and a municipal council ought not to deal by mere resolution whether in the way of original enactment, or in that of amendment or repeal, that any matter properly made by the code. the subject matter of a by-law, as opposed to a resolution. But, where it has done so in good faith, and no public wrong, or, to quote the phrase of article 16 of the Municipal code, no "substantial injustice" has resulted, the informality cannot be thought of by the court, as fatal. Under article 16, it is to be regarded as fatal or otherwise, according as "substantial injustice" may or may not be the result of its being allowed to stand good as the reasonable equivalent of a by-law. In this case, if only this repealing resolution had been entitled a by-law, and so promulgated, it would have been beyond the reach of criticism, the law of the municipality, clearly in force on the 8th of january, and regulative of the election. No substantial injustice can be apprehended from a judgment of this court condoning this informality. On the contrary, in view of the ulterior action of the late council, and of the action of the electors, at their meeting, the fair presumption (against which the petitioners have advanced nothing), is that substantial injustice would be done, were this court, upon a mere technicality, to give effet to what must be presumed to be the wish of a minority, as against that of the majority of of the community interested. Judgment rejecting petition. (16 J. p. 153.)

JAMES O'HALLORAN, Q. C, for petitioners.

G. C. V. BUCHANAN, ERNEST RACICOT, GEORGE B. BAKER, for respondents.

DEPOSIT IN REVIEW

SUPERIOR COURT in Review, Montreal, 23rd April, 1868. Coram MONDELET, J., BERTHELOT, J., MONK, J.

LEAVITT US Moss et al.

Held: Where two defendants had raised separate contestations, in the Superior court, and in review made one inscription and one deposit that, on plaintiff's motion, a double deposit under C. C. P. 497, would be ordered.

(MONDELET, J., dissenting.) (16 J. p. 156.) O'HALLORAN, for plaintiff.

J. J. C. ABBOTT, for defendants.

INSCRIPTION IN REVIEW

SUPERIOR COURT, in Review, Montreal, 24th October, 1870.

Coram BERTHELOT, J., MACKAY, J., TORRANCE, J.

CLEMENT dit LARIVIERE vs BLOUIN et al.

Held:-That one inscription and one deposit in review, by the defendant and incidental plaintiff, is sufficient. (16 J. p. 156. )

D. D. BONDY, for plaintiff.

R. LAFLAMME, Q. C., for defendants.

MUNICIPAL ELECTION.

CIRCUIT COURT, Sweetsburg, 26th February, 1872.

Corain DUNKIN, J.

LARAWAY, petitioner, vs BRIMMER et al.

Held:-In the case of an election of municipal councillors, that, after the presiding officer has received, without objection, a requisition from five or more presumed electors for a poll, and has granted such poll, and called on the electors to come up and vote, be cannot legally go back on what he has thus done, and, on the alleged ground of want of legal qualification in some of those who made the demand for the poll, act as if no such demand had been made and received.

PER CURIAM: "The petitoner alleges that, at the municipal election held on the 8th of january last, for the East part of the Township of Farnham, he was a candidate, duly qualified, for election as a municipal councillor; that respondents, on the one hand, and himself and six other persons, all duly qualified on the other hand, were respectively, thereat, put in nomination, as candidates, for such election; that the presiding officer, without objection or question from any quarter, received and proposed both nominations, and took the sense of the meeting upon them, and gave it as his opinion that the majority of the electors were in favor of respondents; that, thereupon, upwards of twenty electors demanded a poll; that, afterwards, when about an hour had elapsed, from the time of opening the meeting, and the poll was on the point of being opened, objection was, for the first time, raised to the qualification of the proposers of the petitioner and his friends; and that, though many electors present instantly demanded to be substituted in their place, and, though nearly half the electors

present instantly demanded the opening of a poll, the presiding officer, after enquiry as to the qualification of the proposers of the petitioner and his friends, and, without enquiry as to that of the proposers of respondents, declared the nomination of the petitioner and his friends irregular and null, and that he could then receive no new nomination, and could grant no poll, and that respondents were elected. And he prays, accordingly that the appointment of respondents so made be declared null, and a new election ordered. The respondents appeared, but put in no written pleading. The parties have gone to proof, and been heard on the merits of the case. The material facts, to be established, are briefly these : The respondents were first put in nomination collectively, their names and surnames given, by two well-known persons present, claiming to be electors, and whose names and surnames were given. The petitioner, and six others, were then put in nomination, in like manner. The presiding officer received the two nominations, and proposed them to the meeting, and called for a division, which was had; and he declared himself satisfied that the majority was for the first nomination. A poll was demanded. on behalf of the supporters of the second nomination; five well known persons in particular, who claimed to be electors, giving in their names as making the demand. These proceedings not having occupied a full hour, from the time of the opening of the meeting, the presiding officer then waited for some time, and, in fact, until five or ten minutes after the expiration of the hour. He then set himself, with the secretary of the meeting, to prepare for taking the poll, and (as he states) called on the electors to come up and register their votes. Till then, there had been no question raised by any one, as to the regularity of anything that had been done; but, then, one of th proposers of the first nomination addressing the presiding officer, objected that the two proposers of the second nomination, and the five persons who had demanded a poll, were not qualified electors, by reason of their not having paid all municipal and school taxes due by them, and insisted that the nomination was therefore not legally made, nor the poll legally demanded. Therepon, at least one person present expressed objection to one of the proposers of the first nomination, as not being a British subject, and, therefore, not an elector; but the objection does not seem to have been formally addressed to the presiding officer, and certainly, failed to catch his attention. The presiding officer, on the demand, which was expressly made upon him, called up the seven persons who thus stood questioned in the interest of the first nomination, and proposed to them the electors' qualification oath prescribed by article 315 of the Muni

cipal code. Two of them, one a proposer, the other a demander of the poll, on hearing the oath read, declined to take it, saying they had not paid all their school taxes. Upon demand then made for substitution of other persons in their respective places, the presiding officer, at first, said he would give five minutes delay for this to be done. But, within that delay, being struck by the consideration that the change asked involved, in effect (as he thought), a new nomination, he concluded he could not allow it, as the hour was more than expired, and so declared. And, thereupon, in the midst of much confused opposition, which he thought himself precluded from regarding, he pronounced the second nomination, and the demand of a poll irregalar and null, and the respondents elected. It was further put in evidence, that, on the day in question one of the proposers of the petitioner and his friends stood on the school assessment roll as owing a certain amount of school tax, which he still had not paid; and that the other of them, being also one of the five demanders of the poll and also two others of the demanders of the poll, stood on the same roll, as owing certain amounts of school tax, which they severally paid two days later. The respondents, by their counsel, did not go so far in argument as to impeach the petitioner's quality of candidate, as entitling him to contest the appointment here in question. They did contend, however, that, as the second nomination and demand of a poll were not, in fact, made within the hour, by the requisite number of persons duly qualified as electors, both the one and the other were absolutely null and could neither be amended, nor renewed in any shape or way; and, in fact, that the presiding officer was altogether right in the course he took. The petitioner, by his counsel, on the other hand, maintained that the four persons in question are not even now sufficiently shown to have been in arrear at the time in question for any amount of school tax; and that, whether they were so or not, the presiding officer had, at the meeting, no right to take congnizance of any such objection made to them, but was bound to take every one there present as being, for all purposes of the meeting, municipal electors, until such time as the voting should be in progress, when, and when only, he could entertain a question in that behalf, and must solve it purely and simply by the oath, or by the refusal to swear of the individual parties themselves. The court is unable to confirm these extreme pretensions advanced on either side. The fact that, at a given time, a person's name is borne on a school assessinent roll for a school tax therein stated as due, raises, with a view to any issue of the kind here involved, a presumption of indebtedness, which such person (if desirous to

be relieved from it) must rebut, whether by showing that he really has paid, or by showing that the supposed tax, by reason of irregularity or otherwise was really not due. In this instance, it is shown, on the contrary, that one of the four persons here in question, said to the presiding officer, at the meeting, that he had not paid, clearly implying his conviction that he owed, the tax; that another, besides so saying paid his tax two days after; and that the remaining two, who, at the meeting had said nothing, paid theirs within the delay. The 84th section of chap. 15 of the C, S. for L. C., which was cited at the argument, merely requires the formalities therein set forth, in order to the constituting of such roll as "conclusive evidence," that is to say, of course, as conclusive evidence of a precise amount against persons and properties. There is nothing in it adverse to or limitative of the prima facie presumption of regularity which must subsist in favor of such roll. Much less is there, or can there be, in it, anything limitative of the inferences unavoidably following from the admissions, whether by word or act, of the parties, who, if they pleased, might have contested, should they, in fact (so far from contesting) practically admit its correctness as against themselves. Nor can it, by any means, be said that the presiding officer, at a municipal election, is bound absolutely to regard all persons present as electors. He must so presume, unless he knows, or reasonably believes, or is reasonably notified, to the contrary. But the Code is far from making him a merely ministerial officer, or from recognizing all persons present as electors. By article 309, it is not made the right of any two persons present to nominate a candidate or candidates. Two" electors (and article 291 tells us what the word "elector" means, and, just as clearly requires payment of all municipal and school taxes then due, as it does any other of the qualities enumerated, as a condition necessary to the constituting of any person as an elector at all) may submit" names to the presiding officer either verbally or in writing; but it is only the presiding officer who can "receive and propose" the parties so named, "as candidates. He is bound to receive and propose all persons whose names are duly so submitted to him; and he is even expressly forbidden so to do, unless, as well their names and surnames, as also those of their proposers, are given him. By inevitable inference, if the names and surnames or any of them, are not given, or, if the persons submitting to him the name and surname of any intended canditate are not electors, he is not bound to receive or propose the name of such intended candidate, and, indeed, ought not knowingly to do so. The petitioner's counsel, indeed, naturally shrank at the argument, from pushing his principle to the extreme, but fair test of a sup