any Court in Lower Canada." This provision sufficiently satisfies the comity of Nations, by allowing foreigners to use the same remedies, and to the same extent, as citizens. The appellants are properly, therefore, intervening parties, before the Court, in this cause, but this does not authorize them to withdraw the seized effects from the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court. Admitting, in principle, the correctness of the rule generally, that moveables are presumed, in law, to follow the person of their owner, and are subject to the law of his domicile, and which, in this cause, being New York, the effects seized would be subject to the foreign laws of that State, that principle would effectively override our provincial jurisdiction, and compel our Courts of Justice to submit to the foreign law, and set aside their legally issued process of attachment. But, as already stated, that result could only follow from the express or tacit consent of our law, and, in this respect, our Civil Code has made express provision for the matter in contention, by providing this special exception to the general rule, que les meubles suivent la personne, et sont censés être de la jurisprudence où la personne est domiciliée. By the 6th section of the preliminary title of the Civil Code, page 5, it is enacted: "Moveable property is governed by the law of the domicile of its owner. But the law of Lower Canada "is applied whenever the question involved relates to the "distinction or nature of the property, to privileges and rights of lien, contestations as to possession, the jurisdiction of the Courts and procedure, the mode of execution and "attachment, public policy and the rights of the Crown, and also in any other cases specially provided for by this Code." The French copy of the law is preferable to the English above, in its perfect clearness and precision. The attachment in this case is clearly within the exception of the Code to the generality of the rule for moveables, and must therefore stand. Under these circumstances, without adverting to other fatal objections against the claim of appellants to withdraw the seized property from the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court, the conclusions of their intervention in this respect cannot be legally maintained, and the judgment, for this cause, must be sustained with costs. CARON, J.: La contestation est sur l'intervention produite par les appelants, laquelle a été renvoyée par le jugement dont est appel. La partie de ce jugement qui condamne l'assurance (The Columbian Assurance Company) défenderesse, dans l'action portée contre elle par les intimés, demandeurs, ne souffre aucune difficulté, non plus que cette autre partie du jugement qui déclare bonne et valable la saisie avant jugement faite à l'instance des intimés, entre les mains de la Banque de Montréal, de certains argents dont elle était en possession appartenant à la compagnie d'assurance. La question à résoudre est de savoir: Si les appelants, en leur qualité de Receivers, charge à laquelle ils avaient été nommés par les tribunaux de New York, et qui équivaut, à peu près, notre charge de Syndics (Trustees) aux banqueroutes, ont droit de retirer de la banque, et de recevoir pour distribution, à New-York, les argents ainsi saisis, pour le profit et avantage des créanciers de l'assurance, y résidant, en préférence et à l'exclusion des demandeurs, intimés, et des autres créanciers du pays. Telle était la prétention des appelants, fondée sur ce que les fonds et valeurs en question, étant d'un caractère mobilier, devaient être régis, administrés et distribués d'après la loi de New York, suivant laquelle l'assurance avait été incorporée, et où elle avait le siége principal de ses opérations. Le jugement dont se plaignent les appelants a décidé à l'encontre de cette prétention, en renvoyant leur intervention, et en déclarant qu'ils n'avaient aucun droit de retirer de la banque les fonds et valeurs qu'elle avait, appartenant à la compagnie, et qui avaient été saisis et arrêtés entre les mains de la banque ; lesquels devaient être distribués par la Cour Supérieure, qui rendait le jugement, suivant la loi et la procédure du Bas-Canada. Ce jugement (MONK J.,) confirmé en cour de révision, me paraît correct, et j'approuve en tous points les motifs sur lesquels il est fondé. Au soutien du bien jugé, l'on peut consulter, avec profit, les raisonnements et les autorités qui se trouvent au factum des intimés. A ces autorités, l'on peut ajouter l'art. 6, § 2, de notre code civil, au bas duquel se trouvent nombre de citations, établissant la doctrine émise au jugement. L'on pourrait ajouter que le contrat, dont les intimés demandaient l'exécution, par leur action, et par la saisie pratiquée comme dit plus haut, ayant été fait à Montréal, où l'assurance faisait aussi des affaires comme telle, devrait être exécuté d'après la loi du Bas Canada, et les procédures et la pratique de ses tribunaux. Je confirmerais donc le jugement dont est appel, (le jugement de la cour de révision) lequel confirme celui de la Cour Supérieure. La règle générale sur le sujet, applicable au cas actuel, telle que passée par les auteurs, et, entre autres, par Fœlix (du droit International, édition par Demangeat, page 255, no 125, 1 vol.) est que les formalités de justice sont réglées par la loi du pays où la demande est formée. Cette maxime est reproduite dans notre art. 6, du Code Civil, cité lus haut. C'est dans le n° 126 de Felix, ler vol. page 257, que l'on trouve l'explication et l'application de cette règle, qui me paraît décider notre question, comme l'a décidé la Cour de première instance, sans qu'il soit nécessaire de s'enquérir qu'elle est sur le sujet de la loi de l'état de New-York; c'est notre propre loi qu'il faut suivre ; or, cette loi est contre les appelants, et en faveur du jugement qui a renvoyé leur intervention. Aux autorités d'autres parts, l'on peut ajouter Holcombe's Leading Cases, on Commercial Law, Index, Vo, Assingments and Bankruptcy Law. Judgments of S. C. confirmed. (16 J., p. 141) STRACHAN BETHUNE, Q. C., for appellants. MUNICIPAL BY-LAW. SUPERIOR COURT, Sweetsburg, 26th February, 1872. Coram DUNKIN, J. LEQUIN et al., petitioners, vs MEIGS et al., respondents. Held:-That a by-law of a village municipality may be legally repealed by a resolution passed by the body having power to change the bylaw, when done in good faith, and without any public wrong or "substantial injustice" resulting therefrom. PER CURIAM: The petitionners, claiming to have been, and to be duly qualified municipal electors of the village of West Farnham, in the county of Missisquoi, impeach the legality of the election of respondents, as councillors for that village, on the 8th of January last. They allege that, on the 10th of november last, the council of the village, under, Article 617 and 618 of the municipal Code, duly passed a by-law to divide the village into five wards, and provide (as in such case requisite) for the election of councillors in and for such several wards, at the next general election; that such by-law was duly promulgated, and was in force on the 8th January last; but that the election then held, instead of having been held (as it ought to have been) in and for such five several wards, was illegally held, under the authority of the council, at only one place, in and for the village as a whole; and that the election of respondents, which took place thereat, was and is therefore wholly illegal. They pray, accordingly, that the same be so declared, and that a new election, to be held in and for the five several wards, be ordered. Six of the seven respondents appeared, and put in written pleadings, by which they raise two distinct issues; the one, by denying the qualification of one of the petitioners to be received as such, by reason of his not having been, and not being a municipal elector, from nonpayment of school taxes due by him; the other, by alleging that, on the 11th december last, the council of the village, by a so called resolution, wholly repealed and annulled the bylaw in question, and that the election was therefore duly and legally held, without reference to it. As regards the first issue, it is enough to say that both parties have been content to rest their case rather on presumptions which each claims to be entitled to draw from a certain want of precise proof offered by the other, than on such precise proof offered on their own behalf. The view taken by the court on the other and principal issue makes it unnecessary to consider whether or not respondents are entitled to judgment on the merely preliminary issue, of alleged want of quality on the part of petitioners. The by-law for dividing the village into wards is shown to have been passed on the 10th of november, at a meeting attended by only four members of the Council. The mayor being in the chair, and one of the councillors opposing it and in vain trying to obtain a postponement of the question to the next meeting, when a fuller attendance of councillors might be had; it was thus carried by the votes of two councillors only. The so-called resolution for its repeal is shown to have been passed on the 11th of december, at that next meeting which was attended by all the councillors. The mayor again presiding. the two councillors whose votes had carried the by-law formed the minority, and the repeal was carried by the votes of the other four. Both by-law and resolution are shown to have been promulgated in ordinary course, the latter, on the 17th december, considerably more than fifteen days before the date of the election. The council, after voting the repeal, also, by a later order, directed the holding of the election as it was held, at one and the same place for the village as a whole. Three out of the four councillors who had voted for the repeal were thereat elected, together with four new men; the two whose votes had carried the bylaw not being elected. The question turns upon the legallity or otherwise, of this alleged repeal, as warranting the election held. The petitioners contend that article 460 of the Municipal code defines restrictively the objects for which a council may act by resolution, in contradistinction from by-law, the matter of the division of a village into wards, under articles 617 and 618, not being of the number; that a by-law, in the nature of things, requires to be amended or repealed by by-law; and that article 463, which provides that by-laws submitted for approval of the electors, or of the lieutenant-Governor in council, or of both, can only be amended or annulled by another by-law, approved in the same manner, very sufficiently confirms this view. Admitting this, however, the question recurs, whether or not the informality of assuming to repeal a by-law, by a vote of the council styled a resolution, and promulgated as such, instead of so doing by a vote of the council duly styled a by-law, and promulgated under that designation, is, under the circumstances of this case, a fatal informality. Looking back to cas-s indicative of the meaning originally assigned to the word "by-law," in reference, to the action of corporations thereby, the court does not find anything like a marked distinction between a by-law and a resolution. On the contrary (in the case, it must be admitted, of corporations having a merely private character), it has been held, that a court may even presume a by-law, its terms and adoption, from the usage and conduct of the corporation and its officers, and, in like manner, from non-observence of one, may presume a subsequent by-law to repeal or alter it. (Attorney General vs Middleton, 2 Vesey Sen. 328; cited Angell and Ames, edition 1846, p. 327.) Here, someting less than a regularly proved resolution is made to serve as a by-law. In the case of Garrett vs Newcastle (3 B. and Adolph. p. 252), where the question was of the action of a corporation in England, of municipal character, the terms by-law and resolution seem to have been used as absolutely interchangeable. Indeed, the rule, in England, seems to have been, and still to be, to regard the resolutions of a corporate body, in respect of any matter with which it can deal by by-law, as having presumably the nature and quality of by-laws. What is insisted on, in regard to amendment or repeal of by-laws, is merely that the same power which alone can make shall alone assume to change or unmake. (Angell and Ames, ubi supra, and cases there cited.) And, in a very late and interesting case, the latest probably bearing on this subject, the Royal Bank of India's case (Law Rep., 4 Chanc. App. p. 252), the court of Chancery Appeal has even gone further. The Bank, there in question, by the articles under which it was constituted a corporation, was expressly limited, as to conduct of its business, "by such rules, regulations and by-laws, as the directors of the company might from time to time make, and which should be entered in a book kept for that purpose, aud signed by three directors." The directors, or six of them, by a resolution not entered in such book, nor so signed, but simply recorded in their ordinary minute book, had assumed to lay down a rule materially variant from the tenor of an important by-law which had been duly so entered and signed. And the Lords Justices, though it was not necessary for the maintaining of the judgment they gave, that they should do so, yet, did expressly hold that this resolution, though not properly a by-law, having been passed by the body which had power to change the by |