explain the 5th section of the act of 1797, which relates exclusively to that subject. But the act of 1797, neither in its title nor its enacting clauses, contains any words of reference to the act of 1795. The words which are supposed to imply this reference are, "to provide more effectually." But these words have relation to the existing state of the law, on all the subjects to which the act of 1797 relates, not to those alone which are comprehended in the act of 1795. The title of the act of 1795 is also, "for the more effectual recovery of debts," and, consequently, refers to certain pre-existing laws. The act of 1797, therefore, may be supposed to have in view the act of 1795, when providing for the objects contemplated in that act; but must be supposed to have other acts in view, when providing for objects not contemplated in that act.

As, therefore, the act of 1795 contains nothing respecting the priority of the United States, but is limited to provisions respecting suits in court, the act of 1797 may be considered in connection with that act, while on the subject of suits in court; but when on the subject of preference, must be considered in connection with act which relate to the preference of the United States.

The first act on this subject passed on the 31st of July, 1789, s. 21, and gave the United States a preference only in the case of bonds for duties.

392

*On the 4th of August, 1790, vol. 1, p. 221, an act was passed on the same subject with that of 1789, which repeals all former acts, and

re-enacts, in substance, the 21st section, relative to the priority of the United States.

On the 2d of May, 1792, vol. 2, p. 78, the priority previously given to the United States is transferred to the sureties on duty bonds, who shall themselves pay the debt; and the cases of insolvency, in which this priority is to take place, are explained to comprehend the case of a voluntary assignment, and the attached effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor.

Such was the title of the United States to a preference in the payment of debts previous to the passage of the act of 1797. It was limited to bonds for the payment of duties on imported goods, and on the tonnage of vessels. An internal revenue had been established, and extensive transactions had taken place; in the course of which, many persons had necessarily become indebted to the United States. But no attempt to give them a preference in the collection of such debts had been made.

This subject is taken up in the 5th section of the act of 1797. The term "revenue officer," which is used in that act, would certainly comprehend any persons employed in the collection of the internal revenue; yet it may be well doubted whether those persons are contemplated in the foregoing sections of the act. They relate to a suit in court, and are perhaps restricted to those receivers of public money who have accounts on the books of the treasury. The head of the department in each state most probably accounts with the treasury, and the sub-collectors account with him.

If this be correct, a class of debtors would be introduced into the 5th section by the term "revenue officer," who are indeed within the title, but not within the preceding enacting clauses of the law.

But passing over this term, the succeeding words seem, to the majority of the court, certainly to produce this effect. They are, "or other person hereafter becoming indebted to the United States, by bond or otherwise." If this section was designed to

place the collection of the internal revenue *393 on the same footing of security with the external revenue, as has been argued by one of the counsel for the defendants, a design so reasonable that it would naturally be attributed to the legislature, then the debtors for excise duties would be comprehended within it; yet those debtors cannot be brought within the title, or the previous enacting clauses of the bill.

The 5th section, then, would introduce a new class of debtors, and if it does so in any case, the act furnishes no principle which shall restrain the words of that section to every case to which they apply.

Three acts of Congress have passed, subsequent to that under particular consideration, which have been supposed to bear upon the case.

The first passed on the 11th of July, 1798, and is entitled "An act to regulate and fix the compensation of the officers employed in collecting the internal revenues of the United States, and to insure more effectually the settlement of their accounts." The 13th section of this act (vol. 4, p. 196,) refers

expressly to the provisions of the act of March, 1797, on the subject of suits to be instituted on the bonds given by the officers collecting the internal revenue, and shows conclusively that in the opinion of the legislature the four first sections of that act did not extend to the case of those officers; consequently, if the 5th section extends to them, it introduces a class of debtors distinct from those contemplated in the clauses which respect suits in court. The 15th section of this act takes up the subject which is supposed to be contemplated by the 5th section of the act of 1797, and declares the debt due from these revenue officers to the United States to be a lien on their real estates, and on the real estates of their sureties, from the institution of suit thereon. It can scarcely be supposed that the legislature would have given a lien on the real estate without providing for a preference out of the personal estate, especially where there was no real estate, unless that preference was understood to be secured by a previous law.

The same observation applies to a subsequent act of the same session for laying a direct tax. A lien is reserved on the real estate of the collector, without mentioning any claim to preference out of his personal estate.

*394

The last law which contains any provision on the subject of preference passed on the 2d of March, 1799. The 65th section of that act has been considered as repealing the 5th section of the act of 1797, or of manifesting the limited sense in which it is to be understood.

It must be admitted that this section involves the subject in additional perplexity; but it is the opinion of the Court, that on fair construction, it can apply only to bonds taken for those duties on imports and tonnage, which are the subject of the act.

From the first law passed on this subject, every law respecting the collection of those duties, had contained a section giving a preference to the United States, in case of the insolvency of the collectors of them.

The act of 1797, if construed as the United States would construe it, would extend to those collectors if there was no other provision in any other act giving a priority to the United States in these cases. As there was such a previous act, it might be supposed that its repeal by a subsequent law would create a doubt whether the act of 1797 would comprehend the case, and, therefore, from abundant caution, it might be deemed necessary still to retain the section in the new act respecting those duties. The general repealing clause of the act of 1799 cannot be construed to repeal the act of 1797, unless it provides for the cases to which that act extends.

It has also been argued that the bankrupt law itself affords ground for the opinion that the United States do not claim a general preference. (Vol. 5, p. 82.) The words of the 62d section of that law apply to debts generally as secured by prior acts. that section was not upon the subject of preference, but was merely designed to retain the right of the United States in their existing situation, whatever

But as