especially to the courts. It prescribes, directly for them, a rule of evidence not to be departed from. If the legislature should change that rule, and declare one witness, or a confession out of court, sufficient for conviction, must the constitutional principle yield to the legislative act? From these, and many other selections which might be made, it is apparent, that the framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument as *180 * a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature. Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it? This oath certainly applies in an especial manner, to their conduct in their official character. How immoral to impose it on them, if they were to be used as the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to. support! The oath of office, too, imposed by the legislature, is completely demonstrative of the legislative opinion on this subject. It is in these words: "I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich; and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties incumbent on me as according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the constitution and laws of the United States." Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties. agreeably to the constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no rule for his government? if it is closed upon him, and cannot be inspected by him? If such be the real state of things, this is worse. than solemn mockery. To prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes equally a crime. It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of .the constitution, have that rank. Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written. constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. The rule must be discharged. The United States v. Fisher etal. NOTE. THIS case arose on certain questions certified by the Circuit Court of Pennsylvania in regard to the right of the United States, in case of the insolvency or bankruptcy of a debtor, to enforce, without regard to his other creditors, priority of payment out of his effects. The main point which counsel made against the claim of the United States, the consideration of which occupies by far the major part of the opinion, was that the statute under which the United States claimed that right did not apply to the specific case at bar. The constitutional point, as to whether Congress could create such a priority, was, however, definitely and strongly raised by Mr. Ingersoll (of counsel for Fisher). It was rather summarily and brusquely disposed of by Marshall in his opinion, and his decision settled the law, yet, as an original question, it is hard to see why the point was not of real difficulty. There was no particular clause in the Constitution giving this priority to the United States,-as Mr. Ingersoll in the argument said: "How strange and improbable is it, that Congress should give the United States a preference so much exceeding the royal prerogative of England," and again: "Under what clause of the Constitution is such a power given to Congress? Is it under the general power to make all laws necessary or proper for carrying into execution the particular powers specified? If so, where is the necessity or the propriety of such a provision, and to the exercise of what other power is it necessary?" Such a power, Mr. Ingersoll argued, would produce a collision between the prerogative of the United States and the prerogative of the several states. "Suppose," he said, "the treasurer of a state should be come indebted to the United States, the latter would take his whole property in opposition to any law of the state which had passed, to secure herself against the default of her officers." To answer this Marshall in his opinion gives one brief sentence on the doctrine of implied powers. "Congress must possess the choice of means and must be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the Constitution." That sentence contains in a nutshell the whole doctrine of implied powers under the Constitution that was later put forth so strongly in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316; it would seem the point which was later so bitterly contested deserved a more extensive justification. The implied power of the United States to secure its finances by this priority is hardly more clear than its right to secure its finances by the agency of a national bank; each was historically a power of sovereignty, neither a natural attribute of a federated republic. The slightness of the opinion on the constitutional point may be easily explained. The point was little pressed in argument, the attorneys against the United States were federalists,- Harper was obliged to break off his argument to appear before the Senate to oppose the impeachment of Justice Chase which Jefferson and the Republicans sought,-again the priority of the United States in such cases was a natural and convenient power, and the question could never become a political one. But surely the opinion interprets the Constitution very broadly without a hint that the question presented any difficulty, -as Mr. Henry Adams says: Constructive power could hardly go further."' 66 1 History of the United States, vol. iv., p. 270. Mr. Adams was speaking of the failure of the opponents of the embargo to raise the question of its constitutionality. The United States V. Fisher et al., Assignees of Blight, a Bankrupt. [2 Cranch, 358.] Mr. Dallas (Attorney of the United States) for the Plaintiffs in Error. Mr. Harper, Mr. Ingersoll, Mr. Lewis, Mr. C. Lee, contra. ERROR FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA. Marshall, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case is, whether the United States, as holders of a protested bill of exchange, which has been negotiated in the ordinary course of trade, are entitled to be preferred to the general creditors, where the debtor becomes bankrupt. The claim to this preference is founded on the 5th section of the act, entitled "An act to provide more effectually for the settlement of accounts between the United States and receivers of public money." Vol. 3, p. 423. The section is in these words: And be it further enacted, that where any revenue officer, or other person, hereafter becoming indebted to the United States, by bond or otherwise, shall become |