President, "and the time and place for commencing proceedings under this constitution."

The conventions of nine states having adopted the constitution, Congress, in September or October, 1788, passed a resolution in conformity with the opinions expressed by the convention, and appointed the first Wednesday in March of the ensuing year as the day, and the then seat of Congress as the place, "for commencing proceedings under the constitution."

Both governments could not be understood to exist at the same time. The new government did not commence until the old government expired. It is apparent that the government did not commence on the constitution being ratified by the ninth state; for these ratifications were to be reported to Congress, whose continuing existence was recognized by the convention, and who were requested to continue to exercise their powers for the purpose of bringing the new government into operation. In fact, Congress did continue to act as a government until it dissolved on the first of November by the successive disappearance of its members. It existed potentially until the 2d of March, the day preceding that on which the members of the new Congress were directed to assemble.

The resolution of the convention might originally have suggested a doubt whether the *423 government could be in operation for every purpose before the choice of a President; but this doubt has been long solved, and were it otherwise, its discussion would be useless, since it is apparent

that its operation did not commence before the first Wednesday in March, 1789, before which time Virginia had passed the act which is alleged to violate the constitution.

In the trial of the cause, the defendant produced a witness to prove that the lot for which the suit was instituted, was a part of the 100 acres vested in trustees by the act of assembly. To this testimony the plaintiff objected, because the witness stated that he had sold a lot in Bardstown, with warranty, and was in possession of another. He added, that no suit had been brought for the said lot, and that he was not interested in this suit. The court admitted the witness, and to this opinion also a bill of exceptions was taken.

It is so apparent that the witness had no interest in the suit in which he was examined, and it is so well settled that only an interest in that suit could affect his competency, as to make it unnecessary to say more than that the court committed no error in permitting his testimony to go to the jury.

There was also an exception taken to the opinion of the court in allowing the book of the board of trustees, in which their proceedings were recorded, and other records belonging to the corporation, to be given in evidence.

The book was proved by the present clerk, who also proved the handwriting of the first clerk, and of the President, who were dead. The *424 trustees were established by the legislature for public purposes. The books of such a body are

the best evidence of their acts, and ought to be admitted whenever those acts are to be proved. There was no error in the opinion admitting them.

There is the less necessity in this case for entering more fully into this question, because the record contains other evidence of the facts, which the testimony, to which exceptions were taken, was adduced to prove.

Judgment affirmed with costs.

Farmers' and Mechanics'

Bank of Pennsylvania

1.

Smith.

NOTE.

An action of assumpindorser on a promis

THIS case arose on demurrer to a plea. sit was brought against the defendant as sory note. The defendant pleaded his discharge under a Pennsylvania bankruptcy statute passed subsequent to the endorsement and also averred that the cause of action arose on a contract made in Pennsylvania, and that the plaintiffs and defendant were, at all times, citizens of that State. To that plea the plaintiff demurred and judgment was given for the defendant by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, affirming the validity of the Pennsylvania law. From that judgment this appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Marshall's decision is right since the law was subsequent to the contract, but the Court chose to rest it on the doctrine of Sturges v. Crowninshield, which, as is explained in the note to that case, supra, is not now law.

of Pennsylvania

ย.

Smith.

[6 Wheaton, 131.]

1821.

This cause was argued by Mr. Hopkinson for the plaintiffs, and by Mr. Sergant for the defendant.

Mr. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the court, that this case was not distinguishable from its former decisions on the same subject,' except by the circumstances, that the defendant in the present case was a citizen of the same state with the plaintiffs, at the time the contract was made in that state, and remained such at the time the suit was commenced in its courts. But that these facts made The constitution of the

no difference in the cases.

United States was made for the whole people of the Union, and is equally binding upon all the courts and all the citizens.

Judgment reversed.

1 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. Rep., 122; M'Millan v. M'Neill, Id. 209.

399