their numbers. If, then, a direct tax be laid at all, it must be laid on every state, conformably to the rule Congress has clearly from its due share of provided in the constitution. no power to exempt any state the burden. But this regulation is expressly confined to the states, and creates no necessity for extending the tax to the district or territories. The words of the 9th section do not in terms require that the system of direct taxation, when resorted to, shall be extended to the territories, as the words of the 2d section require that it shall be extended to all the states. They, therefore, may, without violence, be understood to give a rule when the territories shall be taxed, without imposing the necessity of taxing them. It could scarcely escape the members of the convention that the expense of executing the law in a territory might exceed the amount of the tax. But be this as it may, the doubt created by the words of the 9th section relates to the obligation to apportion a direct tax on the territories as well as the states, rather than to the power to do so. If, then, the language of the constitution be construed to comprehend the territories and District of Columbia, as well as the states, that language confers on Congress the power of taxing the district *324 *and territories as well as the states. If the general language of the constitution should be confined to the states, still the 16th paragraph of the 8th section gives to Congress the power of exercising "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever within this district." On the extent of these terms, according to the common understanding of mankind, there can be no difference of opinion; but it is contended that they must be limited by that great principle which was asserted in our revolution-that representation is inseparable from taxation. The difference between requiring a continent, with an immense population, to submit to be taxed by a government having no common interest with it, separated from it by a vast ocean, restrained by no principle of apportionment, and associated with it by no common feelings; and permitting the representatives of the American people, under the restrictions of our constitution, to tax a part of the society, which is either in a state of infancy advancing to manhood, looking forward to complete equality so soon as that state of manhood shall be attained, as is the case with the territories; or which has voluntarily relinquished the right of representation, and has adopted the whole body of Congress for its legitimate government, as is the case with the district, is too obvious not to present itself to the minds of all. Although in theory it might be more congenial to the spirit of our institutions to admit a representative from the district, it may be doubted whether, in fact, its interests would be rendered thereby the *325 more secure; and certainly the constitution does not consider their want of a representative in Congress as exempting it from equal taxation. If it were true that, according to the spirit of our constitution, the power of taxation must be limited by the right of representation, whence is derived the right to lay and collect duties, imposts and excises, within this district? If the principles of liberty, and of our constitution, forbid the raising of revenue from those who are not represented, do not these principles forbid the raising it by duties, imposts, and excises, as well as by a direct tax? If the principles of our revolution give a rule applicable to this case, we cannot have forgotten that neither the stamp act nor the duty on tea were direct taxes. Yet it is admitted that the constitution not only allows, but enjoins the government to extend the ordinary revenue system to this district. If it be said that the principle of uniformity, established in the constitution, secures the district from oppression in the imposition of indirect taxes, it is not less true that the principle of apportionment, also established in the constitution, secures the district from any oppressive exercise of the power to lay and collect direct taxes. After giving this subject its serious attention, the court is unanimously of opinion that Congress possesses, under the constitution, the power to lay and collect direct taxes within the District of Columbia, in proportion to the census directed to be taken by the constitution, and that there is no error in the judgment of the Circuit Court. Judgment affirmed. Owings 7. Speed et al. NOTE. THE case and the principle that it lays down seem too clear for argument or comment. Owings V. Speed et al. [5 Wheaton, 420.] The cause was argued by Mr. B. Hardin for the defendants, no counsel appearing for the plaintiff. Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the court: This was an ejectment brought by the plaintiff in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kentucky, to recover a lot of ground lying in Bardstown. *This town *421 was laid off in 1780, on a tract of land consisting of 1,000 acres, for which, in 1785, a patent was issued by the commonwealth of Virginia to Bard and Owings. In 1788 the legislature of Virginia passed an act vesting 100 acres-part of this tract in trustees, to be laid off in lots, some of them to be given to settlers, and others to be sold for the benefit of the proprietors. The cause depends, mainly, on the validity of this act. It is contended to be a violation of that part of the constitution of the United States which forbids a state to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. Much reason is furnished by the record for presuming the consent of the proprietors to this law; but the Circuit Court has decided the question independently of this consent, and that decision is now to be reviewed. Before we determine on the construction of the constitution in relation to a question of this description, it is necessary to inquire whether the provisions of that instrument apply to any acts of the state legislatures which were of the date with that which it is now proposed to consider. This act was passed in the session of 1788. Did the constitution of the United States then operate upon it? In September, 1787, after completing the great work in which they had been engaged, the convention resolved that the constitution should be laid before the Congress of the United States, to be submitted by that body to conventions of the several states, to be convened by their respective legislatures, *422 * and expressed the opinion, that as soon as it should be ratified by the conventions of nine states, Congress should fix a day on which electors should be appointed by the states, a day on which the electors should assemble to vote for President and Vice |