institutions, the body corporate, as possessing the whole legal and equitable interest, and completely representing the donors, for the purpose of executing the trust, has rights which are protected by the constitution.

It results from this opinion, that the acts of the legislature of New Hampshire, which are stated in the special verdict found in this cause, are repugnant to the constitution of the United States; and that the judgment on this special verdict ought to have been for the plaintiffs. The judgment of the State Court must therefore be reversed.

Loughborough v. Blake.

NOTE.

THE main, and substantially the only, interest of the case is in the dictum thrown out by Marshall in the course of his opinion that in the Constitution the words "United States" designate the whole not any particular portion of the American empire. The exact point before him did not call for any such statement, and in the recent cases arising before the Supreme Court as to the application of the constitutional restrictions to the government of the territorial possessions gained by the Spanish war, that old dictum of Loughborough v. Blake required a great deal of explaining away on the part of the Court, and in the opinion of the Court in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244, at p. 262, Mr. Justice Brown said of these observations of Marshall, "So far as they apply to the territories they are not called for by the exigencies of the case." All through these Insular Cases Loughborough v. Blake was constantly and confidently cited but in truth the case contains no argument or reasoning on the topics of the Insular Cases, and written as it was with no conception of the circumstances and difficulties that later arose, has very little to do with them.

Loughborough

V.

Blake.

[5 Wheaton, 317.]

1820.

The case was argued by Mr. Jones for the plaintiff, Mr. Wirt, the Attorney-General, for the defendant.

Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the court: This case presents to the consideration of the court a single question. It is this: *318 * Has Congress a right to impose a direct tax on the District of Columbia?

The counsel who maintains the negative has contended, that Congress must be considered in two distinct characters. In one character as legislating for the states; in the other, as a local legislature for the district. In the latter character, it is admitted, the power of levying direct taxes may be exercised; but, it is contended, for district purposes only, in like manner as the legislature of a state may tax the people of a state for state purposes.

Without inquiring at present into the soundness of

this distinction, its possible influence on the application in this district of the first article of the constitution, and of several of the amendments, may not be altogether unworthy of consideration. It will readily suggest itself to the gentlemen who press this argument, that those articles which, in general terms, restrain the power of Congress, may be applied to the laws enacted by that body for the district, if it be considered as governing the district in its character as the national legislature, with less difficulty than if it be considered a mere local legislature.

But we deem it unnecessary to pursue this investigation, because we think the right of Congress to tax the district does not depend solely on the grant of exclusive legislation.

The 8th section of the 1st article gives to Congress the "power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises," for the purposes thereinafter mentioned. This grant is general, without limitation as to place. It consequently extends to all * places over *319 which the government extends. If this could be doubted, the doubt is removed by the subsequent words which modify the grant. These words are, "but all duties, imposts, and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States." It will not be contended that the modification of the power extends to places to which the power itself does not extend. The power, then, to lay and collect duties, imposts, and excises, may be exercised, and must be exercised throughout the United States. Does this term designate the whole, or any particular portion

of the American empire? Certainly this question can admit of but one answer. It is the name given to our great republic, which is composed of states and territories. The District of Columbia, or the territory west of the Missouri, is not less within the United States than Maryland or Pennsylvania; and it is not less necessary, on the principles of our constitution, that uniformity in the imposition of imposts, duties, and excises, should be observed in the one than in the other. Since, then, the power to lay and collect taxes, which includes direct taxes, is obviously co-extensive with the power to lay and collect duties, imposts, and excises, and since the latter extends throughout the United States, it follows that the power to impose direct taxes also extends throughout the United States.

The extent of the grant being ascertained, how far is it abridged by any part of the constitution?

The 20th section of the first article declares, that "representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned

among the several states which may be in*320 cluded within this Union, according to their respective numbers."

The object of this regulation is, we think, to furnish a standard by which taxes are to be apportioned, not to exempt from their operation any part of our country. Had the intention been to exempt from taxation those who were not represented in Congress, that intention would have been expressed in direct terms. The power having been expressly granted, the exception would have been expressly