the year 1801, when, having become desirous of migrating from the state of New Jersey, and *166 of joining their brethren at Stockbridge, in the state of New York, they applied for, and obtained an act of the legislature of New Jersey, authorizing a sale of their land in that state. This act contains no expression in any manner respecting the privilege of exemption from taxation which was annexed to those lands by the act under which they were purchased and settled on the Indians. In 1803, the commissioners under the last recited act sold and conveyed the lands to the plaintiffs, George Painter and others. In October, 1804, the legislature passed an act repealing that section of the act of August, 1758, which exempts the lands therein mentioned from taxes. The lands were then assessed, and the taxes demanded. The plaintiffs, thinking themselves injured by this assessment, brought the case before the courts in the manner prescribed by the laws of New Jersey, and in the highest court of the state the validity of the repealing act was affirmed and the land declared liable to taxation. The cause is brought into this court by writ of error, and the question here to be decided is, does the act of 1804 violate the constitution of the United States? The constitution of the United States declares that no state shall "pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts." In the case of Fletcher v. Peck, it was decided in this court on solemn argument and much delibera tion, and this provision of the constitution extends to contracts to which a state is a party, as well as to contracts between individuals. The question, then, is narrowed to the inquiry whether in the case stated, a contract existed, and whether that contract is violated by the act of 1804. Every requisite to the formation of a contract is found in the proceedings between the then colony of New Jersey and the Indians. The subject was a purchase on the part of the government of extensive claims of the Indians, the extinguishment of which would quiet the title to a large portion of the province. A proposition to this effect is made, the terms stipulated, the consideration agreed upon, *167 * which is a tract of land with the privilege of exemption from taxation; and then, in consideration of the arrangement previously made, one of which this act of assembly is stated to be, the Indians execute their deed of cession. This is certainly a contract clothed in forms of unusual solemnity. The privilege, though for the benefit of the Indians, is annexed, by the terms which create it, to the land itself, not to their persons. It is for their advantage that it should be annexed to the land, because, in the event of a sale on which alone the question could become material, the value would be enhanced by it. It is not doubted but that the state of New Jersey might have insisted on a surrender of this privilege as the sole condition on which a sale of the property should be allowed. But this condition has not been insisted on. The land has been sold, with the assent of the state, with all its privileges and immunities. The purchaser succeeds, with the assent of the state, to all the rights of the Indians. He stands, with respect to this land, in their place, and claims the benefit of their contract. This contract is certainly impaired by a law which would annul this essential part of it. New Orleans v. Winter. NOTE. THE case arose on error from the District Court for the District of Louisiana. The suit was brought by a citizen of Kentucky and by one Winter, who stated himself to be a citizen of the territory of Mississippi, to recover possession of certain lands in New Orleans. Judgment was given for the plaintiffs, and on appeal from that judgment the question arose whether a citizen of a territory had a right to maintain a suit in the federal court. The decision was inevitable after the case of Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445, supra. The Corporation of New Orleans V. Winter et al [1 Wheaton, 91.] 1816. Winder and Harper for Plaintiffs in Error. Marshall, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court, and, after stating the facts, proceeded as follows: The proceedings of the court, therefore, is arrested in limine, by a question respecting its jurisdiction. In the case of Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, this court determined, on mature consideration, that a citizen of the District of Columbia could not maintain a suit in the Circuit Court of the United States. That opinion is still retained. It has been attempted to distinguish a territory from the District of Columbia; but the court is of opinion that this distinction cannot be maintained. They may differ in many respects, but neither of them is a state, in the sense in which that term is used in the constitution. Every reason assigned for |